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ARE WTO VIOLATIONS ALSO CONTRARY TO
THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
OBLIGATIONS IN INVESTOR PROTECTION
AGREEMENTS?
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.*
Bilateral investment treaties typically require the host state to ensure "fair
and equitable" treatment to the investors of the other state. While decisions
concerning fair and equitable treatment are often fact specific, three pending
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations raise a novel legal variant of the following
issue: Is the breach of a WTO obligation that results in harm to a foreign
investor a denial of fair and equitable treatment?'
In Methanex v. United States, the investor argues that certain WTO
agreements require that "governmental measures cannot restrict trade any more
than necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective."2 Methanex goes on to
argue that this "least restrictive" principle as embodied in the WTO Agreements
is widely followed among civilized nations, and thus constitutes a part of
'customary' 'international law' 3 Finally, Methanex argues that the failure of
California to apply the "least restrictive" principle in banning a gasoline addi-
tive was a denial of fair and equitable treatment in violation of NAFTA Article
1105. 4
A slightly different argument is advanced in Canfor Corporation v. United
States, where the claimant contends that U.S. officials acted arbitrarily in failing
to follow WTO rulings concerning the calculation of dumping and counter-
vailing duties and that such action was a denial of fair and equitable treatment.5
In Kenex v. United States, the investor claims that the respondent failed to
* Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, 1776 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006, (202) 719-7323,
cverrill@wrf.com. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law
Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. For an informed analysis of this issue, see Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor State
Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relieffor Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L.,
493,493-506 (2003).
2. Claimant Rejoinder 156, Methanex v. United States (2004). NAFTA Investor-State Arbitration
pleadings and decisions are available on the U.S. State Department, Office of the Legal Adviser website, at
http://www.state.gov./s/l/c3439.htm .
3. Claimant Rejoinder 57, Methanex.
4. Claimant Rejoinder 57, Methanex.
5. Statement of Claim 114, 122, 146-47, Canfor Corp. v. United States (2004),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/! 3203.pdf.
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follow the WTO rule of proportionality and consequently denied the investor
fair and equitable treatment.6
Since Methanex, Canfor, and Kenex are arbitrations pursuant to NAFTA
Chapter 11, the tribunals will have to take into account the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission ("FTC") "interpretation" that Article 1105 "prescribes the custo-
mary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investorments of investors of another
Party."7 The interpretation also states that a "determination that there has been
a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1)."
Subsequently the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal in Mondev v. United States
observed that this interpretation "makes it clear that Article 1105(1) refers to a
standard existing under customary international law, and not to standards
established by other treaties of the three NAFTA parties.",
8
It is not necessary to wade into the debate whether the FTC Action was a
permissible "interpretation" of NAFTA or an unauthorized amendment, to con-
clude that it is likely that the Methanex, Canfor and Kenex tribunals will follow
the FTC rule.9 Even so, unless the tribunals somehow manage to dodge the
issue, the decisions in Methanex, Canfor and Kenex could reach beyond the
conclusions in the Mondev award and conclude that WTO obligations, or at
least those that are "norm-creating," have achieved the status of "customary
international law" and, therefore, indicate what protections derived from WTO
rules the "fair and equitable" treatment standard in Article 1105(1), as inter-
preted by the FTC, requires governments to afford investors protected by BITs.
It must be observed that giving investors the right or opportunity to
challenge WTO violations would be a radical departure from the normal rules
of WTO dispute resolution. Under those rules, only states can assert WTO
"rights." Individuals have no standing to request dispute resolution no matter
6. Notice of Arbitration E, § 5(iv), (v), Kenex, Ltd. v. United States (2002),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/13204.pdf.
7. Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter 1 I Provisions (NAFTA Free
Trade Comm'n, July 31, 2001), www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf.
8. Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 121 (2002),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
9. Tribunals have generally followed the FTC guidance. Thus, in UPS v. Canada, the tribunal
accepted "that the obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment is not in addition to or beyond the
minimum standard." Award on Jurisdiction, United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada (2002), www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/jurisdication%20Award.22NOV02.pdf. Similarly, in Loewen v. United States,
the tribunal held that the "effect of the Commission's interpretation is that 'fair and equitable treatment' and
'full protection and security' are not free-standing obligations." Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 128, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/
22094.pdf. "They constitute obligations only to the extent that they are recognized by customary international
law." Id.
Verrill
how harmful the WTO violation is to their personal interests. Methanex,
Canfor, and Kenex, therefore, could open to investors' rights to compensation
that is not available to traders.
Since this is a novel and likely to be controversial issue, I propose to
venture into this subject by presenting for discussion the following hypothetical
involving the imaginary Republic of Tremex. In anticipation of the ending of
textile quotas as required by WTO obligations, a Tremex company invests a
substantial amount in distribution facilities in the United States. However,
before the WTO compliance deadline, the United States responds to pressure
from domestic interests and announces that the quotas will stay in place inde-
finitely. The Tremex government can challenge this action at the WTO and
would probably win in Dispute Resolution Body proceedings that could take
three or more years.
However, even if the Tremex government does win and achieves eventual
withdrawal of the quotas, there is no compensation under the WTO agreements
for the losses incurred by the Tremex investor during the period when the
quotas were in effect. The WTO system focuses on trade damage to the
economy of members and the balance of concessions negotiated, not on injury
to individuals or corporations. There is no provision for damages to private
parties even though they are the purported beneficiaries of WTO obligations.'0
Suppose though that there is a BIT between the United States and Tremex
with investor protection provisions identical to NAFTA Chapter 11. In these
circumstances, would the investor have a basis to request arbitration before
ICSID or under UNCITRAL rules (or whatever venue is available) claiming that
the failure to eliminate the quota was a denial of fair and equitable treatment as
required by customary international law even under the restrictive NAFTA
standard?"
In support of such a claim, the petitioner would point out that the WTO
Agreement clearly states that the multilateral trade agreements "are integral
parts of this Agreement, binding on all members."' 2 Further, the petitioner
would cite Article XVI.4, which provides that "[E]ach member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." These obligations are
mandatory even though it could be argued that WTO commitments are not
"binding" because a WTO member can ignore an obligation even if the
10. For example, GATT Article XI confers "trading rights" in the sense that exporters from a WTO
country have the "right" to market access in other member countries except as constrained by WTO consistent
measures. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,224. However, exporters
that are denied market access have no right to enforce these rights at the WTO. Id. 224-25.
11. That is, fair and equitable treatment as interpreted by the FTC.
12. WTO Agreement art. H., para. 2 (emphasis added).
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consequence is retaliation following dispute resolution proceedings. 3 This
argument, however, is NOT consistent with the clear directive of the WTO
Agreement, as it must be construed under the Vienna Convention. Nor is it con-
sistent with the conclusion of Professor John Jackson that there is an inter-
national law obligation to implement WTO dispute resolution determinations. 4
The petitioner could thus argue that the principle that emerges from the
WTO Agreements is this: WTO members not only have an obligation to follow
the substantive WTO obligations, but also to implement those rules and
regulations in domestic legislation. While the substantive rules and regulations
would not themselves necessarily be deemed customary international law, the
obligation to implement them would be. This is essentially the claim advanced
in Canfor v. United States, where the complainant argues that the failure to
follow WTO Dispute Resolution Body decisions in the administration of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws by the Department of Commerce was
a denial of fair and equitable treatment. Under the FTC interpretation, this argu-
ment would only be valid if the obligation to implement WTO rules, as inter-
preted by dispute resolution panels, is derived from customary international law.
It is not, of course, sufficient to simply claim that a principle is customary
international law. There are well-established but not always clear or easily
applied criteria for the identification of customary international law that have
evolved and need to be evaluated. What follows is a preliminary and hopefully
not too superficial effort to analyze whether WTO obligations can be deemed
principles of customary international law, which, if violated, would constitute
a denial of fair and equitable treatment under the restrictive NAFTA definition.
In Methanex, the claimant argued that many "international tribunals and
scholars have recognized that treaty provisions, if widely adopted, can become
a source of customary international law." It continued that since the "least-
restrictive measure principle" has been adopted by more than 100 countries in
the WTO agreement, "it has become a part of customary international law."' 5
Thus, the claimant in Methanex contends that multilateral treaties or trade agree-
ments can create new customary international law (as contrasted to codification
of existing customary international law).'6
13. In defending the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements, the United States Trade Representative
claimed there would be no loss of sovereignty if the Agreements were implemented precisely on this ground.
See USTR Statement on the URAA.
14. John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to
Obey or Option to Buy Out?, 98 AM. J. INT'L LAw 109 (2004).
15. Claimant Rejoinder 157, Methanex v. United States (2004) (Arguing that the "least restrictive"
principle is found in several of the multilateral WTO Agreements, including GATT 1994, Article XX.).
16. This is a key distinction since there are authorities that argue that only treaties that codify
existing customary international law are evidence thereof. See e.g., Richard Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 B.Y.1.L 275 (1965-66).
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The Methanex Rejoinder accurately argues that multilateral treaty
obligations can "create" customary international law under current theory. 7
Section 102(3) of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States provides that: "(3) International Agreements create law for the states
party thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when
such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted." The Comments to Section 102 elaborate on his articulation
of the contemporary role of treaties in the creation of customary international
law as follows:
International agreements constitute practice of states and as such can
contribute to the growth of customary law. Some multilateral agree-
ments may come to be law for non-parties that do not actively dissent.
That may be the effect where a multilateral agreement is designed for
adherence by states generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected
by a significant number of important states. A wide network of
similar bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice
and also result in customary law. 8
The WTO Agreements fit precisely into this framework:
1) They are designed for adherence generally;
2) Are widely accepted; and
3) Have not rejected by a significant number of important states.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has also held that treaty obliga-
tions can become customary international law. In Methanex, both the claimant
and the United States rely on the ICJ decision in North Sea Continental Shelf,
ICJ (1969). According to the Court, a treaty can create customary international
law when it concerns a
norm-creating provision which has constituted the foundation, or has
generated a rule which, while only commercial or contractual in its
origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law
and is now accepted as such by the opiniojuris, so as to have become
binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become
parties to the convention. 19
17. Id. Baxter disagrees, but his views now seem to be in the minority.
18. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(i) (1987).
19. Claimant Rejoinder 1 71, Methanex.
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The ICJ went on to observe that this process is "one of the recognized
methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed,"
and which from "time to time occur.
20
While not a model of clarity, the North Sea Continental Shelf decision
seem to require the following before a treaty can be said to create new
customary law:
i) There must be a norm-creating provision that has passed into
the general corpus of international law;
ii) The provision must be accepted by the opinio juris; and
iii) As such, is deemed binding on states that are not parties to the
convention/treaty.
In Methanex, the claimant cited North Sea Continental Shelf and other
authorities as support for its claim that WTO principles are customary inter-
national law; that the least restrictive principle was long accepted by GATT; and
that it was explicitly adopted by more than 100 states.2 The Legal Adviser
disagreed, and argued that the "least restrictive principle," as well as the treaty
provisions relied on by the claimant "are not the type of norm-creating
provisions" the ICJ had in mind in North Sea Continental Shelf.2 The Legal
Adviser goes on to argue that there are no international tribunal decisions or
other authorities that find the principle to be part of customary international law.
In addition, it was argued that trade agreements are not suitable to be considered
customary international law because they involve a balance of concessions and
assumption of obligations as opposed to norm-creating provisions.
The Legal Adviser's arguments never explain why the WTO agreements
are not "fundamentally norm-creating provisions., 23 Its arguments suggest there
is a standard test for identifying norm-creating provisions that the WTO
agreements do not meet. But, this test is not articulated, which is not surprising
since there is a paucity of authority on this point. Indeed, a report by the Inter-
national Law Association concludes that this "phrase does not seem to have any
antecedents in international law, and the Court was somewhat Delphic about
what it had in mind. '24 The report continued that "it can be inferred that what
it [the ICJ] meant was that the rule [at issue] did not have the degree of
20. Id.
21. Claimant Rejoinder 157, Methanex.
22. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
594-98, (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2001).
23. Id.
24. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOC., COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
FINAL REPORT: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2000).
generality and compulsoriness that it thought necessary."25 That, is, there were
so many reservations to the treaty being considered that it could not be of a
"fundamentally norm creating character." 26 Brownlie seems to agree with the
ILA interpretation, but states that "with respect, it may be doubted if the exis-
tence of reservations of itself destroys the probative value of treaty provi-
sions. 27
Approached from this vantage, one could argue that the requirement of the
WTO Agreement that "each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws with
its WTO obligations '' 28 is a "norm-creating" provision. While this obligation
was "commercial or contractual" in origin, it is now arguably in the "general
corpus" of international law. To begin with, the WTO Agreement and the
obligation to implement its provisions are not generally subject to reservation.
True, there are special rules for developing countries and accession agreements
often delay full implementation by new members. However, these exceptions
are hardly of the same magnitude or character as the reservations referred to in
the ICJ North Sea Continental Shelfopinion. Moreover, the WTO Agreements
are "intended for adherence by states generally" as required by the Restatement,
which enhances their "norm-creating" status.29
The opiniojuris argument is more problematic. Relying on this point, the
Legal Adviser's Rejoinder in Methanex contends that there was no evidence that
any state not a member of the WTO had adopted the least restrictive principle.
The Legal Adviser further argues that the only relevant state practice is that of
non-participants "for only the practice of such States can clearly evidence a
belief that the principle at issue is binding as a rule of customary, rather than
conventional, international law."3 This analysis of the practice of non-party
states is necessary, according to the Legal Adviser, to demonstrate "a general
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved."'"
The Legal Adviser's argument arguably overstates the role of the practice
of states not a party to the treaty/convention. For example, the Restatement
provides that wide acceptance of a treaty obligation is important, as is the fact
that the treaty/convention "is not rejected by a significant number of important
25. Id.
26. See MA Report at 52.
27. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 13 (4th ed. 1990).
28. WTO Agreement art. XVI, para. 10.
29. Another commentator has argued that the North Sea Continental Shelf test for the creation of
new customary law is based on intent. "If the treaty manifests an intent to have a particular provision create
customary law, that manifested intent is controlling." Anthony D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation
by Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law, 64 AM. J. INT'L LAW 892, 896 (1970).
30. Claimant Rejoinder, Methanex cites North Sea Continental Shelf (Judgment), 1969 I.C.J. 3,43,
74 (Feb. 20).
31. Id.
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states. 32 In the case of the WTO, there are 148 member states, which is
evidence that the WTO Agreement is "widely-accepted," as required by the
Restatement. This wide acceptance is further evidenced by the fact that 25
additional states (including Saudi Arabia and Russia)33 are in the accession pro-
cess. These non-member states therefore would also appear to accept the bind-
ing effect of WTO obligations. Indeed, no major state has rejected the WTO
agreements and only a few (including North Korea) have not applied for
accession or observer status. (Iraq and Libya are among the few states that are
observers but not accession applicants.)
This almost universal acceptance of the WTO obligations would appear to
satisfy the North Sea Continental Shelf requirement of "a very widespread and
representative participation in the convention.., provided it includes States
whose interests were specifically affected."34 Indeed, with the accession of
China and the approaching access of Russia, it would appear reasonable to argue
that the WTO membership is "functionally universal."
Finally, the WTO Agreement has now been in effect for ten years. During
this period, accessions have occurred almost monthly as the pool of member
states has rapidly been enlarged. No country has withdrawn its accession.
While the Legal Adviser argued in Methanex that the (then) six years since the
WTO Agreement was adopted was not a "considerable"35 period of time, it is
now plausible to argue that the WTO has passed the test of time. Indeed, in
North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ stated that "even without the passage of
any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative partici-
pation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of
States whose interests were specifically affected."36 Moreover, Brownlie states
that: "Provided the consistency and generality of a practice are proved, no
particular duration is required: the passage of time will of course be a part of
the evidence of generality and consistency.
37
Even if certain customary law principles can be said to have evolved from
the WTO Agreements, a question remains about their applicability to NAFTA
Article 1105 claims. Shortly after the FTC interpretation was adopted, Canada
took the position in Mondev that the meaning of fair and equitable treatment
was to be derived from the decision "of the Mexican Claims Commission in the
32. Claimant Rejoinder 102, Methanex.
33. Russia has undertaken ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to obtain EU support for the Russian
accession application. Guy Chazan, Russia to Move Closer to Joining Kyoto Accord, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
2004, at A6.
34. See North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 I.C.J. at 43, 73.
35. Id. 173.
36. Id. 73-74.
37. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 5.
Neer case., 38 The tribunal rejected this contention, noting that the "United
States itself accepted that Article 1105(1) is intended to provide a real measure
of protection of investments, and that having regard to its general language and
to the evolutionary character of international law, it has evolutionary
potential. 39 Summing up, the tribunal concluded that the term customary
international law in the FTC interpretation "refers to customary international
law as it stood no earlier than the time at which NAFTA came into force." 40
The Mondev analysis leaves open the question whether customary inter-
national law that has been created after 1994 can be referred to in addressing
claims that NAFTA country actions amount to a denial of fair and equitable
treatment. NAFTA and the WTO came into effect the same year (1994).
Hence, the practice of the large number of states that have joined the WTO since
1994 could be cited as evidence that they did not deem themselves bound by
WTO "norm-creating" provisions as of 1994. In addition, the U.S. could argue
that even if it accepted the "evolutionary" character of customary international
law prior to 1994, subsequent evolution of that law would not be binding or
relevant to Article 1105(1) claims.
While the U.S. (and the other NAFTA governments) may claim it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the NAFTA parties entered into commitments
in 1994 that could be modified by the evolution of the meaning of fair and
equitable treatment, it seems unlikely that tribunals would not be sympathetic
to this argument. Both the Restatement and the North Sea Continental Shelf
decision recognize that customary international law is evolutionary and the
NAFTA governments can hardly claim they were unaware of this when the FTC
interpretation expressly referencing customary international law was adopted.
38. Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 114 (2002).
39. Id. 119.
40. Id. 125.
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THE LUGANO CASE IN THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE: EVOLVING EUROPEAN
UNION COMPETENCE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ronald A. Brand
On October 19, 2004, the European Court of Justice held its first en banc
hearing since the 2004 enlargement to twenty-five Member States. The case
was Opinion 1/03, involving a request by the Council of the European Union on
whether the Community has exclusive or shared competence to conclude the
Lugano Convention. While the case on its face deals only with a single conven-
tion, it has far broader implications and is likely to influence the development
of private international law and private law on a Community level for years to
come. In this brief article, I hope to trace the origins of the issues faced in the
Lugano case and comment on some of its implications for the future.
The original Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community
recognized that in order to have effective free movement of goods, services,
capital, and persons, it was also necessary to have free movement ofjudgments
and arbitral awards. After all, the ultimate test of the existence of a right is the
ability to reduce that right, as against others, to a form that is both recognized
and enforced by the legal system. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which
addresses this issue in its Full Faith and Credit Clause,' the original Rome
Treaty provided in its Article 220 that the Member States of the Community
should "enter into [further] negotiations with each other with a view to securing
for the benefit of their nationals... [including among others] the simplification
of formalities governing the reciprocal, recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards. ' 2
The six original Member States carried out this dictate by negotiating the
Brussels Convention,' a treaty that was both narrower and broader than the
objectives of Article 220. Due to the existence of the New York Convention
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of
Pittsburgh. This article is a revised version of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004,
held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 293 (ex Art. 220)
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 art. 293 [hereinafter TEC].
3. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(consolidated version), Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
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covering arbitration,4 the Brussels Convention was limited to court judgments
and did not have to cover arbitration. It also was limited to "civil and com-
mercial" matters, thus avoiding a broader scope that would have been consistent
with Article 220. On the other hand, as to judgments, the Convention is not
limited to recognition and enforcement. The original Member States realized
the importance of jurisdiction to questions of judgment recognition. They
negotiated a "double convention" that included rules of direct jurisdiction for
the originating court, as well as rules of recognition and enforcement for the
court addressed in the second instance, for purposes of gaining the effect of the
judgment.' The Brussels Convention thus did much more than provide the equi-
valent of a Full Faith and Credit clause for Europe; it harmonized jurisdictional
rules and provided specific protection for defendants domiciled in other
Member States from otherwise "exorbitant" jurisdictional bases. In this
respect, it added the equivalent of the U.S. Due Process Clause as it has been
applied to jurisdictional issues!
As each new Member State joined the European Community, it acceded
to the Brussels Convention as a part of its package of obligations.8 As the Com-
munity was broadened, it was also deepened, and in the area of private inter-
national law the Treaty of Amsterdam added language to the European
Community Treaty that moved competence from the Member States to the
Community Institutions. As part of the establishment of "an area of freedom,
security and justice," Article 61 of the Treaty now provides that "the Council
shall adopt... measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters as
provided for in Article 65." 9 Article 65 in turn, describes the scope of such
authority as follows:
4. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, entered into force
June 7, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The text of the Convention, and
information on its status, are available on the UNCITRAL website at http://www.uncitral.org/en-main.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
5. Single (sometimes referred to as "simple") conventions on the recognition ofjudgments deal
only with indirect jurisdiction and apply only to the decision of the court asked to enforce a foreign judgment.
The recognizing court considers the jurisdiction of the court issuing a judgment in deciding whether to
recognize the judgment of the originating court. Double conventions, like the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions, not only deal with recognition, but also provide direct jurisdiction rules applicable in the court
in which the case is first brought - thus addressing the matter from the outset and preempting the need for
substantial indirect consideration of the issuing court's jurisdiction by the court asked to recognize the
resulting judgment.
6. See Brussels Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
7. For a discussion of the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses
to issues of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts, see Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction anda Hague
Judgments Convention, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 661 (1999).
8. See Brussels Convention, supra note 4.
9. TEC, supra note 3, art. 61.
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Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having
cross-border implications, to be taken in accordance with Article 67
and insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal
market, shall include:
a) Improving and simplifying: the system for cross-border service
of judicial and extrajudicial documents; cooperation in the
taking of evidence; the recognition and enforcement of deci-
sions in civil and commercial cases, including decisions in
extrajudicial cases;
b) Promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the
Member States concerning the conflict of laws and of juris-
diction;
c) Eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceed-
ings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on
civil procedure applicable in the Member States.'"
The Community institutions have not hesitated to exercise this authority.
The Council has adopted regulations dealing with:
a) Insolvency proceedings;"I
b) Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments
in family law matters; 2
c) Service of process; 3
d) Taking of evidence; 4 and
e) Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments
in civil and commercial matters. 5
Proposals for further instruments continue to be considered. 6 Each of
these instruments adds to the set of rules now applicable to internal Community
10. TEC, supra note 3, art. 65.
11. Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J.
(L 160) 1.
12. Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children
of Both Spouses, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 19 [hereinafter Brussels HI].
13. Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the Service in the Member States
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 37.
14. Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on Cooperation Between the Courts
of the Member States in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1.
15. Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 [hereinafter Brussels
I] (The Brussels Convention remains in force for relations between Denmark and the other Member States).
16. For further information on the agenda under Article 65, see
http://europa.eu.int/conn/justicehome/fsj/civil/fsj_civil intro._en.htm (visited Oct. 8, 2004).
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legal matters. They combine with several treaties to provide the current private
international law framework within the European Union. Those treaties include
the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 7 and the
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters. 8
While these instruments clearly have brought about change regarding the
source of law applicable to private law and private international law issues in
the courts of the Member States of the European Union, they are on their face
limited for the most part to litigation that is internal to the Union. While the
rules of the Brussels Regulation would apply to a case brought by a U.S.
national against a French domiciliary in a French court, they would not apply
in courts outside the European Union. Those rules reflect exercise of compe-
tence for matters relating, as required by Article 65, to "the proper functioning
of the internal market."' 9 This leaves open the question of authority for the
adoption of such rules for purposes of external relations.
The question of external competence in the area ofjudicial cooperation has
surfaced in several ways. One is at the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, where since 1992 the Hague Member States have considered the
possibility of a multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercial matters.20 The Hague nego-
tiations have evolved from full participation by European Union Member States
to full coordination of a Community position represented in the Hague Special
Commissions by the European Commission and Council on behalf of the
Community. This has not occurred, however, without some tension in regard
to the appropriateness of this representation. There has been no clear statement
as to whether the competence for such matters now rests with the European
Union Member States; with the Community institutions; or in a mixed form
with Member States and Community institutions each having competence for
some, but not all issues.
17. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, openedfor signature June
19, 1980, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 [hereinafter Rome ]. On July 22, 2003, the European Commission submitted
its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contratual Obligations, COM(03)0427 final [hereinafter Rome II]. This would effectively
extend the rules of Rome I to non-contractual obligations, thus giving the package of applicable law rules
coverage more consistent with the scope of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Regulation. Id.
18. European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter
Lugano Convention].
19. TEC, supra note 3, art. 65.
20. Information on the Hague Conference project may be found at Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Works in Progress, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index.en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=4 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005).
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Another setting in which the issue of Community competence for external
relations in matters of judicial cooperation has surfaced, is found in the effort
to adopt amendments to the Lugano Convention that are consistent with the
changes made when the Brussels Convention was replaced with the Brussels I
Regulation. In this setting, however, there has been a further step in the process
with the Council having asked the European Court of Justice for an opinion
under Article 300(6) of the European Community Treaty,2 on whether the
Community "has exclusive or shared competence to conclude the new Lugano
Convention."
Citing the 1971 ERTA decision of the European Court of Justice,22 the
Council's Legal Service rendered an opinion on February 5, 1999, that:
once the Community has exercised its internal competences adopting
positions by which common rules are fixed [pursuant to Article 65],
the Community competence becomes exclusive, in the sense that the
Member States lose the right to contract, individually and even
collectively, obligations with third countries which affect the said
rules.23
The ERTA doctrine was further developed by the Court in its Open Skies
judgment of 2002,24 when it stated:
21. TEC, supra note 3, art. 300(6)
The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible
with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is
adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the
Treaty on European Union.
22. Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263 (1971) [hereinafterERTA].
23. Alegria Borris, The Effect of the Adoption of Brussels I and Rome I on the External
Competences of the EC and the Member States 2 (copy on file with the author). The Legal Service was
paraphrasing the ERTA judgment at 1 17 and 18, which stated:
17 In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common
policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, what-
ever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right acting indivi-
dually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect
those rules.
18 As and when such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in
a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations towards third countries
affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community legal system.
24. Case C-467-98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9519; Case C-468/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9575; Case C-469/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Finland, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9627; Case C-471/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingodm of Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9681; Case 472/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
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81 It must next be determined under what circumstances the scope
of the common rules may be affected or distorted by the international
commitments at issue and, therefore, under what circumstances the
Community acquires an external competence by reason of the
exercise of its internal competence.
82 According to the Court's case-law, that is the case where the
international commitments fall within the scope of the common rules
(AETRjudgment, paragraph 30), or in any event within an area which
is already largely covered by such rules (Opinion 2/91, paragraph 25).
In the latter case, the Court has held that Member States may not
enter into international commitments outside the framework of the
Community institutions, even if there is no contradiction between
those commitments and the common rules (Opinion 2/91, paragraphs
25 and 26).
83 Thus it is that, whenever the Community has included in its
internal legislative acts provisions relating to the treatment of
nationals ofnon-member countries or expressly conferred on its insti-
tutions powers to negotiate with non-member countries, it acquires an
exclusive external competence in the spheres covered by those acts
(Opinion 1/94, paragraph 95; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33).
84 The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision
authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries,
where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a
given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected
within the meaning of the AETR judgment if the Member States
retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries (Opinion
1/94, paragraph 96; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33).
Commentators have argued that these decisions do not indicate clear
exclusive Community competence in areas of private international law and judi-
cial cooperation because a doctrine lay down in "purely economic areas such as
external trade," may not apply evenly to private international law.25
From this side of the Atlantic, the ERTA line of cases is particularly
interesting. The idea that powers emanating from constitutional documents-in
this case the treaties creating the European Community-that grant specific
authority for internal matters, without granting specific authority for external
matters, can be exercised internally and thus result in the capture of external
authority is an intriguing one. This clearly is seen as both fundamental and
2002 E.C.R. 1-9741; Case C-475/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9797; Case C-476/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany,
2002 E.C.R. 1-9855.
25. See, Borris, supra note 23, at 2.
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necessary to the evolution of the law of the European Community. At the same
time, this concept demonstrates the tension between the Member States and the
Community institutions as the deepening of the Community moves forward. In
the Lugano case, it also demonstrates the capture by international trade lawyers
within the Community institutions of authority in the realm of private inter-
national law; something the private international law experts seem never to have
been consulted upon when the Treaty of Amsterdam was concluded and
competence was moved to the Community institutions.
The outcome of the Lugano case will have significance beyond just deter-
mining who should sign the amended Lugano Convention. It is likely to
suggest, as well, the answer to who represents the Community and its Member
States in negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private International Law and
other multilateral bodies.26 Whether the European Court of Justice finds any
important distinction between prior cases in the international economic law
realm and these matters in the field of private international law will say a lot
about the evolution of the European Community from a simple common market
to the more complex type of law-making framework that makes it look more-
and-more like a federal system.
26. The allocation of competence may have implications as well for negotiations in the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the Institute for Unification of
International Private Law (UNIDRO1T).
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of last year, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its
decision in Beals v. Saldanha.' This case had appeared some years before in the
courts of Ontario where a Florida plaintiff had sought the recognition and
enforcement of a Florida federal district court decision awarding damages
against Ontario resident defendants concerning a small land purchase that had
gone bad. It was unexceptional, save perhaps for the impressive quantum of
damages enterprising Florida plaintiffs managed to secure in default proceed-
ings before the Florida court. Nevertheless, it became the chosen vehicle of
Canada's highest court to complete the evolution of a judge-made transforma-
tion of Canadian conflict of laws principles specific to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments that it had embarked upon thirteen years
earlier with its seminal ruling in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. DeSavoye.2 For
an American legal audience, the decision is significant. It confirms the correct-
ness of lower court rulings which had applied the Morguard precedent- itself
a case confined to inter-provincial recognition and enforcement within the
Canadian federation-to foreign judgments. Most of these cases, not
* Partner, TheallGroup LLP, Toronto, A.B. 1974, LL.B, 1977 (Queen's Univ.); LL.M. 1979
(N.Y.U.); S.J.D. 1987 (Harv.), Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Hague Conference of Private
International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, (1997-present). This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2004.
1. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 465.
2. Morguard Investments, Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
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surprisingly, emanated from various U.S. jurisdictions, with initially unanti-
cipated and sometimes harsh consequences for Canadian defendants.
3
From a Canadian legal standpoint, particularly from an incoming perspec-
tive on international litigation, Beals and the previous pattern of Canadian court
decisions that it has vindicated, suggests a level playing field that may have
been irretrievably lost, absent legislative redress domestically or, if possible, by
treaty at the international level.4 That too, should be of interest from an
American law reform perspective that has perennially viewed the U.S. legal
system as considerably more hospitable to the enforcement efforts of foreign
plaintiffs than American plaintiffs tend to receive from other legal systems.5
But my basic message today is that Americans have nothing to complain about
north of the border. For hunters of compensation in Canada for damages done
to them outside of Canada, we might even go so far as to say that the Supreme
Court has declared an "open season" on Canadian assets.
II. A REVISED STATUS QUO
Not long ago, Canadian courts rigorously adhered to the English-some-
what imperial-common law approach to recognition and enforcement issues
which allowed that, unless the Canadian defendant had voluntarily attorned to
the jurisdiction of the foreign court, or was otherwise deemed to be found within
that jurisdiction in certain circumstances,6 the foreign proceeding could be
safely ignored. The foreign plaintiff would be required to sue on its judgment,
against which a full defence on the merits could then be waged at home. This
3. The new standard for recognition and enforcement raised serious issues for Canadian defendants
including the following: retrospective operation of Morguard, substantially different standards of foreign
justice and unpredictability of outcomes. H. Scott Fairley, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments by Canadian
Courts: A New Age of Uncertainty, 2 CAN. INT'L LAW. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments-Can. Cts.].
4. H. Scott Fairley, In Search of a Level Playing Field: The Hague Project on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 57 (Chi Carmody et. al. eds., 2003).
5. Ronald A. Brand, Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts, 2 CAN. INT'L LAW. 10 (1996); see
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-82 (1987).
6. Emanuel v. Symon, 1. K. B. 302, 309 (Eng. C.A. 1908) (per curiam):
In actions inpersonam there are five cases in which the Courts of this country will enforce a foreign judgment:
(1) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has
been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
(3) where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in which he
is afterwards sued; (4) where he has voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has
contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained.
Vaughan Black, Enforcement of Judgment and Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
546 (1989) (commenting critically on the pre-Morguard approach of Canadian courts).
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rule applied co-equally to the enforcement of rulings from one province to
another within the Canadian federation.
Morguard abandoned the traditional English formula in relation to the
inter-provincial context, importing the American constitutional concept of "full
faith and credit"7 as between coordinate jurisdictions within national boundaries,
and posited a new formula. The enforcing court would recognize and enforce
the judgment of the originating court, precluding any further defense on the
merits, provided that first, the adjudicating court had properly exercised juris-
diction under its own rules and second that the enforcing court could satisfy
itself that there was "a real and substantial connection" between the adjudicating
jurisdiction and determinative features of the lis or the Defendant as a party.8
However, the Morguard Court, in prophetic unanimous reasons in obiter
authored by Justice LaForest, suggested that the same approach might apply to
foreign judgments of comparably civilized jurisdictions, premised on the notion
of international comity. Citing Spencer v. The Queen, the Morguard court
quoted, "[T]he recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws..." 9
The rationale for resurrecting this nineteenth century notion straight from
the pen of Justice Gray in Hilton v. Guyot'° was, however, grounded in the late
twentieth century realities of a trade dependent country. Justice LaForest
elaborated:
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state
lines has now become imperative. Under the circumstances, our
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would appear ripe for reappraisal. Certainly, other countries, notably
the United States and members of the European Community, have
adopted more generous rules for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments to the general advantage of litigants."1
7. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
8. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1103-1109. See Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-Can.Cts.,
supra, note 3, at 2; Joost Blom, Reform of Private International Law by Judges: Canada as a Case Study,
in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH
31-47 (James Fawcett ed., 2002).
9. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1096.
10. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1895).
11. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1098.
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This invitation to a dramatically liberalized approach was taken up enthu-
siastically by lower courts across Canada. 2 These endorsements entailed harsh
consequences for Canadian defendants. Many were caught by the retrospective
application of the new rule to pre-Morguard decisions made not to defend
foreign lawsuits;1 3 others by exposure to damages awards-notably from U.S.
civil juries-far in excess of anything a Canadian court would have awarded
had the defendant been sued in a Canadian jurisdiction at first instance.14
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose not to revisit such concerns until it
granted leave to appeal in Beals.
III. CONFIRMING THE STATUS Quo: FACT AND LAW FROM BEALS
A. Compelling Facts
An ultimately very unlucky Canadian couple, the Saldanhas, together with
another Canadian couple, the Thivys, had purchased in 1981 a vacant lot in
Florida for $4000. Three years later, they were approached by a real estate
agent to sell the lot to two American couples, which they agreed to do for the
sum of $8000. There was a mistake in the property description in the original
offer, which Mrs. Thivy corrected, and the transaction was completed. How-
ever, some months later, the American purchasers, the Beals and the Foodys,
discovered they were building a model home for a development project they had
in mind on the wrong lot, adjacent to the one they had actually purchased.
Predictably, in the spring of 1985, a variety of individuals were sued in
Florida State Court, including the Saldanhas, who filed a defense on their own
behalf; the suit was withdrawn, having been commenced in the wrong county.
A second suit was commenced in the fall of 1986, this time in the Circuit Court
of Sarasota County. The Canadian defendants were served in Ontario and Mrs.
Thivy filed an unsigned duplicate of the Saldanhas' previous defense on their
behalf. Thereafter, amended claims were served and filed in the Florida court,
but no further defenses were forthcoming from the Canadians who, alas, had not
retained Florida counsel. In the end, only the Canadians were left at the end of
a default judgment on liability in the summer of 1990. A further jury award on
damages followed in late 1991 for $210,000 in compensatory damages, an
12. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-Can. Cts., supra note 3; Blom, supra note 8.
13. Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd., (1993) 106 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (BCCA), leave to appeal
refused, (1994) 24 C.P.C. (3d) 294n (Can. Sup. Ct.) (post-Morguard enforcement of pre-Morguard Alaska
Judgment). See Blom, supra note 8, at 38-39.
14. See generally Joost Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Goes Forth into
the World, 28 CAN. Bus. L.J. 373 (1997); Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-Can. Cts, supra note 3, at 3-5.
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additional $50,000 in punitive damages, and post judgment interest of twelve
percent per annum, notice of which the Saldanha received for Christmas 1991.15
At this point, the Saldanhas did consult a lawyer in Ontario. Unfortunately,
that lawyer was not aware of the Morguard precedent of the previous year or its
possible application to foreign as well as interprovincial enforcement actions.
He advised the Saldanhas to do nothing in Florida, as they had not secured legal
representation in Florida, and, as and if necessary, they could offer a full
defense in Ontario. 6 This was bad advice.
B. The Lower Court Rulings
Enforcement proceedings began in Ontario in 1993. At first instance, the
Ontario trial court refused to enforce the Florida judgment, notwithstanding
Morguard; however, not without some difficulty. 7 Justice Jennings expressed
considerable discomfort with the practical consequences of Florida justice for
the Saldanhas, and equal discomfort with the limits of the law he felt obligated
to apply. In the result, Justice Jennings reached to find an element of fraud
based on the absence of certain facts before the Florida jury, and also refused
to enforce on grounds of public policy. Although none of the traditionally
narrow grounds precluding application of penal, revenue or other foreign public
law fit the situation, Justice Jennings posited an extension of doctrine to encom-
pass a "judicial sniff test" allowing for non-enforcement in what he viewed as
the particularly egregious circumstances that confronted him in this case.18
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed in favor of enforcement based on
Morguard principles. '9 Justice Doherty, joined by Justice Catzman on a three-
judge panel, rejected the defense of fraud, restricting it to extrinsic circum-
stances, not those which the Saldanhas could have discovered with reasonable
diligence and countered had they defended themselves in Florida. The Court
viewed Justice Jennings' imaginative extension of public policy in like terms.
No matter how egregious the totality of the circumstances, Justice Doherty
concluded: "The fact of the matter is the respondents chose not to go to court
in Florida and demonstrate just how 'strange and wonderful' the allegations in
the complaint were,"" and that decision was fatal to any defense on the merits
in Ontario.
15. Beals, [200313 S.C.R. at 427-3 1.
16. Id. at 431.
17. Beals v. Saldanha, 42 O.R.3d 127 (Gen'l Div., 1998).
18. Id. at 144.
19. Beals v. Saldanha, 54 O.R.3d 641 (C.A. 2001).
20. Id. at 662.
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In lone dissent, Justice Weiler appealed to substantive elements of natural
justice in the context of undisclosed jeopardy arising from features of the
Florida legal system not readily apparent to foreign defendants. For her, the
procedural requirement of notice was based on "the underlying fundamental
principle of justice that defendants have a right to know the case against them
and to make an informed decision as to whether or not to present a defence,'
an opportunity never squarely presented to the Saldanhas. To this perception
was added, in the context of a potential fraud on the Florida court, the apparent-
ly less than frank disclosure of material facts by counsel for the Beals to the
Florida judge and jury.22
Of course, all of the foregoing procedural pitfalls and consequential
substantive liabilities would have become apparent had the Saldanhas engaged
competent Florida counsel. What separated the majority and dissenting voices
on the Ontario Court of Appeal, mirrored again in the Supreme Court, was their
profoundly different views on the necessity of taking that critical step.
IV. THE LAST WORD AND A FEW DISSENTING VOICES
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (6-3) affirmed the Ontario
Court of Appeal in favor of enforcement.23 Justice Major opined:
International comity and the prevalence of international cross-border trans-
actions and movement call for a modernization of private international law. The
principles set out in Morguard ... can and should be extended beyond the
recognition of interprovincial judgments, even though their application may
give rise to different considerations internationally. Subject to the legislatures
adopting a different approach by statute, the 'real and substantial connection'
test should apply to the law with respect to the enforcement and recognition of
foreign judgments.24
The question remains, of course, whether the common law result merits a
statutory response. Hard cases often make bad law and perhaps they should not
invite statutory revision of otherwise positive and necessary organic legal
developments. Justice Major appears not unreasonable in noting:
Here, the appellants entered into a property transaction in Florida
when they bought and sold land. Having taken this positive step to
bring themselves with the jurisdiction of Florida law, the appellants
could reasonably have been expected ... to defend the claim pursuant
to the Florida rules. Nonetheless, they were still entitled, within ten
21. Id. at 675-76 (Weiler J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 670.
23. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 431.
24. Id. at 436.
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days, to appeal the Florida default judgment, which they did not. In
addition, the appellants did not avail themselves of the additional one-
year period to have the Florida judgment for damages set aside.
While their failure to move to set aside or appeal the Florida judg-
ment was due to their reliance upon negligent legal advice, that negli-
gence cannot be a bar to the enforcement of the respondents' judg-
ment.
25
Leaving aside the retrospective application of Morguard to the
circumstances confronted by at least the Saldanhas,26 Justice Major does have
a point. The substantial connections test, once accepted, appears unassailable
because if a foreign court did not properly take jurisdiction, its judgment will
not be enforced. Here, it was correctly conceded by the litigants that the Florida
court had a real and substantial connection to the action and parties.27 On this
general proposition, the Court was essentially unanimous. 28 The more trouble-
some question, however, is whether, in the wake of adopting the new test,
existing defenses to enforcement elaborated under the previous Anglo-Canadian
common law approach of formal attornment, also require revision. Justice
Jennings thought as much at first instance in resorting to his "judicial sniff test"
and Justice Major was not unmindful of such considerations, in which respect
it is appropriate to quote the Justice at length:
The defenses of fraud, public policy and lack of natural justice were
developed before Morguard, supra, and still pertain. This Court has
to consider whether those defenses, when applied internationally are
able to strike the balance required by comity, the balance between
order and fairness as well as the real and substantial connection, in
respect of enforcing default judgments obtained in foreign courts.
These defenses were developed by the common law courts to guard against
potential unfairness unforeseen in the drafting of the test for the recognition and
enforcement of judgments. The existing defenses are narrow in application.
They are the most recognizable situations in which an injustice may arise but are
not exhaustive.
Unusual situations may arise that might require the creation of a new
defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. However, the facts of this
25. Id. at 440.
26. The Court found that the co-defendant Dominic Thivy had secured representation in Florida and
had specifically submitted to the jurisdiction of the Florida Court. Id. at 438.
27. Id. at 441.
28. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 456 (Binnie, J., lacobucci, J., concurring); Id. at 473 (LeBel, J.,
concurring).
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case do not justify speculating on that possibility. Should the evolution of
private international law require the creation of a new defence, the courts will
need to ensure that any new defences continue to be narrow in scope, address
specific facts and raise issues not covered by the existing defences. (emphasis
added)29
Justice Major goes on to apply the traditional defenses without enlarge-
ment, essentially concurring with the Ontario Court of Appeal.3 It is with these
applications, however, that the two dissenting opinions on the Supreme Court
take issue with the majority.
Justice Binnie, joined by Justice lacobucci, readily agrees that the sub-
stantial connections test "provides an appropriate conceptual basis for the
enforcement in Canada of finaljudgments obtained in foreign jurisdictions....
At the same time, however, the Binnie/lacobucci dissent emphasizes the original
domestic context and "constitutional flavour" of Morguard stressing: "We
should not backtrack on the importance of that distinction., 32
The difference between a known system of justice within national borders
and the undisclosed mysteries of foreign legal systems provide the touchstone
for Justice Binnie's dissent from the majority, but in the end, he does so within
the traditional defence of a failure of natural justice as a ground for non-
enforcement, purportedly without enlargement.33
My colleague Major J. holds, in effect, that the appellants are largely the
victims of what he considers to be some ostrich-like inactivity and some poor
legal advice from their Ontario solicitor. There is some truth to this, but such
a bizarre outcome nevertheless invites close scrutiny of how the Florida
proceedings transformed a minor real estate transaction into a major financial
bonanza for the respondents.
While the notification procedures under the Florida rules may be
considered in Florida to be quite adequate for Florida residents with easy access
to advice and counsel from Florida lawyers (and there is no doubt that Florida
Procedures in general conform to a reasonable standard of fairness), neverthe-
less the question here is whether the appellants in this proceeding were suffi-
ciently informed of the case against them, both with respect to liability and the
potential financial consequences, to allow them to determine in a reasonable
way whether or not to participate in the Florida action, or to let it go by
default.3 4
29. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 441-42.
30. Id. at 440-453.
31. Id. at 456 (Binnie J., concurring).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 458-59 (emphasis in original).
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I do not propose to detail all the steps in Justice Binnie's argument. It
emphasizes the idiosyncrasies of Florida procedural rules-at least from a
Canadian perspective-requiring defendants to refile in response to each and
every amended claim, rendering their previous defense non-existent.35 addition-
ally there was other information the appellants did not know. In particular, the
gradual removal of other domestic defendants, notably the Florida real estate
agent and title insurer with whom the respondents settled for comparatively
modest sums while retaining title to the property conveyed,36 all of which
remained invisible to the Saldanhas. On these cumulative findings, Justice
Binnie concludes:
I do not accept the suggestion that the appellants are the authors of their
own misfortune on the basis that if they had hired a Florida lawyer they would
have found out about all of these developments. The Appellants decided not to
defend the case set out against them in the Complaint. That case was subse-
quently transformed. They never had the opportunity to put their minds to the
transformed case because they were never told about it.
I do not suggest that any one of the foregoing omissions of notice would
necessarily have been fatal to enforcement of the respondents' default judgment
in Ontario. Cumulatively, at all events, these continuing omissions seem to me
to demonstrate an unfair procedure which in this particular case failed to meet
the standards of natural justice.37
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice LeBel, expresses much stronger
concerns. In reasons considerably more expansive than those provided by either
the majority or the Binnie/lacobucci dissent, Justice LeBel asserts that the
possible circumstances arising within foreign legal proceedings as illuminated
in Beals call for a reformulation of the traditional nominate defences to enforce-
ment.
Justice LeBel does not explicitly endorse an expansion of the public policy
defence to include Justice Jennings' "judicial sniff test," and notes international
efforts at the Hague Conference on Private International Law to develop a treaty
instrument that would confer discretion on a court to limit the quantum of a
foreign judgment if the court was satisfied that the amount of the award was
grossly excessive. However, he would "continue to reserve the publicpolicy defence for cases where the objection is to the law of the foreign forum,
35. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 464-65.
36. Id. at 465-69.
37. Id. at 470-71.
38. Id. (LeBel, J., dissenting) (citing Jacob S. Ziegel, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada,
Unlevel Playing Fields and Beals v. Saldanha: A Consumer Perspective, 38 CAN. BUS. L.J. 294, 306-307
(2003) (citing Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, art. 33, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgmdrafte.pdf)).
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rather than the way the law was applied, or the size of the award per se."39
Nevertheless, Justice LeBel is equally clear that "there is more work for this
defence to do. It should also apply to foreign laws that offend basic tenets of
our civil justice system, principles that are widely recognized as having a quality
of essential fairness."4 One example Justice LeBel cites in this regard as a
candidate for non-enforcement should resonate with an American legal audience
is as such: a Canadian court presented with a judgment from a jurisdiction
whose law provides, for example, that punitive damages can be awarded on the
basis of simple negligence or strict liability ought to have a discretion to deny
or limit the enforceability of the judgment on grounds of public policy.4 It is
important to note here, again principally for the benefit of an American legal
audience familiar with statutory prescriptions for punitive damages in civil
cases, that Canadian courts do currently enforce without serious question
foreign judgments embracing extensive punitive damages awards where even
the threshold of simple negligence is barely met.42 Indeed, the majority of the
Supreme Court did just that in Beals. It bears emphasis, however, that the
LeBel dissent sees the future differently.
With regard to the defence of fraud, Justice LeBel generally adheres to the
majority approach of requiring fresh evidence of fraud not reasonably
discoverable at first instance to properly invoke the defence. Justice LeBel
would not, however, rule out the possibility that a broader test should apply to
default judgments in cases where the defendant's decision not to participate was
a demonstrably reasonable one. If the defendant ignored what it justifiably
considered to be a trivial or meritless claim, and can prove on the civil standard
that the plaintiff took advantage of his absence to perpetrate a deliberate
deception on the foreign court, it would be inappropriate to insist that a
Canadian court asked to enforce the resulting judgment must turn a blind eye to
those facts.43
Nevertheless, Justice LeBel finds that neither of the two preceding
defences would support a reversal in favour of the Saldanhas. Rather, his
principal concern, in common with the Binnie/Iacobucci dissent, is one of
natural justice applied to the facts of the particular case before him. Justice
LeBel embraces the notion expressed by the English Court of Appeal in Adams
v. Cape Industries' and by Justice Weiler, dissenting in the Ontario Court of
39. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 508.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 511.
42. See e.g., Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Services, Inc., [1999] 4 W.W.R. 573
(B.C.C.A.) (upholding North Carolina default judgment of treble damages and punitive damages).
43. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 515.
44. Adams v. Cape Industries, [1991] 1 All. E.R. 929 (C.A. 1989).
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Appeal on Beals, that the natural justice defence comprises both substantive as
well as procedural elements "such as the proposition that damages should be
based on objective proof and judicial assessment." '45
Applying substantive and procedural considerations to the case before him,
Justice LeBel concludes that the Saldanhas were deprived of natural justice:
first in relation to lack of proper notice on the basis of which to make an
informed decision to continue defending in the Florida proceeding, and further,
in terms of substantive unfairness in the quantum of general damages without
apparent objective proof of the harm suffered, together with the awarding of
punitive damages without proof of conduct deserving of punishment.46 Under
this reasoning, in marked contrast to the six-justice majority of the Supreme
Court, the natural justice defence was available, notwithstanding the Saldanhas'
failure to defend.
What Justice LeBel appears to be allowing for here within the context the
natural justice defence is a subsidiary defence of reasonable expectation as to
both process and consequences, even though such expectations are uninformed
and clearly unjustified when placed in the context of the foreign legal proceed-
ing. Justice LeBel observes:
The evidence at trial was that Florida's legal system provides all the
appropriate protections for judgment debtors in the appellants'
position and probably would have afforded them a remedy in these
circumstances. But at the relevant time the appellants did not know
this; they only knew that Florida's legal system had produced a judg-
ment against them for an astronomical amount, a verdict that was
difficult to reconcile with the simple facts they had set out in their
defence. Their apprehensiveness about going back to that very legal
system to seek relief was, in the circumstances, understandable.47
Justice LeBel could have stopped there, but decided to go further. Even
if his expanded view of natural justice did not avail, he would decline to enforce
on a residual ground of general unconscionability:
The circumstances of this case are such that the enforcement of this
Judgment would shock the conscience of Canadians and cast a nega-
tive light on our justice system. The appellants have done nothing
that infringes the rights of the respondents and have certainly done
nothing to deserve such harsh punishment. Nor can they be said to
have sought to avoid their obligations by hiding in their own
45. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 518.
46. Id. at 523.
47. Id. at 527.
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jurisdiction or to have shown disrespect for the legal system of
Florida. They have acted in good faith throughout and have diligently
taken all the steps that appeared to be required of them, based on the
information and advice they had. The plaintiffs in Florida appear to
have taken advantage of the defendants' difficult position to pursue
their interests as aggressively as possible and to secure a sizeable
windfall. In an adversarial legal system, it was, of course, open to
them to do so, but the Ontario court should not have to set its seal of
approval on the judgment thus obtained without regard for the
dubious nature of the claim, the fact that the parties did not compete
on a level playing field and the lack of transparency in the Florida
proceedings.48
The residual category of concerns resorted to by Justice LeBel is, on the
one hand, a refuge for judicial discretion. In extreme cases, it may have a place
where none of the bright-line rules quite fit. On the other hand, an unconscion-
able test in the hands of lower court judges potentially lacking the world view
that informed Justice LaForest in Morguard, could be equally viewed as
something of a trojan horse undermining the substantial connections test which,
simplicity, the Supreme Court of Canada has unanimously affirmed.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS
At this time, Canada taken as a whole, and specifically in individual pro-
vinces, is one of the most hospitable jurisdictions in the world for the recogni-
tion and enforcement ofjudgments from foreign jurisdictions. It has become so
through perhaps, due to an overly generous adoption to twentieth and twenty-
first century circumstances of the nineteenth century common law doctrine.
Unfortunately, at least for Canadian defendants, international comity is neither
universally shared doctrine, nor even championed any longer by the juris-
dictions in which it was originally developed.49 While Canada is also distin-
guished by a large and important civil law jurisdiction in the province of
Quebec where the applicability of common law doctrine derived from
Morguard and Beals may be debated, the pragmatic approach of Quebec courts
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments complements that of
the Canadian approach overall.50
48. Id.
49. See Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law, in REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 89-110 (James
Fawcett ed., 2002).
50. Civil Code of Quebec, R.S.Q. ch. 64, §3134-40 (2004XCan.); Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. Am.
Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205.
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The result is a situation of opportunity for foreign plaintiffs and one of
some risk and discomfort to Canadian defendants exposed at home to foreign
standards of justice with which they are unfamiliar. The Supreme Court
dissents in Beals sound a muted alarm in that regard, but the majority has
confirmed a reality that will be difficult to substantially alter in future cases.
Once the substantial connections test is met, and barring extensive procedural
sloppiness by an originating court, the only latitude that remains for denying
recognition and enforcement by a Canadian court lies within the currently
narrow parameters of the established impeachment defences. The Supreme
Court of Canada has left open the possibility of expansion within those
categories, but apart from Justice LeBel in vigorous dissent, there seems little
current judicial appetite for residual protectionism in aid of hapless or unlucky
Canadian defendants." Similarly, there is no suggestion that recognition or
enforcement should be predicated on conditions of reciprocity within the
originating jurisdiction. However, all of these concerns are voiced in the
legislative precincts of law reform and by governmental private international
law visionaries and putative legal engineers at the Hague.52 It remains to be
seen whether any of those efforts will come to fruition. But, from a Canadian
perspective, critics ofjudicial methodology and legal consequences in Beals and
the work of Canadian lower courts that Beals has implicitly endorsed, may have
little alternative but to embrace and advocate some form of legislated law
reform agenda. The Canadian courts are unlikely to re-engage in such a task any
time soon. Indeed, as previously noted, Justice Major signaled with some clarity
that legislative reform was an available alternative to the road taken since
Morguard, but not one the Court was inclined to vary of its own accord.53
In the meantime, what does all this mean for American litigants bringing
the results of American justice to Canada? A truly generous and hospitable
environment! Given constitutionally imposed standards of "minimum contacts"
required to support the assumption of in personam jurisdiction by American
state and federal courts over foreign defendants, fulfillment of the substantial
connections test as applied by Canadian enforcing courts would appear to be a
virtually foregone conclusion.' Finally, notwithstanding some disquiet in
51. Since Beals was decided, two of the judges supporting the majority opinion of justice Major
(Gonthier, J. and Arbour, J.) have retired or resigned, together with one of the dissenting justices (lacobucci).
See at http://www.scc.csc.gc.ca (last visited June 12, 2005).
52. See Ronald Brand, Concepts, Consensus and the Status Quo Zone: Getting to "Yes " on a Hague
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES:
CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 71-108 (Chi Carmody et. al. eds., 2003).
53. Beals, [2003] 3 S.C.R. at 416.
54. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (interpreting the "Due Process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to require out-of-state or foreign defendants to have
certain "minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction before jurisdiction to adjudicate is established); Muscutt
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Canada for the profligacy of American civil trial juries, Canadian courts are
basically sending the message that different standards of justice between
jurisdictions on the quantum of damages are not unenforceable ones. In short,
the season is open, and the hunting is good. Welcome to Canada.
v. Courcelles, [2002] 60 O.R. 3d 20 (discussing Canadian standards for assumption of jurisdiction and the
preferability of a broader approach-extending to substantial connections between the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim and the forum--than that suggested by U.S. "minimum contacts" analysis).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) come in all shapes and sizes.
However, they usually have something in common: they are geographically
located near concentrations of power. In the United States, this usually means
Washington D.C. or New York City.
Lawyers Without Borders, Inc. (commonly called LWOB) was incor-
porated in Connecticut on March 1,2000 and its primary offices are in Hartford,
Connecticut. While Hartford is the capitol of Connecticut, people outside of
Connecticut tend to overlook it. From the beginning, LWOB was supported by
the Connecticut Bar Association's Section of International Law & Practice and
strongly supported by Byrne & Storm, P.C. Christina Storm was the founding
executive director of LWOB.
LWOB strove to match resources with needs, regardless of where the
resource and the need were located. A number of pools of talent were recog-
nized early on; younger lawyers and more senior lawyers with experience that
could be applied in different circumstances. Recognizing Connecticut was a bit
out of the way for many wanting to help, LWOB focused its organizing efforts
* Member, Brown & Welsh, P.C. of Meriden, CT www.BrownWelsh.com. Member, Lawyers
Without Borders Board of Directors www.LWOB.org. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks
presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
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through the internet. LWOB is very much a virtual organization because of the
way it communicates, galvanizes and harnesses legal resources.
II. PROJECT
Over the years LWOB has undertaken a number of projects. Some of the
projects have been large and some have been small. Each project has reflected
LWOB's desire to connect resources with needs. While it is not possible to
discuss all of LWOB's projects, a representative list can be shown.
III. FINGERPRINTS
One of the first virtual projects came from Yugoslavia. As criminal trials
under the new regime commenced, the local bar did not know how to examine
fingerprint experts. Fingerprint evidence was not commonly used under the old
regime. Fingerprint evidence was being used under the new regime as part of
the criminal prosecution.
A local Yugoslavian lawyer requested assistance from LWOB. LWOB
located a Canadian criminal attorney with substantial experience in cross
examining fingerprint experts who was willing to assist the Yugoslavian lawyer.
While the Canadian lawyer did not leave his office, he was able to effectively
assist another lawyer in Yugoslavia through the use of the internet.
IV. NEUTRAL INDEPENDENT COURT TRIAL OBSERVER PROJECT
In some countries and some proceedings, a court proceeding is not open to
the public. LWOB has sent observers to watch closed trials in Tehran and
Pakistan. LWOB contacts the governments involved before sending the
observers. The ground rules are agreed upon in advance and differ from many
NGOs.
LWOB observers will not report their finding and observations in public.
They will report their findings, observations and recommendations to the
government in question. The emphasis is cooperation rather than confrontation.
The objective is to fix the problem rather than to create publicity. Under these
circumstances, LWOB has been able to observe trials no other NGO has been
able to observe.
V. INS DETAINEE PROJECT
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of
immigration detainees within the United States. Simply put, the federal govern-
ment does not have enough space to house all of the detainees. This means
some detainees are being held in state facilities under contract to the federal
government.
Lowry
There are comprehensive regulations on holding such detainees (because
they are not incarcerated criminals). While the federal government may be well
versed in these rules, the states are not. In response to inquiries from various
people, LWOB teamed up with the American Bar Association to conduct
inspections in Connecticut and Massachusetts. LWOB's report resulted in some
changes in how detainees were being held.
VI. PROVIDING BOOKS
When the United States invaded Iraq, it committed itself to reopening
universities and teaching. A number of courses were taught on United States
Constitutional Law, but there was a critical shortage of books and teaching
materials.
LWOB provided a number of copies of the United States Constitution and
the federalist papers for several law schools in Northern Iraq. When it was
pointed out that a number of students felt more comfortable reading this
material in Arabic rather than English, LWOB located reliable Arabic transla-
tions of the United States Constitution and the federalist papers in Brooklyn
Public Library. Copies were made (with the appropriate copyright permissions)
and sent to Iraq.
VII. CENTRALIZED BULLETIN BOARD FOR JOBS AND INTERNSHIPS
One of the difficulties has been locating opportunities for those with an
interest in pro bono (and paying!) work. LWOB launched (with the assistance
of JobTarget.com) a jobs board in February 2004 that allowed the anonymous
posting of resumes (people looking for opportunities) as well as the traditional
posting ofjob listings. The job board is free to job seekers and free for a period
of time for employers wishing to test the system. The first major employer to
enlist the system for his human resource needs was the International Criminal
Court. This jobs board was a "first" of its type for rule of law, transitional
justice, and legally oriented capacity building jobs.
VIII. NGO ACCREDITATION
LWOB has been an accredited NGO with the United Nations Department
of Public Information for some time. It was recently accredited to the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (one of the five principal organs of the
United Nations). This provides a greater opportunity for LWOB to contribute
to the work of the United Nations.
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IX. CONCLUSION
LWOB is a relatively new NGO. Its emphasis is on connecting people to
make a difference. Unlike the traditional NGO, this means LWOB offers
exceptional opportunities to its volunteers. We hope you will become one of
those volunteers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When an officer of the Kigali Bar Association in Rwanda said their
members would like an e-commerce training, I was amazed. Rwandan phone
lines don't work and the infrastructure was destroyed after the genocide.
"Why?" I asked. "We want to be prepared," said the Association's officer who
survived the 1994 genocide that left only a few judges alive and only sixteen
lawyers in the entire country.
Developing countries are eager to prepare for the global era and developed
countries seek new markets and avenues of trade. Emerging nations also need
to establish the rule of law because it is a prerequisite to receiving aid from the
World Bank, the IMF and mandated by certain agreements such as the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). New democracies need developed
countries to export training and education regarding their long-established laws.
Equally important is the need for developed nations to import knowledge of
emergent countries' laws in order to trade with them and understand their
training requirements.
Let me first share with you my experience in exporting United States laws
and legal ethics in seminars abroad and, secondly, discuss the effectiveness of
teaching overseas. Lastly, let me focus on lessons learned from such experi-
ences, i.e. the need for continuing programs, the contacts developed and the
knowledge gained from other countries' laws and cultures.
* Former Chair of the Rwanda Legal Task Force and member of the Committee on African Affairs
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks
presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
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II. EXPERIENCE
Experiences, teaching and mentoring abroad can be the most rewarding
part of one's professional career. Exporting United States laws and importing
knowledge of foreign laws adds to the increasing globalization of the rule of
law.
My first experience overseas was in Tibet when I was investigating for the
Tibet Information Network. I was asked to discuss the United States Constitu-
tion at adult education classes in the Tibetan section of the capital, Lhasa, which
is overrun by Chinese military and Chinese settlers. Although the students were
not lawyers, they were men and women at the forefront of the Tibetan quest for
freedom from the Chinese. It was enlightening to discover how much they
wanted to adapt their way of life to American constitutional liberties. "Change
comes with education," commented one of the less shy participants.
I was thereafter invited to teach a seminar on international intellectual
property for practicing lawyers at the International Law Institute in Kampala,
Uganda. Most of the lawyers had a general practice and wanted to learn not
only the international norms of intellectual property law but also practical tips
for handling their cases. A Ugandan judge, who joined us for a session asked
about United States copyright decisions because he had a publishing matter
before him and was interested in cases of a more active copyright jurisdiction.
The workshops we held with hypothetical cases created interesting
discussions, provocative questions, and a congenial fun-filled atmosphere.
Since the class members always lunched together, this gave us an opportunity
for informal talk and learning experiences for both me and the Ugandan
lawyers.
Since Rwanda borders Uganda, I went to Rwanda to address the Kigali Bar
Association, the only active bar association in the country. Their lawyers were
interested in three topics-intellectual property, arbitration and e-commerce.
Although my Ethiopian Airlines flight was four hours late, the President and the
Treasurer of the Association waited for and greeted me at the airport. The
participants at the seminars included not only members of the Rwandan Bar but
the Attorney General, the Justice Minister and Parliamentarians. Such attendees
who were responsible for revising pre-genocide statutes (even those that still
referred to the former colonial power's King of Belgium), wanted to study
United States laws to use as a basis for their revisions.
Although Rwanda has an exemplary Copyright Statute,*developed with the
help of the World Intellectual Property Organization, enforcement of the laws
was minimal. Rwandan lawyers were interested in pursuing their client's claims
more actively. We discussed their trademark cases as well as United States and
1. Rwanda Law Governing Copyright, No. 27/1983 of November 15, 1983.
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East African decisions. Electronic commerce law was an entirely new topic for
the Rwandan legal community. The participants appeared to be interested in our
relevant statutes as well as the legal problems raised by doing business
electronically. The arbitration section of the seminar was aided by a
presentation from the head of the Rwandan Arbitration Court. We discussed
differences between the United States and Rwandan methods of arbitration.
Because United States elections were forthcoming when I was in Kigali in
2000 and the first elections after the genocide were scheduled in 2003, lawyers
asked me about fair and free elections in the United States and the laws
governing them and in 2003 they asked about, as well as the United States
Supreme Court case relevant to the 2000 election.
The students at the Rwandan Law School in Butare, the second largest
Rwandan city, were mostly interested in international intellectual property laws
since there were no courses offered on that subject. Their professors also sat in
on the training.
My experience in Rwanda prompted me to initiate and find funding for two
ethics trainings for the Rwandan justice system, as requested by members of the
Rwandan legal community. Juridical ethics is an important topic for countries
accused of lack of judicial transparency. As World Bank president, James D.
Wolfensohn, said "it is a question of ethics" as to "how a country is run."
Many of the horrors of the genocide went unpunished because of the lack of
impartial judges and prosecutors.
The United States Agency for Development generously supported the
ethics projects enabling the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(ABCNY) to hold two ethics seminars were held in Kigali and Butare in 2002.
Two members of the ABCNY joined me on the first week-long program along
with Michael Johnson, a former Chief of Prosecution at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Acting Deputy Prosecutor for the Rwanda
Tribunal. Judge David Ebel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, who taught
ethics at Duke University and helped formulate a Canadian judicial ethics code,
was a wonderful addition to the group and of great assistance to the Rwandan
judiciary. Joining us with the presentations were the Rwandan Minister of
Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the head of
the Military Court and a Supreme Court judge who oversees the functioning of
the country's courts and personnel. Judges from all over the country attended
the seminar.
We spent two days at the Law School at the National University in Butare,
where we were greeted with an elaborate reception and a chance to chat with the
students and faculty. Among the audience for the training were graduating
2. Manny Fernandez & Steven Pearlstein, WorldBank Defends Policies; Critics Say Debts Should
Be Forgiven, WASHINGTON POST, April 28, 2001, at El.
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seniors who were to be appointed as judges at informal tribunals ("Gacaca"--
Ga-cha-cha, meaning grass because these communal courts are held on the
grass). These prospective judges will try over 500,000 alleged genocide
perpetrators that conventional courts are not able to handle. There were difficult
practical problems such as the senior student, soon to become an unsalaried
judge, who said, "Either I can pay my fare to come here tomorrow or use the
money to feed my family." (The government cannot afford salaries for Gacaca
judges).
The follow-up ethics seminar was joined by Professor Mary Daly, who
teaches ethics at Fordham Law School and Tom Strunk, a lawyer who teaches
ethics at the West Point Military Academy.
My subsequent trip to Rwanda in 2003 was to prepare an international
training on gender and the law for the Ministry of Gender funded by the World
Bank. I not only met many hard-working female lawyers in parliament, the
government and NGOs, but I also studied Rwandan laws to determine the
requirements for change. The input of female leaders was essential to my
formulating a program for the training. (Although Rwandan women constitute
48.8% of the Parliament, more than any other country in the world, some of
their laws lack the gender sensitivity that Rwandan women seek). Several
statutes have been revised, but there are still no laws on domestic violence,
sexual harassment or equal opportunity, and there is no statutory infrastructure
for the commendable Constitutional mandate for a Gender Monitoring Office
and a National Council of Women.
Several women at the ABCNY, including Sara Rakita, a Human Rights
Watch lawyer in Rwanda for two years, have been working on a training manual
for the international program, which is planned for 2005. In the works and
depending on funding, are ethics training sessions for Kenya and one for
Nigeria, both of which countries are accused of corruption in their judiciary.
My interest in the Rwandan genocide and the pursuit of justice for the
perpetrators led me to attend trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in Tanzania where I met the President, judges and prosecutors of the
Court. Through guile and inadvertence of the guards, I interviewed the only
woman on trial for rape and genocide, who is allowed no visitors. Such
adventures are an added feature of training experiences abroad.
Teaching overseas is not only an enriching experience, but enables lawyers
to lecture on foreign and international law in the United States. For instance,
my preparation for the intellectual property seminars in East Africa allows me
to contribute to the forum: "Doing Business in Africa," that the ABCNYs
Committee on African Affairs will be holding in the spring. Likewise, the
knowledge of international, European and African gender-expertise gained in
researching international gender laws for the Rwandan training enables me to
participate in pertinent programs in this country.
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IH. EFFECTIVENESS
Without a result trainings are purposeless. The most productive programs
that I have been involved with were the Rwandan ethics trainings. During the
weekend of the first session officers of the Rwandan Bar established a
Permanent Commission on Ethics to review and answer questions regarding
ethical practices. The training participants also recommended an overall ad hoc
Committee to enforce ethical rules for prosecutors and military court judges.
Internal Ethics Committees for judges and prosecutors were also suggested as
well as a codification of ethics rules for each group to be publicly disseminated.
(Ethics rules were previously spread out over many statutes so there was no easy
reference to them and they were not available to the public). The participants
also recommended further ethics training sessions, permanent contacts with the
ABCNY for assistance, better working conditions for judges (who are not well-
respected and poorly paid), a longer than one-year term for military judges; and
more emphasis on respect for ethics codes and strict adherence to their rules.
At the second session, the Kigali Bar had codified its ethics code. With the
help of Judge Ebel, judicial ethics rules were drafted and incorporated into one
document. Judge Ebel later participated in two Law Reform seminars that
produced drafts of both judicial and prosecutorial statutes improving and
restructuring these segments of the justice system. Both of these drafts are now
law as well as a statute establishing a Superior Council of the Judiciary that
approves the appointment of judges and that can sanction them for infractions
of the judicial code.
The effectiveness of the Tibetan training was proven by one of the
student's immigration to the United States, where she is fighting for Tibetan
rights similar to those in the United States Constitution. One of the students at
the Ugandan training now practices intellectual property law there after
completing a masters at the South African Law School at the University of
Wittswatersrand.
The Rwandan seminars were effective for the presenters to learn about
local laws from overseas lawyers and to identify their needs rather than
imposing United States concepts. Preparing for the trainings enabled us to
import knowledge of international and African laws to advise United States
clients dealing abroad.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED
Knowledge gained from global trainings was threefold, i.e. continuing
training requirements, contacts developed abroad, and countries' customs and
laws.
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A. Continued Training Requirements
Continuing commitment to a project is necessary to effectuate the goals of
global trainings. The fact that there was a follow-up Rwandan ethics seminar
and a continuing interchange with the Kigali Bar enabled the training objectives
to be met. This is not to minimize the purposefulness of short-term programs
that can also produce results through ongoing contacts and cultivation of other
countries' customs and laws. One-time trainings can also help with current
legal problems and be inspirational for further study and professional practice
in a specialized area. However ongoing projects can assist in not only drafting,
but finalizing legislation and professional codes.
B. Contacts Developed
Developing and continuing contacts is not just about acquiring clients,
although that can be the outcome of overseas professional relationships
(particularly with the increasing privatization plans in emerging democracies).
Ongoing contacts are important in guiding seminar participants in their careers
and advising them on specialties in the law. Mentoring in this global era not
only helps overseas lawyers develop skills and ongoing associations keep us
abreast of legal changes in foreign countries. For instance, a Rwandan judge
recently told me that there was a complete overhaul of their judiciary. All the
judges were sacked and must now reapply for a seat on the bench and adhere to
a strict, recently-legislated Judicial Code.
For me, an offshoot of keeping connected with female Rwandan lawyers
was the ability to suggest and advise them on incorporating a Woman's Law
Association and to complete an article, "Rwandan Women Reborn" that will be
published later this year.
C. Knowledge Of Countries Customs and Laws
Without a background in local customs, we are less helpful to participants
in training seminars. We may seem out of place and too foreign to understand
attendees' needs. It is even helpful to appreciate local dress codes. I learned
that, even if it's hot in Africa, women lawyers wear black suits both to deflect
Kampala dust and the droppings of the flamingo storks constantly circling the
city. Even female lawyers who are parliamentarians wear traditional dress in
Rwanda. The Rwandan Supreme Court judge, who participated in the ethics
trainings, stressed the importance of proper dress to elicit esteem for the
profession and show respect for the court.
Learning local laws is important in suggesting and drafting revisions of
statutes. For instance the Rwandan rape law is very limited and denies
prosecution for deeds commonly committed during the genocide-penetrating
women's vaginas with gun barrels, bottles and sharpened sticks. Female
Rwandan lawyers realize this law must be changed as well as the adultery
statute that penalizes women with imprisonment, but only fines men. Revisions
of these laws, adapted to international standards, have been sent to the Ministry
of Gender.
It is also important not to offend lawyers whose laws and customs are
different than ours. For instance, abortion is outlawed in Rwanda except in
medical emergencies and homosexuality is viewed with disfavor. Additionally,
unlike our system, Rwandan lawyers are not permitted to participate in any
business.
The best way to learn about local customs and laws is to make a
preparatory trip. But, absent that, one can always speak to someone from a
country's diaspora; the Mission to the UN of that country can give you the name
of a person to contact.
V. CONCLUSION
My experience in teaching and formulating trainings for overseas
participants has been the most interesting and rewarding part of my professional
career. It has led to more involvement and further service to overseas lawyers
and United States clients.
The effectiveness of trainings benefits legal communities abroad and
enables them to familiarize themselves with international and United States laws
and adapt them to their own justice system. Among the lessons learned from
these trainings are not only the need for continuing programs, but also the
professional and personal pleasure of maintaining contacts with overseas
lawyers. Additionally, knowledge of foreign laws helps in advising clients and
developing our own clientele and expertise.
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I. DEFINITION OF JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT
This contribution will examine whether or not there exist jurisdictional
conflicts between international tribunals operating under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the courts of the United States of
America, one of the three NAFTA member states. It will be useful first to
identify the perceived jurisdictional conflict before investigating whether or not
there exists such a conflict at present. We are dealing here with a situation
where a non-U.S. claimant in an international proceeding under NAFTAs
Chapter 11 complains of a violation of international law founded upon a U.S.
judicial act, i.e., one or more decisions of a court, or courts, of the United States.
The judicial act essentially constitutes the NAFTA member state's "measure"
complained of. This situation must be distinguished from the one in which the
* Counsel, International Arbitration Group, White & Case LLP, New York City; LL.B., Ph.D.,
University of Leiden, The Netherlands; LL.M., Harvard Law School; formerly staff lawyer in the Registry
of the International Court of Justice (1992-94); Chair, ABILA Committee on Intergovernmental Settlement
of Disputes. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author. Article referenced at the ABILA
International Law Weekend 2004 in New York City on October 15, 2004. This article is a revised
reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
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action challenged is that of another branch of government, as in the case of ADF
Group Inc. v. U.S.A.'
Is there a problem here? In other words, is there a trend of domestic cases
brought as NAFTA cases that should be of concern? As with so many legal
problems, there is more to it than initially meets the eye.
As the Tribunal in the Mondev Case, discussed below, explicitly
recognized,2 NAFTA tribunals are faced here with a tension between the
following two considerations: International tribunals are not courts of appeal;
and NAFTAs Chapter 11 is intended to provide a real measure of protection for
foreign investors.
The critical questions that must be asked in this context are threefold.
First, is the NAFTA claim in substance an original, or un-remedied, appeal from
a municipal decision, or was there true judicial finality? Second, is the NAFTA
claimant in essence a foreign party or, rather, a U.S. party? Third, does the
NAFTA claim present a colorable case under international law, i.e., is there
primafacie evidence of a breach of international law constituted by a municipal
judicial act?
In investigating whether or not the NAFTA case law points to a problem,
it is necessary to distinguish the following two scenarios: Is the judicial act
challenged that of a lower municipal court (as in the Loewen Case); or is the
judicial act challenged that of the NAFTA member state's highest judicial
authority (as in the Mondev Case)?
Assuming that the requirement of diversity of nationality under NAFTA
Article 1139 is met, the NAFTA claim might be in substance an improper
appeal from a municipal court decision in case of a failure to exhaust local
remedies (usually implicated by a failure to file a writ of certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court), or in the absence of a colorable international law claim.
II. NAFTA CASE LAW
Given that the Mondev and Loewen Cases have been referred to as
possibly presenting ajurisdictional conflict between NAFTA tribunals and U.S.
courts, we will concentrate on these two cases below. A summary of the facts
in each of these cases will assist in clarifying their meaning in the present
context.
I. ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (2003),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ADF-award.pdf.
2. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 LL.M. 85
(2003), 1127 (2002).
A. The Mondev Case
The Mondev Case was brought by a Canadian investor against the U.S.
under the "Additional Facility" Rules of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Canada not being a party to the ICSID
Convention. The case arose from a failed Boston real estate investment by the
Canadian investor through its U.S. subsidiary, a Massachusetts limited partner-
ship. The U.S. subsidiary obtained ajury verdict against the City of Boston and
the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) in the Massachusetts Superior
Court. The court ruled, however, that the BRA was immune from liability for
interference with contractual relations based on a Massachusetts statute. Both
the City of Boston and the U.S. subsidiary appealed the lower court's ruling.
Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's ruling with
regard to the BRA and also overturned the jury verdict against the City. The
U.S. subsidiary's petition for a writ of certiorari filed in the U.S. Supreme
Court in respect of the contract claim against the City of Boston was denied
without giving any reasons, as was its petition for rehearing before
Massachusetts' highest court. These decisions effectively put an end to the U.S.
subsidiary's claims under Massachusetts law.
The Canadian investor then brought a proceeding under NAFTAs Chapter
11 alleging U.S. violations of Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105
(Minimum Standard of Treatment), and 1110 (Expropriation and Compensa-
tion), and claiming some fifty million in damages caused to its interests in the
U.S. subsidiary.3 The essence of the Canadian investor's complaint was that the
U.S. courts had frustrated its compensation in respect of a failed investment.
In its Award of October 11, 2002, the NAFTA Tribunal allowed as the
basis of Mondev's claim under NAFTA only the conduct of the U.S. courts in
dismissing the U.S. subsidiary's claims (Art. 11 05(l))." In the circumstances,
the case turned on the presence or absence of a denial of justice by the U.S.
courts. Finding no evidence of such a denial of justice under contemporary
international law in the circumstances, the NAFTA Tribunal dismissed
Mondev's claims in their entirety.
B. The Loewen Case'
The Loewen Case also was an ICSID Additional Facility case brought by
a Canadian investor against the U.S. Loewen's case rested on the judgment and
judicial orders of a Mississippi trial court and the Mississippi Supreme Court,
which judicial acts were alleged to be the relevant government measures under
3. The author's law firm represented the Canadian claimant in the NAFTA case.
4. Id at 110.
5. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003).
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NAFTA Chapter 11 and were alleged to have violated NAFTA Articles 1102,
1105, and 1110. The dispute arose from litigation involving a local funeral
home and funeral insurance business in Mississippi State Court against Loewen.
This litigation resulted in a $500 million jury award against Loewen, by far the
largest verdict ever awarded in Mississippi. The value of the underlying
contract in dispute was a mere $980,000. Loewen did not pursue an appeal in
light of Mississippi State court decisions refusing to relax excessive bond
requirements (125% of the jury award) as a condition to an appeal. Loewen also
did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Loewen finally agreed to settle the Mississippi case for $175 million.
Subsequently, it initiated a proceeding under NAFTAs Chapter 11.
In June 2003, the NAFTA Tribunal dismissed Loewen's claim based on its
failure to show that it had no reasonably available and adequate remedy under
U.S. municipal law in respect of the matters of which it complained.
C. Inconsistent Rulings?
In the light of the facts of these cases, it may be asked: Did the Mondev
and Loewen Tribunals provide openings that should concern or disturb us? The
Mondev Tribunal did express "some sympathy for Mondev's situation" and
found it "implicit in the jury's verdict that there was a campaign by Boston ...
to avoid contractual commitments freely entered into." Yet it dismissed
Mondev's NAFTA claims. To soften the pain, the Tribunal did not make any
order for costs or expenses.
Even though the Loewen Tribunal concluded that there had been a
miscarriage ofjustice by the courts of the U.S. State of Mississippi vis-6-vis the
Canadian investor, including the trial court's failure to take control of the trial,
it still decided not to "use the [NAFTA] weapons at hand to put it right." It did
so even after asking itself the following rhetorical question: "What clearer case
than the present could there be for the ideals of NAFTA to be given some
teeth?" 7
In order fully to understand the rulings of the NAFTA Tribunals in the
Mondev and Loewen Cases, which appear to be sound from an international law
perspective, it will be necessary to examine the international law concepts
underlying them, in particular those of attribution and exhaustion of local
remedies, before a proper evaluation may be made.
6. Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 I.L.M. at 116.
7. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 850.
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III. THE POSITION UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Attribution
It is well-settled under general international law that the unlawful actions
of the U.S. courts, which constitute organs of the U.S. for purposes of inter-
national law, entail the U.S.' responsibility under international law. The Inter-
national Court of Justice has stated that "the conduct of an organ of a state
-even an organ independent of the executive power-must be regarded as an
act of the state."' It also has pointed out in a recent case against the U.S. that
"the international responsibility of a state is engaged by the action of the
competent organs and authorities acting in that state, whatever they may be."9
NAFTA Article 105 confirms this fundamental rule of attribution, which also
is reflected in Article 4 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility, for purposes of NAFTA proceedings.
As the NAFTA Tribunal in ADF Group Inc. v. U.S.A. confirmed "the
established rule of customary international law that acts of all its governmental
organs and entities and territorial units are attributable to the [s]tate and that that
[s]tate as a subject of international law is, accordingly, responsible for the acts
of all its organs and territorial units." '0
Consequently, it is wholly unexceptionable for an international tribunal to
examine whether the decisions of the judicial organs of a state gave rise to a
violation of that state's obligations under international law, and hence triggered
its responsibility under international law.
B. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
When can an investor take action against a foreign state on the inter-
national plane? Under general international law, before pursuing an inter-
national claim, the claimant is bound to exhaust any local remedy that is
adequate and effective so long as the remedy is not obviously futile i.e., so long
as it is not clear in advance that the municipal courts of the state concerned will
not provide redress for the injured investor. This rule was confirmed in the
Ambatielos and Interhandel cases."
8. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29).
9. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3).
10. ADF Group Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/I 166.
11. See 23 I.L.R. 306 Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J., 27 I.L.R. 475 (Mar. 21).
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As we will see, the local remedies rule translates into a rule of judicial
finality in NAFTA cases that are based on a judicial act alleged to violate
international law.
C. Diversity of Nationality
As stated above, we are dealing here with the situation where a non-U.S.
claimant in an international (NAFTA) proceeding complains of a violation of
international law constituted by a U.S. judicial act. As is common in investor-
state proceedings, NAFTA requires diversity of nationality as between a clai-
mant and the respondent government. Therefore, in each NAFTA proceeding
the question must be asked: Is the NAFTA claimant truly a non-U.S. party? In
other words, who owns the claim? Mondev involved injury done directly to a
U.S. limited partnership fully owned by a Canadian company. Mondev brought
the NAFTA claim on its own behalf and not on behalf of its U.S. subsidiary. In
the view of the Mondev Tribunal: "It is true that these interests [relating to
Mondev's investment in the Boston project] were held by [Mondev's U.S.
subsidiary] LPA, but LPA itself was 'owned or controlled directly or indirectly'
by Mondev, and these interests were an 'investment or an investor of a Party'
as defined in Article 1139" of the NAFTA.12 The U.S. had urged the Tribunal
to pierce the corporate veil. The Tribunal found, however, that faced with the
NAFTA scheme, "there does not seem to be any room for the application of any
rules of international law dealing with the piercing of the corporate veil or with
derivative actions by foreign shareholders."' 3
In the Loewen case, Loewen had assigned its NAFTA claims to a Canadian
corporation owned and controlled by a U.S. corporation as part of a reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Loewen Tribunal
warned: "If NAFTA could be used to assert the rights of an American investor
in the instant case, it would in effect create a collateral appeal from the decision
of the Mississippi courts, by definition a unit of the U.S. government.' ' 14 In its
view: "[i]n international law parlance, there must be continuous national
identity from the date of the events giving rise to the claim, which date is known
as the dies a quo, through the date of the resolution of the claim, which date is
known as the dies ad quem."'5 The problem is that NAFTA expressly requires
nationality only on the date of the submission of the claim, the treaty being
silent on the question of whether nationality must continue to the time of
resolution of the claim. The Loewen Tribunal adopted the rule of customary
12. Mondevlnt'lLtd., 42 1.L.M. at 100.
13. Id.
14. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 847.
15. Id
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international law requiring continuous national identity, which it found to
emerge from U.S. non-espousal treaties.
The claim of one of the claimants, the Loewen Group, Inc., was dismissed
due to a lack of diversity of nationality following U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization as a U.S. corporation. This ruling will dissuade claimants from
changing their nationality at tactical points. 6
IV. EVALUATION OF NAFTA CASE LAW
Back to the critical issue at hand, i.e., the exhaustion of local remedies and
its treatment under the NAFTA case law. The Loewen Tribunal held that it
"cannot under the guise of a NAFTA claim entertain what is in substance an
appeal from a domestic judgment."' 7 It rightly pointed out that a "NAFTA
claim cannot be converted into an appeal against the decisions of municipal
courts"'" and that "the [s]tate is not responsible for the errors of its courts when
the decision has not been appealed to the court of last resort."' 9  Most
importantly, the Tribunal stated that:
the whole trial and its resultant verdict were clearly improper and
discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum standards of inter-
national law and fair and equitable treatment. However, because the
trial court proceedings are only part of the judicial process that is
available to the parties, the rest of the process, and its availability to
Loewen, must be examined before a violation of Article 1105 [of
NAFTA] is established.20
As the Tribunal pointed out, however, the problem is that NAFTA "says
nothing expressly about the requirement that, in the context of a judicial
violation of international law, the judicial process be continued to the highest
level."'2' At the same time, "[n]or is there any basis for implying any dispen-
sation of that requirement. '22 The Tribunal concluded that "Article 1121
involves no waiver of the duty to pursue local remedies in its application to a
16. For an instructive ICSID case containing an elaborate discussion of the diversity of nationality
requirement and corporate nationality under international law, see Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/I 8 (2004), http.//www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm#award3O.
17. Loewen Group, Inc, 42 I.L.M. at 819.
18. Id. at 833.
19. Id. at 834.
20. Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 837.
22. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 837.
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breach of international law constituted by a judicial act.",2 3 It came up with its
own version of the international law rule requiring exhaustion of remedies: "It
is an obligation to exhaust remedies which are effective and adequate and are
reasonably available to the complainant in the circumstances in which it is
situated.
24
Given that Loewen had entered into a settlement agreement instead of
appealing the merits of its case, the Tribunal concluded:
[This] is not a case in which it can be said that it was the only course,
which Loewen could reasonably be expected to take. Accordingly,
our conclusion is that Loewen failed to pursue its domestic remedies,
notably the Supreme Court option.
In other words, it failed to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court. 25
Interestingly, the Tribunal attached the following postscript to its decision:
[W]e find nothing in NAFTA to justify the exercise by this Tribunal
of an appellate function parallel to that which belongs to the courts of
the host nation. In the last resort, a failure by that nation to provide
adequate means of remedy may amount to an international wrong but
only in the last resort. The line may be hard to draw, but it is real. 6
By contrast to the Canadian investor in Loewen, the investor in Mondev
did file an appeal and a petition for a writ of certiori in the U.S. Supreme Court,
and thus had exhausted all local remedies in that there was a final judicial act
of the municipal courts. The U.S. initially claimed that there was a lack of a
final judicial act, but it withdrew this objection later in the proceeding. As the
Tribunal pointed out:
It will be a matter for the investor to decide whether to commence
arbitration immediately, with the concomitant requirement under
Article 1121 of a waiver of any further recourse to any local remedies
in the host state, or whether initially to claim damages with respect to
the measure before the local courts.27
23. Id. at 838.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 851.
27. Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 I.L.M. at 103.
In the circumstances, the Mondev Case turned on the question whether or
not there had been a denial of justice (the standard of treatment of aliens
applicable to decisions of the host state's courts or tribunals) under NAFTA
Article 1105(1). As the Tribunal stated:
It is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary
and another to second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest
courts of a state. Under NAFTA, parties have the option to seek local
remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits, it is not the function
of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal.28
The Tribunal cited another NAFTA case, Azinian v. United Mexican
States, which had held that a denial of justice may exist if:
a) The relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit;
b) There was undue delay in the relevant courts;
c) The relevant courts administered justice in a seriously
inadequate way; or
d) There was a clear and malicious misapplication of the law.29
The standard formulated by the Mondev Tribunal was the following:
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having
regard to generally accepted standards of the administration ofjustice,
a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the
impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the
result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable
treatment.30
The Loewen Tribunal cited this standard with approval. 1 These considera-
tions by the Mondev and Loewen Tribunals are all perfectly sound from the
perspective of international law and should put to rest any concerns that
NAFTA tribunals might sit as courts of appeal over municipal decisions of
NAFTA member states.
28. Id. at 109.
29. See Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, 39 I.L.M. 537, 552
(2000).
30. Mondev Int'l Ltd., 42 l.L.M. at 110.
31. See Loewen Group, Inc, 42 I.L.M. at 838. According to the Loewen Tribunal, "a court decision
which can be challenged through the judicial process does not amount to a denial ofjustice at the international
level." Id. at 836. "...the pursuit of local remedies plays a part in creating the ground of complaint that there
has been a breach of international law." Id. at 838.
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V. DISTINGUISHING THE FORK-IN-THE-ROAD PROBLEM
The situation examined here must be distinguished from that where an
investor attempts to have a "second bite at the apple" after having pursued
domestic proceedings, otherwise known as the "Fork-in-the-Road Problem."
This problem may be described as follows: If an investor has initiated domestic
litigation (or contractual arbitration) in respect of a particular dispute, does he
still have available the alternative of treaty arbitration in respect of that dispute?
By comparison, Article 26(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) stipulates
that, for Contracting Parties who are signatories of the ECTs Annex ID (an opt-
out annex), consent to treaty arbitration is not given where the investor has
previously submitted the dispute to the courts of the Contracting Party or to a
previously agreed dispute settlement procedure. In other words, the ECT
prevents a party from pleading treaty breaches in two separate arbitrations. It
does not, however, bar a party from pleading contract breach at one time, and
treaty breach at another.32 The NAFTA claims discussed above all concerned
alleged breaches of NAFTA and customary international law.
It is true that NAFTA Article 1121 requires that the would-be claimant to
a NAFTA arbitration waive its "right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute
settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the dis-
puting [NAFTA] party that is alleged to be a breach" of Section A of NAFTAs
Chapter 11 and must desist from pursuing claims for damages in relation to such
measures. But that provision has nothing to do with the local remedies rule. On
the other hand, the rule of judicial finality is tied to the local remedies rule.
As the Loewen Tribunal explained, "[a]rticle 1121 involves no waiver of
the duty to pursue local remedies in its application to a breach of international
law constituted by a judicial act."33
In that scenario, "the pursuit of local remedies plays a part in creating the
ground of complaint that there has been a breach of international law."34 On the
other hand, the Tribunal pointed out, "Article 1121 may have consequences
where a claimant complains of a violation of international law not constituted
by a judicial act.",31 It all depends on the essential basis of the cause of action
that is pleaded. As the ICSID Tribunal in Vivendi v. Argentine Republic held,
"[I]n a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an international
32. See Michael Polkinghorne, Investor-StateDispute Resolution Under The Energy Charter Treaty:
Which Fork? Which Road?, 19 MEALEY'S INT'L ARBITRATION REP. 13 (2004).
33. Loewen Group, Inc., 42 I.L.M. at 838.
34. Id.
35. Id.
Bekker
tribunal is a breach of contract, the tribunal will give effect to any valid choice
of forum clause in the contract.
3 6
Thus, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, an inter-
national claim for breach of treaty (such as NAFTA) and, on the other hand, a
breach of domestic legal obligations. As the ICSID Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan
pointed out: "the same set of facts can give rise to different claims grounded on
differing legal orders: the municipal and the international legal orders." 37 This
distinction is also reflected in Article 3 of the ILCs Articles on State Respon-
sibility. NAFTA cases are restricted to the international legal order.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the above review of the decisions in the Mondev and Loewen
Cases, the conclusion is inescapable that there is no need for panic. These cases
do not present a jurisdictional conflict with U.S. courts. It should be kept in
mind that there is no de novo review in NAFTA proceedings. As the NAFTA
Tribunal in ADF Group, Inc. v. U.S.A. stated:
The Tribunal has no authority to review the legal validity and stand-
ing of the U.S. measures here in question under U.S. internal admini-
strative law. We do not sit as a court with appellate jurisdiction with
respect to the U.S. measures. Ourjurisdiction is confined by NAFTA
Article 113 1 (1) to assaying the consistency of the U.S. measures with
relevant provisions of NAFTA Chapter eleven and applicable rules
of international law.38
Recent state reluctance to accept that judicial acts may give rise to inter-
national claims under the NAFTA Chapter eleven scheme is redolent of argu-
ments raised by Latin American states resorting to the Calvo Doctrine. As the
Loewen and Mondev decisions and those of ICSID tribunals demonstrate, non-
domestic tribunals have not allowed, and should not allow, themselves to be
used for obtaining domestic relief not previously sought in the domestic courts.
The claims underlying these decisions were claims under international law for
violations of NAFTA. As long as NAFTA tribunals continue to adhere to a
strict interpretation of the local remedies/judicial finality and diversity of
nationality requirements along the lines of international law, there should be no
jurisdictional conflicts.
36. Compania de Aguas Aconquija S.A v. Vivendi Universal, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 98
(2002), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/vivendi-annul.pdf.
37. SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 42 I.L.M. 1290,
1313,1 147 (2003).
38. ADF Group Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 190.
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Investors will need to file a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court lest they find themselves struck out under NAFTA Chapter eleven based
on the non-fulfillment of the rule of judicial finality. Most importantly,
however, if the domestic courts (arguably) got it wrong under international law
and if the rule of judicial finality is satisfied, NAFTA remedies should be
available and such suits will not be frivolous or abusive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to be part of this panel devoted to the Middle East and of this
year's rich program at International Law Weekend.
I have decided not to speak directly about Arab human rights today, despite
the title of my panel. I believe you will agree with this decision, given that most
of what I have to say about the recent context of human rights in Arab countries
is pessimistic. The post September 11, 2001 context has allowed political
systems in the Middle East to use deterring terrorism as an excuse to clamp
down on human rights to a worrying extent. I shall talk a little about human
rights in Arab countries, but mostly as an example of a broader argument I
would like to present to you about law and politics in the Middle East.
I would like to discuss instead a general issue that has been of interest to
me since fieldwork I did as a Fulbright Scholar in Morocco in the early 1990s.
At that time, I was visiting the uncle of a Moroccan professor friend of mine in
a quintessentially rural village in a really remote region of the country. This is
the sort of place that took hours to get to by bus from the nearest large town, and
had the electricity and running water cut off for hours every day. There I was
having tea with a man in an unheated living room with no electricity and far
away in space and time from think tanks in Cairo or Washington. Then we
started to talk about politics. My host astonished me by stating bluntly that "the
real problem in our local and national politics is instilling popular respect for the
rule of law." As the lights occasionally flickered on and our tea was refreshed,
* Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Center for Public Policy and
Administration, University of Massachusetts-Amherst; A.B., Princeton University, A.M., J.D., Ph.D.
(expected), Harvard University. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the
International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
from October 20 to 22, 2004.
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we proceeded to speak for an hour or so about the rule of law and politics in
Morocco.
I decided that I wished to follow up on this conversation. More specifi-
cally, my sense that even in isolated parts of Arab countries people appreciated
the idea of the rule of law in sophisticated ways led me to conduct research on
how this is used more generally in contemporary political discourse by diverse
politically-active Arabs. Since my initial interest in this general area, even
before the Bush Administration's self-created challenge of trying to shape a
viable political and legal order in Iraq, the importance of the rule of law in Arab
societies has gained enormous ground as a focus in Washington. Out of a sense
that neither Arab democratic political institutions nor integration into the global
economy can occur without the rule of law, well-meaning American policy-
makers and legal practitioners have built a new industry to teach Middle
Easterners their collected wisdom as to how law works. As Tom Carothers at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has observed, however,
American rule of law specialists often operate with a striking lack of clear
knowledge about what and how they are doing.'
This problem is especially evident with respect to contemporary Arab
societies. Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa generally share two
features: non-democratic governments; and legal systems that are a patchwork
of Islamic, Ottoman, European, and contemporary sources. It certainly does not
make sense to presume that thinkers and practitioners trained in an Anglo-
American common law tradition can build respect for the rule of law by
transporting and transplanting their technocratic techniques to such different
legal soil. Indeed, the very idea that people in Arab societies would be receptive
to being taught by Americans how to reform their legal systems in the current
climate of popular mistrust of the United States reflects some combination of
elitism, hubris, and ignorance.
Thus, there is little reason to believe that American lawyers can bring the
rule of law directly to Arabs. Nonetheless, there are grounds to appreciate the
importance of shoring up law's potential to check the political centralization and
corruption of contemporary Arab political systems. This talk embraces the
assumption that enhancements in the rule of law may be useful to Arab citizens,
who generally have concerns about the accountability and performance of their
governments. However, I also argue that it is crucial to map out the terrain and
contours of law in the current political context of these societies, rather than
simply taking on faith that they are conducive to improvement by American
legal practice. Indeed, selective enhancement of the rule of law in Arab
1. Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 5 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003).
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societies may actually have the effect of shoring up political authoritarianism,
as one might opine has happened in recent years in Egypt.
While important specific areas of tension exist between how the rule of law
is conceptualized in the United States and Arab societies, the rule of law is
generally appreciated as useful and in need of amelioration within the Middle
East. The impediment for American rule of law advisors does not, therefore, lie
in a lack of Arab desire for more predictable, responsive, and fair laws. Instead,
the problem is a widespread two-fold Arab concern about the United States as
the messenger for the rule of law in the Middle East. First is a common sense
that U.S. policymakers do not know or care to know basic aspects of law,
politics, and society in Arab countries. Second is an even stronger perception
that the United States does not, in fact, practice what it preaches in fealty to the
rule of law through its government's policies, particularly those in the Middle
East.
As a result, well-intentioned American efforts to export ideas about the rule
of law to Arabs are unlikely to succeed unless and until the U.S. is seen as less
hypocritical in its own embrace of the rule of law at home and abroad. Even
should this happen, I argue below, the rule of law as an export industry seems
inherently problematic because it cannot be decoupled from the broader
challenge of bolstering political accountability and limits on governments in
Arab countries.
With this basic point in mind, after discussing in brief what is meant by the
rule of law, I turn to ways in which the understanding and the politics of the rule
of law are, as a general matter, similar and different in American and Arab
societies.
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN ARAB AND AMERICAN CONTEXTS
Before discussing the rule of law in the Middle East, it is important to be
clearer about the meaning of the concept itself. The brevity of this talk and the
complex ways in which the concept is used defy a complete answer to this
definitional issue. Nonetheless, the rule of law generally refers to the pre-
eminence of legal norms over personal political authority, or, as often form-
ulated, a government of laws, not men.
Although the concept is used in diverse and imprecise ways,2 it typically
is grounded in an assumption of some separation between a society's politics
and law.3 Specifically, the rule of law is meant to protect people from anarchy,
2. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); FRANK UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Papers No. 30, 2002).
3. Gerhard Robbers, The Rule of law and its Ethical Foundations, in THE RULE OF LAW (Josef
Thesing ed., 1997).
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unpredictability, and arbitrariness. In broad terms, the rule of law suggests a
promise that legal supremacy, stability, and accountability will prevail over
leaders' caprices.
However, the extent to which politics can or even should be entirely sepa-
rated from law is unclear; it varies within and across societies. At the same
time, the rule of law does not mean or guarantee that ordinary citizens enjoy the
same access to legal resources as leaders. Despite the ideal of laws trumping
leaders, the reality is that the drafters, executors, or interpreters of law can flout
this ideal unless meaningful accountability and transparency exist in a political
system.
Indeed, one vein of recent social scientific scholarship on the rule of law
insists that it is, to some extent, an unrealizable ideal that is inseparable from
specific politics.' Perhaps because of the real questions of whether and how law
can truly curb abuses by the leaders of powerful countries, ideas about imple-
menting the rule of law often focus on the relatively limited dimension of
improving procedural regularity in courts or lawyers' guilds. More fruitful
approaches might look instead at detailed assessments of how political and legal
systems do and do not approximate rule of law ideals in such areas as legal
restraints on government, legal system neutrality, and human rights.
In the late 1990s, members of the U.S. foreign policy community con-
cerned with the democratization of non-Western political systems increasingly
asserted that globalization of economic free markets and representative political
institutions could only take root in societies with shared respect for the rule of
law. However, there is little empirical research as to how such shared respect
is established or how the rule of law is conceptualized and contested in specific
non-Western contexts. The research that does exist tends to be focused
narrowly on judicial opinions and the function of courts, rather than whether or
how popular the understanding of or respect for law may matter to legal and
political systems more generally.
The rule of law industry has grown, despite this dearth of research as to
how the rule of law is established and legitimized in a society. In Arab societies
where Washington is prone to underestimate the importance and variations of
popular political attitudes, limiting treatment of the rule of law to the perfor-
mance of elite judicial institutions would seem to compound a major error of
U.S. foreign policy. Some specification of the nature and contested political
meanings of the rule of law that moves beyond judges and courtrooms is
therefore important. My discussion today is limited to the putative connection
between legalism and democratic development. I believe that the contemporary
Arab context suggests that the rule of law cannot and should not be readily
decoupled from its general political situation. Thus, aiming to improve the rule
4. DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 15 (Josd Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, eds. 2003).
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of law without confronting a broader authoritarian backdrop can do little to
foster democratization or better law, for that matter.
This is not to imply either that the rule of law is absent from Arab societies
or that these societies are inherently or unalterably undemocratic. On the
contrary, a major point below is that the rule of law, as an ideal, is similar in
Arab and American societies. However, this ideal should be understood with
reference to the reality of its past and present use by external and internal
autocrats to serve political centralization. For this reason, I argue below that the
best hope for American-based rule of law work in Arab contexts is in areas that
have the potential to decrease the gap between ideal and reality in the
subordination of government elites to laws.
A. Points in Common
As is true in the United States, the rule of law has been an influential
doctrine in Arab political history. Indeed, the Islamic and Ottoman socio-legal
traditions that contribute to contemporary Arab law predate the Anglo-American
common law by many centuries. Moreover, the Middle Eastern origin should
not be forgotten of two of the most ancient legal codes of all: the Code of
Hammurabi and the Judeo-Christian Bible. Thus, no serious discussion about
the potential for American rule of law specialists to bolster the rule of law in
Arab states can proceed without acknowledgment that the concept has firm roots
in Middle Eastern soil.
I focus on points in common between Islamic and American law. This is
sensible in light of the fact that Islam dominated the development and practice
of law from the seventh century until the present. Moreover, the dominant
contemporary trope of political discourse and opposition in Arab countries at
present remains Islamic, so the idea that Islamic law may have some significant
resemblance to law in the United States has implications for contemporary rule
of law work. Nonetheless, a comprehensive discussion of how the legal land-
scape in Arab societies might be recognizable to American law specialists
would require consideration of more dimensions of Arab law than can be
discussed in this modest presentation.
Among the sociopolitical effects of Islam from its seventh-century incep-
tion is three of obvious relevance to the rule of law. The first is the general
understanding of Muslims that Islamic political theory specifically stressed
political accountability by insisting that rulers' legitimacy was grounded in their
status as defenders of the Islamic faith and its principles, whether this status is
based on descent from the prophet Muhammed's bloodline or some other
distinction. In particular, rulers were to be judged by qualified Islamic scholars
and Muslims more generally on their record of executing and enforcing Islamic
law.
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To be sure, leaders historically used their military power more frequently
to subjugate than to empower Muslim jurists in the exercise of their mandate to
determine when Islamic law was being upheld. Nonetheless, the connection of
political legitimacy and legalism cannot be ignored as a core concept in Islamic
history. In short, if the very purpose of an Islamic political order is to execute
law, the rule of law is, in theory, integral to Muslim society.
A second point is the manner in which concerns about justice have been
centrally and popularly embedded in Islam. Justice as a concept and a discourse
is ubiquitous in the Qur'an. Moreover, Islam's emphasis on justice includes
significant emphases on social equity and individual rights. Thus, discussions
of many of the general and specific issues that frame legal discourse are
engrained in the religious identity of the large majority of people in Arab
societies.
The importance of justice within Islam also contributed to the fact that
Islamic jurisprudence never fully developed a concept of natural law. This has
meant that there is no clear theory to ground legitimate, a completely secular
legal order, as natural law helped do over time in the West.
A third, if more contentious point, is that Islamic political theory can be
read as presupposing two central tenets that have clear relevance to contem-
porary discussions of the rule of law: despite the ideal that political authority
exists for the benefit of Islam, authority in practice will tend towards absolu-
tism, rather than subordinating itself to communal legitimacy or justice; and
resources autonomous from the state (civil society) are therefore needed to
check leaders' actions. In essence, a significant tendency of classical Islamic
legal theory is a distrust of government and an emphasis on finding legal ways
to constrain authority that would sound quite familiar to many Americans.
One major scholar of the Middle East argues that Islamic law shares a
fourth and crucial feature of Anglo-American law-a common law system.
Anthropologist Lawrence Rosen makes a good case for considering as funda-
mentally similar American and Islamic laws' reliance on local courts and local
cultural information as characteristics that distinguish both from the legal
centralization of a civil law system.5 Thus, American and Arab lawyers may
share a similar understanding of the importance of locally-grounded legal
process, among other things.
Nonetheless, experts such as Rosen emphasize that similarities between
legal systems exist alongside significant differences. For instance, American
and Islamic common law vary in crucial ways, such as American law's doctrine
of litigating a particular legal issue once to establish a future precedent, as
opposed to Islamic law's predilection towards assuming that no two sets of
5. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW AND
SOCIETY 48 (2000).
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litigants are alike even when issues are similar. Thus, an appreciation that legal
systems in the United States and the Middle East may share important features
should not carry with it an assumption that differences can or should be mini-
mized. I turn now to some of the most basic and important of these differences.
B. Points in Contention
The rule of law exists as a political touchstone in Arab societies, just as it
does in the United States. Yet particular differences in the sociopolitical
environment of the Middle East and North America shape local understandings
and implementation of the rule of law in significant ways. Prime among these
is an important, if sometimes over-stated, source of many contemporary Arabs'
concerns about Western countries' politics, the multifaceted impact of Ottoman
and European colonial domination.
The impact of foreign great power rule on the rule of law in the Middle
East and North Africa was threefold. First, it led to a patchwork of legal orders
in a given society, rather than the relatively long-standing growth of a unitary
national legal system such as occurred in the United States. Second, it set up an
authoritarian norm that law would in fact be subordinated to imperial political
power. Third, and related to this, it fostered a tendency for constitutions to exist
without a significant history of judicial interpretation. In some states, such as
Morocco, this led to frequent redrafts of the constitution to reflect changes in the
power or preoccupations of political authority, in contrast with the American
norm of a single basic constitutional document that can only be modified with
difficulty.
The legal system of every contemporary Arab nation is a unique mixture
of Islamic, Ottoman, European, and post-independent laws.6 To be sure, a
number of territories escaped direct foreign domination, most notably in the
Persian Gulf. The mixture of sources of law in most Arab societies does not in
itself preclude legal clarity or the development of legal checks on authority.
However, along with the lapses in territorial and ethnic logic that European
colonial powers frequently employed in setting borders for many of the contem-
porary nations of the Middle East, the lack of legal systemic unity in Arab states
has two logical consequences for recent American-fostered efforts to enhance
the rule of law: the jurisprudential reference points of lawyers in the United
States are not likely to be of direct use to Arab societies; and post-colonial Arab
leaders have had many incentives to centralize their authority and no real legal
impediments.
6. For a succinct summary of the combination of sources of law in each Arab area, see NATHAN
J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 3-5 (1997).
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This second source of general Arab sociopolitical divergence is even more
obviously related to the primary legacy of colonialism in the Middle East - an
emphasis on control backed by force that was not meant primarily to serve the
best interests of indigenous citizens. The political example that socialized Arab
nationalist elites was the resort by colonial regimes to fictitious and fallacious
political forms like mandates and protectorates to conceal their exercise of raw
military power. Legal norms and institutions existed under colonialism in
which the contradictions between stated and true purposes were readily
apparent.
At the same time, these norms and institutions were somewhat successful
at centralizing political and economic administration. While Arab nationalists
rebelled against colonial rule, they also learned that the lofty promises of
colonial political ideas were generally subservient, or even in direct contrast to
the reality of police control. Small wonder that facing severe economic and
other challenges, these nationalists built on, instead of dismantling, the legacies
of authoritarian rule that they inherited.
To be sure, the ideal of the rule of law will often be at odds with the
centralizing tendencies of governments. My argument is that Arab states in the
Middle East, in general, had an especially wide gap between ideal and reality
because of the combination of the relative lack of autonomous pre-colonial,
unified, legal order in these states, and the repressive tendencies of colonial
governments. More subtly, I am suggesting that the level of discontinuity
between the rational, legalistic values preached by European administrators and
their practice of resource extraction and police rule tainted the very ideal of the
rule of law in a way that is unlikely to resonate with the socialization of many
American lawyers.
In short, many Arabs view the rule of law in a manner similar to American
legal scholars on the left, as an ideology of political control, not as a check on
political abuse. Of course, this does not mean that post-independent Arab
regimes lacked a legal system or avoided legal centralization and growth.
Indeed, most Arab states have basic laws or constitutions. Thus, a third major
distinction between Arab and American political experiences with the rule of
law is not that Arab constitutions do not matter, but that they have been subject
to less institutionalization and independent judicial interpretation than has the
U.S. Constitution.
This difference is neither surprising nor unknown to American rule of law
experts. In fact, given Arab political centralization, the very existence of con-
stitutions is at least as interesting a political phenomenon as the dearth of
independent judicial interpretative traditions for these documents.7 For my
7. For a very good treatment of the importance of Arab constitutions, see NATHAN J. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2002).
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purposes here, however, it is worth underscoring the challenge that the juxta-
position of constitutions and political regimes with few genuine legal checks
poses for building broad social support or even judicial competence for the rule
of law.
A fourth difference of approach to the rule of law between U.S. and Arab
societies does not connect directly to the Middle East's history of outside great
power influence, but it is the relationship of law and religion. Within the United
States, religious pluralism has led to the ideal that law should facilitate the
separation of church and state. However, with the notable exceptions of
Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, Arab societies have predominantly Muslim popula-
tions, and have built political orders that often establish Islam as a state religion.
Thus, laws and legal institutions in many Arab states, even those with
secularized leaders, privilege Islam and its traditions.
Of course, most scholars of American Constitutional law would assert that
the separation of church and state in the United States is far from perfect or
unproblematic, and has often favored Christianity and its ideas. Nonetheless,
the assumption that Islam should inform the political and social order has
caused, and is likely to continue to cause, misunderstandings and difficulties for
would-be American political reformers in the region.
The extent to which Islam in general, and the shari 'a in particular, should
inform the rule of law and what forms this should take is a complicated, current
area of great debate and discussion among Arab and non-Arab Muslim scholars.
Adding to the complexity of this issue is the theoretical contradiction between
the Islamic ideal of siyyasa al-shari'a, or the rule of God's law, and siyadat al-
qanun, or the rule of man-made law. The latter term, the general way in which
the Western idea of the rule of law is translated into Arabic, conveys with it a
patina of illegitimacy to many Muslims.
However, there is no obvious reason that the ideal political effects of the
rule of law, constraining governmental abuse and providing procedural fairness,
are impossible to achieve in a society with an established religion, so long as
religious dissenters and minorities receive legal protection. Yet understanding,
navigating, and being sensitive to the ways that religion and politics are
intertwined in most Arab societies is a daunting task for American rule of law
experts and one that their own socialization and training in the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution is unlikely to facilitate.
It is important to reiterate that the above four major differences between
Arab and American experiences with the rule of law do not eliminate the
possibility that Arab governments can have more robust legal checks or that
many Arabs are predisposed towards the rule of law. My argument is instead
that the experiential differences discussed above pose intellectual barriers for
American law specialists who seek to strengthen the rule of law in the Middle
East. Moreover, these differences raise some Arabs' suspicions that American
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lawyers are functioning in the manner of previous agents of Western foreign
powers, whose attractive political words concealed their complicity in imperial
coercion.
In short, would-be American rule of law experts face a variety of specific
and general challenges in trying to bring legal reform to Arab societies:
1) The diverse sources and systems of law;
2) The authoritarian legacy of colonialism;
3) The lack of authority and tradition of judicial review; and
4) The connection between the mosque and state.
These are all features of the Middle Eastern legal landscape that hobble
easy access for lawyers whose primary grounding is in American common law
and politics. Furthermore, a general wariness towards Western incursion,
alongside a particular negative reaction to American foreign policy since 9/11,
creates a particularly unreceptive current environment for rule of law reformers
with even the best of techniques and intentions. What then, is to be done?
III. REFORMING THE RULE OF LAW REFORMERS?
One simple response to the formidable challenges to U.S.-based rule of law
work in Arab countries is to give up on it. Indeed, there is something to be said
for this. American foreign policy hubris and na'vet6 in general often have
exacerbated the ability of the U.S. to influence political change in the region.
Humility and introspection in the face of a genuine crisis in American-Arab
foreign relations may prove to be the best strategy in the long run to foster legal
reform. After all, Arabs themselves are best-suited to understand and work in
the diverse and different sociopolitical environments discussed above. Given
the pessimism in Washington for Arab political transformation as a result of the
challenge of Iraq, the winding down of U.S. rule of law work in the Middle East
may in fact be the most likely scenario.
However, I do not believe that abandoning the possibility of a useful role
for Americans in Arab legal reform is the only conclusion that follows from my
analysis. Facilitating changes in Arab societies that increase the legal system's
prospects for moderating governmental excess continues to be one possible way
of improving Arabs' lives. The key to rule of law work in the Middle East is the
realization that it cannot get very far if it is decoupled from broader strategies,
which address the repressive tendencies of authoritarian regimes in the region,
along with the popular perceptions of many Arabs that the U.S. government is
complicit in this repression.
Arab governments consistently rank among the worst cases in the world in
their refusal to uphold their citizens' political freedoms, human rights, and civil
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liberties. Explanations abound for the resilience of Arab authoritarianism.8 Yet,
a core part of this issue is Washington's understandable, if short-sighted,
general preference for governments in the Middle East that it might characterize
as stable, whether or not such stability comes at the point of a gun. The second-
largest recipient of American foreign aid in almost every year since the late
1970's, Egypt, has used its funds to buy weapons and police to enforce the
government of the very unpopular and anti-democratic military leader Hosni
Mubarak. Long-term studies of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are clear
that Washington's predilection for maintaining extant regimes usually
outweighs its commitment to popular accountability and democratization.
The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has intensified this trend. The unpopular
governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have delibe-
rately emphasized the message to American policymakers that their repressive
politics are necessary to combat Islamic extremism. Whether or not Washing-
ton insiders are persuaded by this message, the need to line up Arab support to
help with the war and reconstruction in Iraq has made it an especially unlikely
time for the United States to press its allies in the region. For all the Bush
Administration's rhetoric about democracy and change in the Middle East,
regional human rights and democratic reform outside of Afghanistan and Iraq
have received little sustained attention.
In other words, democratic activists in Arab societies are right to express
frustration with the U.S. government's actions, for they correctly perceive a
discontinuity between American democratic ideals and American governments'
general practice of supporting repressive rulers. Ironically, one of the ways that
authoritarian governments in the Middle East, including those closely linked to
Washington, have tried to deflect their citizens' dissatisfaction has been to fan
the flames of anti-Israel feeling, which, in turn, fuels Arab anger towards the
Jewish state's major ally. It may not seem reasonable to Americans that many
Arabs harbor such hostility for Washington's stalwart support of Israel.
Nonetheless, this issue is undoubtedly one of the things that poison potential
dialogue between Arabs and Americans.
Short of an unlikely major foreign policy overhaul, what can American
policy-makers and rule of law specialists do to help Arab legal systems function
more credibly? The obvious first step is for rule of law reform efforts to take
into account the greater cultural and political similarities with respect to the rule
of law between Arabs and Westerners, while also making efforts to understand
and tailor programs geared towards the specific differences discussed above.
This is undoubtedly an easy suggestion for well-intended rule of law activists
8. See, e.g., 36/2 COMPARATIVE POLITICS (Jan. 2004) (a special issue devoted entirely to explaining
Arab authoritarianism); DANIEL BRUMBERG, LIBERALIZATION VERSUS DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING ARAB
POLITICAL REFORM (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 37, 2003).
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to embrace, and one which people engaged in rule of law work undoubtedly
strive to achieve. Nonetheless, it will require much more research and on-the-
ground knowledge to realize.
A second, more challenging step that would-be rule of law reformers
should take, is to appreciate the importance of viewing rule of law work as
inextricably connected to the broader context of authoritarian politics in most
Arab states. Specifically, specialists must craft their programs and arguments
to project a clear understanding that entrenched authoritarian institutions, often
supported by the United States rather than anti-democratic cultural norms, are
the major impediment to expanding the role that legal norms and institutions can
play in expanding political freedom and participation. Indeed, some apprecia-
tion that even societies like the United States that view themselves as shining
examples of the rule of law can show tarnish in some of their practices. Doing
these things, in turn, can contribute to the credibility problem of American
advisors preaching legalism at the same time that the American government is
perceived to stand for supporting repressive regimes and projecting force in a
neo-imperialistic manner.
Rule of law activists need not despair of the impossibility of achieving
these two general policy prescriptions. There are specific strategies that they
can follow that have yielded positive results both in terms of increasing the
pressures of law on centralized politics in Arab states and boosting the
credibility of American reformers. Let me mention four such strategies:
1) Link up with Arab activists and initiatives;
2) Localize the scope of reform to particular issues or sectors that
increase legal pressures for political accountability;
3) Look for openings that move reform work beyond a narrow elite of
judges and politicians;
4) Let issues like education, Internet access and freedom of the press get
onto the reform agenda that may be prerequisites, rather than obvious
components of respect for the rule of law.
This is, of course, where human rights reform in Arab societies is very
instructive. As I have argued at length elsewhere,9 a variety of politicized
groups in several Arab countries in the 1980s and early 1990s found human
rights activism particularly useful, because it manifested the potential to chip
away at state authoritarianism. More specifically, international human rights
activism in two countries I know well, Morocco, and Tunisia, was able to make
use of all four of the above strategies and link up particularly well with local
9. See David M. Mednicoff, Think Locally, Act Globally? Cultural Framing and Human Rights
Movements in Tunisia and Morocco, 7 INT'L J. HUMAN RIGHTS 72-102 (2003).
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initiatives to the extent that it seemed to connect with pressuring governments
to liberalize politically. In Morocco, the ongoing synergy between rights
activism and gradual political opening has meant a continuation and diversifica-
tion of human rights politics, such as the recent effort that bridged international
and indigenous feminists to reform the country's mudawana, or family code in
early 2004.
The release of prominent Egyptian sociologist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, from
an Egyptian prison in 2003 for his criticism of Hosni Mubarak's government is
also notable for its involvement of a coalition of Arab and Western lawyers,
intellectuals, and other activists. This coalition managed to get the Bush
Administration to put high-level pressure on the Egyptian government, which
in turn, publicized the extent to which Mubarak's trial and sentencing flouted
the ideals of the rule of law. Even though Ibrahim's release appears to be a
more modest accomplishment than might the training of an entire cadre of
judges in Anglo-American jurisprudence, it serves the growth of the rule of law
precisely because it highlights the general manner in which a well-developed
Arab legal system can nonetheless be subordinated to authoritarian politics.
The above suggested strategic orientations all build on four major points that
follow from my comments:
1) The rule of law as an ideal is relevant to and understandable within
Arab societies;
2) The legacy and endurance of authoritarianism in Arab countries
engenders understandable cynicism about governments' and out-
siders' use of the term;
3) Rule of law work cannot therefore be decoupled from addressing the
resilience of political elites who see law as serving, rather than con-
straining them;
4) The particular differences between the Arab and American contexts
for the rule of law and the particular distrust which many Arabs have
for the U.S. government require circumspection, caution, and coali-
tion with Arab activists if rule of law work is to have even a modest
hope of success.
My sketch here of the broad problems and prospects for rule of law work in
contemporary Arab societies and the conclusions that follow, should not be read
as an attack on American specialists who believe in the importance of
strengthening the promise of equality, rights, and political accountability for the
betterment of Arabs in general. I am instead proceeding from a posture which
is likely to be shared by the most experienced and proficient of these activists
-that a scaling-down of expectations and a scaling-up of patience represent the
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best prospect for any hope of improvement in the sustained subjugation of law
by Arab leaders.
Echoing Alexis deTocqueville's well-known sense that lawyers are less
inclined than many others to political rashness, I would like to think that
American practitioners of rule of law projects in Arab societies would push for
this policy area to be characterized by diligence, deliberation, and diplomacy,
rather than a legal missionary posture that has little to do with current regional
realities. In any case, as much as we lawyers might like to think otherwise, the
social scientist side of my academic background suggests to me that working to
dismantle authoritarian governments in Arab countries is more likely to foster
the rule of law than the other way around.
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I. INTRODUCTION
My objective in this paper is not to use international law as another weapon
in the conflict, as further fuel to fan the flames, as it's so often used in this
conflict, but instead to use it as a message to both Palestinians and Israelis:
Stop. Enough. A plague on both your houses. The point is to get the parties
back to negotiating a peace agreement by using international law to demonstrate
that each side's brutality through armed action only engenders a reciprocal
armed brutality by the other in a classic cycle of violence.
This approach is prompted by three developments:
1) First, the utter insanity of the current impasse, the mutually
destructive behavior in which close to 4000 people have been
* Dean's Distinguished Research Scholar and Director, Center for Global Law and Practice,
Syracuse University College of Law. Professor Arzt would like to thank Demian Casey, Syracuse University
College of Law class of 2005, for sharing his research on this topic, which will be published in the Syracuse
Journal of Law and Commerce, Spring 2005 issue. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks
presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the City of New
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killed in the four years since the second Intifada began-over
2800 Palestinians and over 900 Israelis - with no end in sight.'
Indeed, in the last two weeks [not counting the Taba bombings,
which may have been by Egyptian militants and not Hamas],
another 100 have died, including perhaps 30 children, primarily
Palestinian. The two sides are incapable of breaking the cycle
themselves, in part because they won't let the other side have
the last shot, literally;
2) Second, the International Court of Justice's July 2004 advisory
opinion about the Separation Wall,2 particularly, the hysterical
Israeli rejection of it. Because Israel did not concede jurisdic-
tion and the opinion, in their view, ignored the murder of Israeli
citizens in repeated terrorist attacks, it has been perceived there
as just another piece of one-sided, politicized anti-Zionist
propaganda from the UN. Therefore, in my estimation, the best
way to attain Israeli compliance with international law is to
demonstrate the culpability of both parties to the conflict and to
seek the accountability of both sides for violating international
law;
3) Finally, the third development is the recent UN "Focus 2004"
Summit drawing attention to treaties on the protection of
civilians, who are the primary victims in armed conflicts all
over the world today. The distinction between combatants, who
take a direct part in armed hostilities, and non-combatants is one
of "the oldest, most fundamental maxims of established
customary rules of humanitarian law."3
I'm now going to lay out how both suicide bombings and targeted
assassinations are war crimes and possibly also crimes against humanity. But
my point is not so much to press for prosecution of those individually
responsible. I'm more concerned about state responsibility on Israel's part and
the question of whether there's some kind of quasi-state responsibility on the
part of the Palestinian Authority for failure to exercise effective control over
terrorists operating from Palestinian-controlled territory.
Given that it's always easy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to accuse the
other side of fabricating facts and given that very few independent monitors of
the "facts on the ground" are deemed to be unbiased, I'm going to use a
paradigmatic series of attacks instead of actual incidents to illustrate this
1. Intifada Death Toll, BBC NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004.
2. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J., 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9, 2004).
3. Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 120 (Dieter Fleck, ed., 1995).
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analysis. Imagine (and it isn't difficult to do, as it has happened so often) that
a 16-year old Palestinian suicide bomber walks into a shopping mall north of
Tel Aviv and kills 17 Israeli shoppers. Approximately two weeks later, Israeli
army helicopters fire a missile at a structure within a refugee camp in the West
Bank where the dispatcher of the suicide bomber is working. He is killed along
with his wife and children, as well as 23 neighbors in surrounding homes.
Shortly after that, a nephew of the bomb dispatcher decides to become a suicide
bomber in memory of his uncle.
Trying to determine "who started it" in order to assign relative fault is not
a particularly effective mediation technique in the middle of a cycle of violence
because the determination is unlikely to be accepted by both sides-which will
then result in further retaliatory attacks.
II. THRESHOLD QUESTION: IS IT INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT?
First, a threshold question: Does international humanitarian law apply to
the waves of violence between Israel and the Palestinians? If the Intifada is
"armed conflict," it is undisputed to be international rather than internal armed
conflict. Not only the ICJ but also the Supreme Court of Israel on numerous
occasions have applied provisions of the 4th Geneva Convention to the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.
But does the cycle of Intifada violence-terrorist attacks (whether in the
name of national liberation or for purely nihilistic reasons) and targeted killings
(whether defended as retaliatory for past attacks or deterrent of future ones) -
constitute armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law?
The ICTY in the Tadic case defined armed conflict as including "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups.
[Therefore,] [i]nternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until ... a peaceful
settlement is achieved."4 The Geneva Conventions apply even when one side
is not a Contracting Party. Moreover, the fighting can be sporadic and still be
considered armed conflict.
Of course, International Criminal Law holds the perpetrators and their
commanders and instigators individually responsible. But as I said, I'm more
interested in focusing on the corporate responsibility, so-to-speak. I'll discuss
shortly the issue of whether there is a command structure within the Palestinian
Authority sufficient to hold it accountable for implementing humanitarian law
in the territory it controls, which would include locations that Hamas operates
from. As for Israel's defense that what it is doing constitutes counter-terrorism
4. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-1-AR72, 70, 35 I.L.M. 32, 54 (October 2)
(decision on the defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction).
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and not war, then it would be required to prove guilt before a court of law
instead of assassinating the targets in their cars, homes or mosques.
III. SUICIDE BOMBINGS AS WAR CRIMES
Using the Rome Statute's article 8 delineation of international crimes as a
codification of customary law, war crimes include willful killing or causing
great suffering to non-combatants (which is a grave breach of the 4th Geneva
Convention), directing an attack against civilians not taking part in hostilities,
and causing excessive incidental death, injury or damage to civilians. All three
types of war crimes require knowledge or intent to subject civilians to attack.
Hamas has frequently claimed that Israeli settlers are not civilians and
sometimes claims that Israelis living within the Green Line are not either. But
under Geneva Protocol I, a civilian is someone who is not a member of an
organized armed force and is not taking part in hostilities, which means
someone in the very act of posing an imminent threat to life.6 While it may be
disputable whether that would cover an attack on Israeli soldiers standing at a
bus stop while on weekend leave, it surely covers bombs which kill or maim
shoppers in a shopping mall.
IV. TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS AS WAR CRIMES
A. Application of the Same Criteria
The same war crimes as just described would apply to Israeli actions.
More particularly, in regard to the direct targets of assassinations, whom Israel
considers to be combatants, Common Art 3 (a baseline ofjus cogens applying
to any armed conflict) prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispens-
able to civilized peoples." Regarding civilians who are killed in the wake of a
targeted assassination, it is a war crime to employ a method of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, including attacks "which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians" and
"which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." 7 Thus, "military necessity" arguments which are made
by Israel are subject to a rule of proportionality.
5. Multilateral Protection of War Victims, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1147, 6 U.S.T 3516 [hereinafter
Multilateral Protection]; Fourth Geneva Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 28, 75 U.N.T.S 287.
6. Geneva Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S. 26.
7. Id, art., 51 para. (5)(b).
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B. Is There a Counter-obligation Not to Locate Military Targets amid
Civilians?
While it's usually a matter of heated factual dispute as to whether
Palestinian militants deliberately place themselves and their associated military
equipment in the middle of civilian areas, so as to make the surrounding
civilians vulnerable to indiscriminate Israeli weaponry, I will note that the 4th
Geneva Convention provides that "the presence of a protected person may not
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations."8
Using civilians as "human shields" is prohibited. But it should also be pointed
out that killing militants when they are not taking part in hostilities or posing an
imminent threat to lives-for instance, when driving a car or exiting a mosque
-is also prohibited. Taking part in hostilities only causes a temporary loss of
protection.
V. ARE EITHER SUICIDE BOMBINGS OR TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS ALSO
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY?
I will leave this issue to those of you who are more predisposed to a
shouting match over facts on the ground and will simply lay out the criteria for
what constitutes a crime against humanity: Particularly serious-in fact, odious
-attacks on human dignity; systematic or widespread attacks (not isolated
events); a civilian population that is specifically targeted and knowledge that the
offenses are part of a systematic or widespread attack against a civilian popula-
tion.
A crime against humanity-in contrast to a war crime-need not be
committed during armed conflict. So even if the Intifada is determined not to
be an "armed conflict," this part of International Humanitarian Law still applies.
According to leading authority Antonio Cassese, crimes are considered syste-
matic or widespread when there is "the manifestation of a policy or plan drawn
up by or inspired by State authorities or by the leading officials of a de facto
state-like organization, or of an organized political group."9
VI. PARITY? Do THE PALESTINIANS HAVE INT'L RESPONSIBILITY?
To begin to wrap-up, I return to my initial motivation for engaging in this
analysis: that demonstrating the culpability of both sides (without attempting
to quantify or assign relative fault) might allow each of them to move beyond
the impulse to retaliate yet again and instead, to agree to cooperate to halt the
cycle of brutality for which they both bear responsibility. There's an irony in
8. Multilateral Protection, supra note 6, art. 28.
9. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 64 (2003).
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this: in the political realm, the asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians
goes the other way: Israel is more powerful because it is a state. But in the
legal realm, there is an asymmetry if the Palestinians are not held to account
under the same rules of armed conflict that apply to Israel.
Three related questions must be asked. Legally, does a national liberation
movement such as the Palestinian Authority, seeking to become a state, have the
duty to implement the rules of international humanitarian law within the
territory it has jurisdiction over? Factually, is there effective control by the PA
over Hamas and other sponsors of suicide bombings? Politically, should Israel
share some responsibility for undermining the authority of the PA to such an
extent that it cannot control the terrorists who operate from its territory?
VII. IMPLICATIONS
A. For International Law
Briefly, there are two important implications for international law
generally. First, especially since September 11, there is a growing awareness
of the need to hold non-state actors directly responsible under international
humanitarian law and human rights law. Provisions of the ILCs Draft Articles
on State Responsibility which deal with non-official actors under the control of
a state or with successful insurrectional movements which later become a state
do not address the question of the current responsibility of a non-state which
wants to be a state.
Second is the lack of an objective adjudicator for conflicts like this one
while it is ongoing. It is unfortunately a truism that not only is international law
on the protection of civilians rarely enforced; it's also true that it is even more
rarely enforced in the Middle East. There is no regional human rights court and
while the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court could, on his own
initiative,'0 undertake an investigation of criminal violations during the second
Intifada, he is unlikely to take on such a politicized case so early on in the
institution's history. And the ICC would not be adjudicating state responsi-
bility.
B. For the Arab-israeli Conflict
There are many implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict. But a significant
one that this analysis discloses is that statehood for the Palestinians is the
obvious answer to halting the violence because statehood will give them the
means as well as the incentive, both legally and politically, to stop terrorists
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 15, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 100.
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before they attack Israel and thereby jeopardize the Palestinian state itself.
What is required for statehood is of course another topic for another day and so
I'll end there.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years ago, when I was a child, the world was a different place. Tele-
vision was a new invention: I remember watching antennae come out of a
man's head on a show called My Favorite Martian and wondering how they did
that-was he really from Mars?. People were sending away for plans to build
bomb shelters in their backyards; and a young scholar named Richard Falk
wondered about the role that courts of law might play in a world order that we
increasingly hoped would become an international legal order.
In his now famous book, The Role ofDomestic Courts in the International
Legal Order,' Professor Falk undertook a critical examination of the act of state
doctrine, particularly as it was considered in the Sabbatino case.2 He wrestled
with the two challenges that were faced by national courts when they adjudi-
cated cases affected by controversies in foreign policy. First, how could courts
promote the rule of law while still showing respect for diverse approaches to
international law and to the fundamental norms that comprise it? And second,
how could courts maintain their independence from the Executive in matters
relating to international law without producing decisions that would undermine
the proper functioning of the Executive in matters of foreign policy?
Much has changed since that time. The information era is upon us; and
men, and women, who are not from Mars, go about with telephones strapped to
* BA (Hons), MA, LLB, DPhil (Oxon), Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School,
http://research.osgoode.yorku.ca/walker. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at
the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
from October 20-22, 2004.
i. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INrERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1964).
2. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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their ears speaking to one another via satellite from around the globe. Each day,
people brave threats of terrorist attacks that make us look on the days of
backyard bomb shelters with a fondness bordering on nostalgia. And the inter-
national legal order that was barely a glimmer in Professor Falk's eye has grown
to become more and more of a reality.
But national courts continue to face challenges arising from the special role
that they serve in the international legal order. And so today, as part of the
tribute to Professor Falk's pioneering book, I would like to give you a snapshot
of some recent moments in the history of these challenges. Because I expect
that many of you are familiar with recent developments in the United States in
this area. I want to share with you three recent developments from Canada that
capture a sense of the current state of the law, and that give us an idea of how
far we have come and what might lie ahead.
These three developments have come in decisions by Canadian courts in
three areas in which the courts have wrestled with the questions that Professor
Falk described in his book. These areas are: state immunity, the revenue rule,
and the enforcement of foreign judgments. While each of these decisions
produced results that were a disappointment to the Canadian parties that were
involved, the approach taken by the courts to their role in the international legal
order shows a degree of sophistication in relation to the challenges described by
Professor Falk. That would, I think, have amazed the first readers of his book
just about as much as would a cellular telephone.
II. STATE IMMUNITY: THE BOUZARI CASE
The first area I want to touch upon is that of state immunity. This summer
the Court of Appeal for Ontario released its decision in the Bouzari case.3 In
that decision, the Court described the plight of a man who was abducted,
imprisoned, and tortured by agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and who
escaped from Iran eventually coming to live in Canada as a landed immigrant.
He sued the State of Iran in a Canadian court for the damages he suffered. He
argued that by engaging in torture, and thereby breaching international law, the
State of Iran had forfeited its right to enjoy the privilege of state immunity. He
also argued that as a country that had committed itself to taking steps to bring
an end to torture, Canada had an obligation to provide a forum for civil
remedies for victims of torture.
The Court did not agree. It granted immunity to Iran. In this regard, the
result was no different from Mr. Bouzari's perspective than it might have been
forty years ago. But the process by which the court arrived at this result was
remarkably different. As might have been expected, there was no intervention
3. Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 OR.3d 675.
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by the Executive to dictate the result, (although that seems less obvious in the
United States since the Altmann decision4 of the Supreme Court). But what
might not have been expected was that the Court did not feel constrained to be
bound by the dictates of the Legislature. To be sure, Canada has a State
Immunity Act5 and the Court did not disregard it. However, remarkably, the
Court approached the issues by engaging in a review of Canada's obligations
under customary international law, and by considering whether granting
immunity as required by the Act would be consistent with those obligations.
Iran did not defend the proceeding, and so it was left to the Attorney
General of Canada as intervener to provide the court with an expert to testify on
the effect of allegations of torture on the application of the Act. Mr. Bouzari's
expert said that Iran had lost its entitlement to claim immunity and that Canada
had an obligation to provide access to the courts and to a civil remedy. The
Attorney General's expert said that even though torture may be contrary to
international law, Canada's treaty obligation to provide access to civil remedies
was limited to torture occurring in Canada. Beyond that, no other country
deprived foreign states of their immunity under these circumstances. Accord-
ingly, the present state of international law was consistent with granting of
immunity as required by the Act. The Court accepted this view and granted
immunity.
Now, some were disappointed with the result. Some felt that it was a
missed opportunity for Canadian courts to strike a blow for accountability in
cases of state-sponsored breaches of international law. But regardless of the
result in this particular situation, the courts demonstrated their independence
from the other branches of government in their approach to this difficult
question. Canadian courts were prepared to determine for themselves the role
that they might best play in the international legal order. The courts recognized
the roles that might be played by other branches of government and by other
institutions and found mechanisms for responding to the underlying complaint.
III. THE REVENUE RULE: THE IVEY CASE
The second area I want to mention is the revenue rule and the way in which
it has resulted in earlier courts denying relief to claimants and judgment
creditors in cases that would otherwise be admissible as ordinary civil claims.
I should clarify that in Canada we do not have "revenue rule" per se, although
our case law has developed just as it has in the United States, from decisions of
the English courts, such as in Holman v. Johnson.6 Rather, we have an
4. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
5. State Immunity Act, R.S.C., ch. S-18, (1975) (Can.).
6. Holman v. Johnson, [1775-1802] All E.R. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1775).
2005]
368 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:365
exception to the application of foreign laws and to the enforcement of foreign
judgments for claims or judgments that are based on foreign public laws. We
tend to describe this in terms of an exception for foreign penal laws (that is,
fines), foreign revenue laws (that is, taxes), and "other foreign public laws" (a
term which is intended to describe other laws that give effect to purely
governmental interests).7
While this exception still exists in theory and is described from time to
time by the courts, it is less and less applied. Indeed, the way in which it is not
applied by Canadian courts is indicative of their interpretation of the role of
courts in the international legal order. A striking example of this is the decision
in the Ivey case, or more properly, United States of America v. Ivey.' In that
case, the United States wanted to enforce a judgment in Ontario based on a
CERCLA order (Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation
Liability Act). The problem addressed was that under the foreign public law
exception, a claim made by a foreign government, or one that would result in
an award that would accrue to a foreign government, would not be entertained
by Canadian courts.
As it happened, the Ontario courts did enforce the judgment. In doing so,
they appeared to be motivated, in part, by one point that was a matter of simple
common sense: this was not a situation in which enforcing the judgment would
be tantamount to giving effect to the sovereign will of a foreign power. Rather,
it was just a situation in which the courts would be holding a defendant
accountable for harm caused by him in another country while doing business
there. The striking part about the result, though, was that the court was prepared
to go beyond the superficial indications that this judgment was subject to the
foreign public law exception. It was prepared to look at the substance of the
claim and the relief granted. Perhaps even more striking was that the court
recommended a flexible interpretation of the foreign public law exception so
that the application would not prevent the court from providing suitable support
for governmental schemes designed to further public interests that are of
obvious trans-boundary significance, such as protection of the environment.
The courts clearly took an approach to comity that called upon them not to
refrain from engaging in matters that might bear on foreign policy, but rather to
take positive steps to cooperate with foreign courts and lend support to them
-where this seems warranted.
Some might say that in doing so, the courts would undermine the capacity
of the Executive to make arrangements with other countries that are the most
7. J. WALKER, CASTEL & WALKER: CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS (Markham: Butterworths, 6th
ed. 2005).
8. United States v. Ivey, [1995], 26 O.R.(3d), aff'd, [1996] 30 O.R. (3d)370, leave to appeal
denied, [1997] 2 S.C.R. x.
favorable for Canadians.' And some might say that such a restriction on access
to Canadian courts by foreign governments should be lifted only for the
governments of foreign states whose courts provide similar access to the
Canadian government.'0 But I think that in the Ivey case, the courts
demonstrated strength in their independence from the other branches of
government and their preparedness to respond to what they regarded as the
requirements of their role in the international legal order."
IV. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: THEBEALS CASE
The third area that I want to talk about is that of the enforcement of foreign
judgments and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Beals case.' 2
It may seem odd to include an ordinary private law judgment enforcement case
among cases that relate more directly to foreign policy and to the interests of
foreign sovereign powers, but I think that there is good reason for including this
case here. In the Beals case, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that
Canadian courts should apply jurisdictional standards to foreign judgments that
are similar to those applied under the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act of 1962. Just to be clear, Canadian courts had been doing that
since the Supreme Court of Canada approved the use of the standard for
judgments from other provinces in 1990.'"
The result in the Beals case was rather harsh because it involved a claim
based on the purchase of a vacant lot from two Ontario couples in Florida for
$8,000. This claim had mysteriously mushroomed into an award that, at the
time of enforcement, had grown to over one million dollars. Various features
of the procedure raised what seemed to many to be serious questions of fairness,
and there is reason to be concerned that the result could encourage abuse. 4
But I want to highlight a point on which I think this decision represents an
advance on the previous state of the law. Under what we call the old rules for
the enforcement ofjudgments, or what is sometimes called, "the English rules,"
the choice of forum in cross-border disputes is policed by the parties. Or, to be
more accurate, the defendant has a veto over the plaintiff's choice of forum,
even if that choice is a sensible one. This is because a judgment is enforceable
internationally only when a defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the
9. V. Black, Oldandin the Way: The Revenue Rule andBig Tobacco 38 CAN. BUS. L.J. 1 (2003).
10. Id.
11. Janet Walker, Foreign Public Law and the Colour of Comity: What's the Difference Between
Friends? 38 CAN. Bus. L.J. 36 (2003).
12. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416.
13. De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
14. JanetWalker, Beals v. Saldanha: Striking the Comity Balance Anew, 5 CAN. INT'L LAw. 28
(2002).
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court issuing the judgment or when the defendant was served there.'5 Under the
new rules, a judgment given by a court in a forum with a real and substantial
connection to the claim will be entitled to enforcement.
I think this is a step forward. It reflects a view of the network of courts of
civil jurisdiction around the world that conceives of it as less like the lawless
highways of old, populated by highwayman and other perils, and more like the
business sectors of major modem cities. It encourages defendants to respond
to claims in the courts chosen by plaintiffs and to direct any challenges to
plaintiffs' choices of court to those courts. To be sure, this deference to foreign
courts exposes defendants with assets in Canada to risks that they were once in
a position to control for themselves-by ignoring foreign proceedings. But the
need for rules to protect litigants from specific concerns about fairness is not a
reason to turn our backs on the need to develop a more generous approach to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments generally. For the many
participants in this conference who have toiled over the years to develop a
workable multilateral judgments convention, I am sure that I am only preaching
to the converted. My point, though, is to underscore the extent to which some
courts are willing to embrace this new respect for the role of domestic courts in
fostering the security of transactions across borders that is so important to the
international legal order.
V. CONCLUSION
And so, with these three examples, I hope that I have given you a sense of
the distance that the courts have come in meeting the complex challenges they
face in fulfilling their important role in the international legal order. As far as
they have come, you can see in the mixed results of each case how far they have
yet to go, particularly as the international legal order itself continues to develop.
In this regard, I wonder if there might be some young member of the audience
here today who, some forty years from now, might give a talk to the American
Branch of the International Law Association on the further progress that has
been made in this area. I do not think that we can fully imagine the role that
domestic courts will play in the international legal order in the year 2044. But
I think that we can safely assume that the man that we might see on the street
with the antennae coming out of his head would not, in fact, be a Martian.
15. Emanuel v. Symon, 1908 P. 302 (Eng. C.A..).
MONUMENTAL FLAWS AND DYSFUNCTIONS:
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR MENDING THE
BROKEN TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
CERTIFICATION PROCESS
Brad A. Brooks-Rubin"
Good afternoon. Please accept my apologies if I suddenly tear out of here,
or look nervously at my watch throughout the panel. My wife is due to give
birth at literally any minute, and I had to promise I would handle no less than
twenty middle of the night feedings in order to be here today. Talk about a job
I would not mind outsourcing.
Anyway, I would like to begin with a quote from a recent Court of
International Trade (or, CIT) opinion:
This case stands as a monument to the flaws and dysfunctions in the
Labor Department's administration of the nation's trade adjustment
assistance laws-for, while it may be an extreme case, it is
regrettably not an isolated one. Only time will tell whether the Labor
Department, and Congress, are listening.'
So wrote Judge Jane Ridgway, venting her frustration after four long years
of trying to resolve the case of Former Employees of Chevron Products Co., v.
Sec 'y ofLabor. Unfortunately, it does not appear that her words have been fully
heard yet. And although other CIT judges have begun to join Judge Ridgway
in reversing their former hesitance to do the Department of Labor's 2 labor job
for it, and affirmatively certify workers as eligible for trade adjustment
assistance (TAA), it is clear that these words need to be heard, and soon.
Amidst all of the current politicking about how to deal with outsourcing,
job creation and free trade agreements, one major issue has been largely
overlooked, or at least is not being paid enough due. In sum, despite the jobs
numbers the presidential candidates like to toss about, we have people losing
* Associate at Leboeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, LLP, New York. This article is a revised
reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. Former Employees of Chevron Products Co. v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 298 F. Supp. 2d
1338, 1348 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003).
2. The division of the Labor Department formally responsible for the TAA program is the
Employment and Training Administration.
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jobs to outsourcing and other trade-related factors all of the time, and there is
a program, TAA, in place, flawed in overall structure though it may be, to
address at least some of the needs of some of these people. In fact, TAA has
been with us, in various forms, since 1962, providing retraining benefits,
extended unemployment payments, etc. President Bush touted TAA specifically
in Wednesday night's debate, referencing the increased funding for TAA during
his tenure. Nevertheless, despite the President's confidence in TAA, according
to one estimate of the manufacturing job loss situation in 2003, less than forty
percent of potentially eligible workers even applied for TAA-and only thirteen
percent of the potentially eligible workers received benefits.3
It is my belief that the failures in the Labor Department's administration
of the legal side of TAA investigation and certification are among the primary
factors in the trend we see of fewer and fewer workers applying for benefits, as
well as the program's overall mixed record. Because of the knowledge that the
certification process is flawed, and may well result in a denial of benefits or
years of protracted appeals, many workers simply choose not to apply to take
advantage of the benefits they may well be entitled to. A report on TAA issued
just last month by the GAO showed that many of the program's newest and
most progressive benefits have gone largely untapped, as workers are either
unaware or uninterested in even starting the process.4 When combining the
TAA failures with the shortcomings in the rest of the array of benefits available
to workers whose jobs have been outsourced-a recent report by the TAA
Coalition concluded that the U.S. spent the least among Germany, Japan, France
and the U.K. to assist unemployed workers'-many of our workers are unable
to adapt to the changing economy, with our nation the worse for it.
Let's start with the problem. According to a special report issued by the
Bureau of National Affairs this past May, a study of three years of CIT deci-
sions found that the Court upheld only twelve and a half percent of Labor's
denials of certifications of TAA eligibility.6 Now, in the TAA context, the
Court will uphold investigations supported by "substantial evidence," defined
as sufficient evidence to show that the investigation based on more than a mere
3. Michael R. Triplett, Trade Court's Critique ofLabor Department Places Spotlight on Handling
of TAA Claims, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. 795,797-98 (2004).
4. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE, U.S. SENATE: TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE - REFORMS HAVE ACCELERATED TRAINING
ENROLLMENT, BUT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES REMAIN 3-5 (2004).
5. Howard Rosen, TRADE-RELATED LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TEXTILE AND APPAREL WORKERS (2003),
http://www.newamerica.net/DownloadDocs/pdfs/Pub-File1426_I.pdf.
6. Triplett, supra note 3 at 795.
scintilla of evidence that leads to an arbitrary and capricious finding.7 For there
to be a mere five Labor determinations satisfying this standard, out of a possible
forty-one published opinions in three years, should be all we need to know to
establish that things are serious, After all, only a few of Labor's denials make
it to this stage-based on these percentages, it is possible thousands of
potentially eligible workers have been left without the benefits they need, and
deserve.
What is it that needs to be shown for benefits to be conferred when workers
petition the Labor Department's benefits? In order to be certified, a group of at
least three workers must meet the following statutory standards 8.
1) That a significant number or proportion of the workers in such
workers' firm, or an appropriate subdivision, have become, or
are threatened to become, totally or partially separated;
2) That sales or production, or both, of such firm or subdivision
have decreased absolutely; and
3) That one of the following is present: (a) increase of imports of
articles like or directly competitive with articles produced by
such workers' firm or subdivision contributed importantly to
such total or partial separation, (b) shift in production to a
country that is party to a free trade agreement or other tariff
preference program; (c) the firm is a downstream or upstream
supplier to another firm.
On the whole, this seems like it should be doable. Fact-intensive, to be
sure, but relatively straightforward standards. But when so few of the cases that
get before the CIT pass judicial muster, we must look at what the issues have
been, and what can be done. To my mind, the current issues with the
investigation and certification process break down in three ways:
1) The understanding of what constitutes "production";
2) What factors are evaluated in determining the impact of trade on
the job losses; and finally
3) The process Labor uses to address the first two issues.
The first question is what a worker must do in order to be certified. In light
of both the estimated loss of 300,000-500,000 service industry jobs, and the
failure of a Senate bill this past Spring that would have enabled service industry
workers to receive TAA, the issue of what work is covered by TAA has become
7. Former Employees of Rohm & Haas Co. v. Chao, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1346 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2003).
8. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2272 (2004).
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more critical than ever. An example of the difficulties involved is the 2003 CIT
case of Former Employees of Marathon Ashland Pipeline,9 where Labor was
faced with the issue of whether gaugers at an oil production facility were
production workers. In sum, gaugers perform quality control to determine
whether oil can be introduced into the stream of commerce. In reviewing and
then denying the gaugers' petition, Labor relied exclusively on basic infor-
mation from the company, ignored the workers' claims and determined, with,
as the Court found, no other investigation, that the gaugers were not involved
in production, but in post-production activity.
The Court reversed this determination and certified the workers for TAA.
After reviewing at length, mostly because Labor had not reviewed it all, the
issue of what production means in the context of oil production, the Court found
that all activity leading up to the introduction of oil into the stream of
commerce, such as gauging, should be considered production. The Court used
a variety of secondary publications, some authored by Labor itself, in creating
a judicial definition of production.
And after all of the CITs heavy lifting, the Federal Circuit reversed, saying,
in essence, the CIT had overstepped its bounds. ° Which left everything back
at the Labor drawing board. But was the CIT right to say what it had, that
production equals anything done up to the point of entry of the good into the
stream of commerce? Was the Federal Circuit right to stop the CIT from doing
Labor's job for it? I'm not sure-but what I am sure about is that this is the
type of question the courts should not-must not-be dealing with at all. In my
opinion, the fix required is to establish standards for what "production" is.
GAO statistics show that approximately thirty-five percent of workers applying
for TAA in the past several years have been from the textile industry. II We
therefore should have definitions of what the production process means in the
textile context: does it include every worker involved from thread to yam to
cutting and sewing and finishing? More importantly, does it include workers,
like oil gaugers, involved in inspection, shipping, etc. How to account for the
changing nature of American work, where the traditional notion of employment
-i.e. companies make only certain products, and workers perform only certain
defined tasks-bears little resemblance to how American companies and
workers must operate to stay afloat?
9. Former Employees of Marathon Ashland Pipeline, LLC v. Chao, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2003).
10. Former Employees of Marathon Ashland Pipeline, LLC v. Chao, 370 F.3d 1375, 1386 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
11. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S.
SENATE: TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE-IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY, BUT PROGRAMS CANNOT SOLVE
COMMUNITIES' LONG-TERM PROBLEMS, 2 (2001).
After all, if production equals creation of a good for sale and introduction
of it into the stream of commerce, it is certainly reasonable to argue that anyone
involved, in any way, in the process of bringing a good to market should be
eligible for TAA. As Howard Rosen of the TAA Coalition has argued,
shouldn't all workers who lose theirjobs in this context be eligible for TAA? 12
Even the Accounting and Customer Service departments make possible the sale
of a good-so why should they be denied TAA because they are not "produc-
tion" workers? Although the argument has always been that individuals in a
department like Accounting can find other jobs in their field, with the growth
in outsourcing of white-collar/service functions, this is no longer an assumption
based on reality. But if the answer to these questions is no, and we do prefer a
more limited TAA coverage scope, shouldn't workers at least know what the
scope is?
The second issue is how, when evaluating TAA petitions, we determine
whether the job losses are, or should be, of the type eligible for TAA. That is,
do we look only to imports or shifts in production related to the specific item or
firm, or do we look industry-wide at overall trends that affect workers? This is
perhaps the most critical question of all-most commentators agree that a
company's decision to outsource or shift production abroad can generally not
be narrowed down to a single factor. For example, domestic plants may become
out-dated, education and training levels may not be at desired levels, etc., in
addition to the more common explanation of salaries and wages. Yet Labor
generally attempts to investigate by simply asking the narrow question
presented by the statute: are imports increasing or have jobs left to one of a
certain list of countries?
In Former Employees of Rohm & Haas,13 Labor attempted to deny certifi-
cation based on just such an analysis. In Rohm & Haas, workers whose plant
was scheduled to have its production shifted to two other company locations
applied for TAA. Labor's investigation consisted solely of inquiring whether
imports of the company's own products from its foreign locations had increased.
Labor then found that, in addition to other factors, because imports were not
increasing, the workers were not eligible for TAA.
The Court rejected this analysis and remanded for further investigation.
Specifically, the Court demanded that Labor investigate the possibility that
imports of competitive third party products had increased, thus impacting the
decision of Rohm & Haas to close the workers' facility. The Court also men-
tioned that Labor needed to make determinations related to the other potential
12. Howard Rosen, Trade Adjustment Assistance and Offshore Outsourcing (2004),
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfn?pg=article&DocED= 1486.
13. Former Employees of Rohm & Haas Co., 246 F.Supp.2d at 1344.
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factors involved in the decision to transfer the jobs, such as technological
obsolescence, in order to satisfy the statutory requirements.
Should it be that, even if there are non-import factors, non-labor related
factors, or shift in world demand for a product to focus on non-U.S. markets,
that those workers are covered as well? Shouldn't the issue of whetherjobs are
lost due to "international trade" be redefined to include all aspects of inter-
national trade? This is admittedly a dangerous road to go down, and the 2002
revisions to TAA addressed some, like upstream/downstream suppliers.14 But
there is room for much more. Resolution of this issue could challenge the
current balance between TAA and other benefit programs available to dislocated
workers, benefits not tied to international trade. Looking elsewhere than
imports for reasons to grant TAA could also impact international trade obliga-
tions, not to mention take the program to potentially untenable funding levels.
Nevertheless, a truly functioning program should at least address and respond
to all of these issues, so that the Court need not take the issue up again and
again, and workers will know the scope of what is available to them.
Finally, there are the details of how investigations are conducted. Reading
through CIT opinions gives you a sense almost that Labor is doing its job for the
first time each time it handles an investigation. Recognizing that the individuals
at Labor are, in general, good people attempting to do a good job, but are
chronically under-funded and short-staffed, one would nevertheless hope that
a system of conducting investigations would have evolved that could pass the
Court's muster.
But, as I mentioned, this is not the case at present. The recent opinion of
Former Employees of Sun Apparel5 is just the latest in a line of cases demon-
strating that there is a need for standardization in the process, as well as guide-
lines for what must occur during an investigation, in order for it to pass the CITs
review. In Sun Apparel, a series of petitions were presented to Labor by
employees of a garment production factory in Texas. The workers lost their
jobs in waves, and a number of petitions were filed over time, with an admitted-
ly complicated series of petitions, dismissals, and requests for reconsideration.
Unfortunately, even with several series of workers applying, from a
number of departments, Labor's investigation consisted of a few emails to the
firm's Human Resources director. Not anyone in the manufacturing, sales,
logistics, or other similar departments, but the Human Resources director, some-
one who is likely not aware of the precise details of the jobs actually performed
by each individual. Even when her answers appeared inconsistent, or at least
incomplete, Labor failed to follow up. Labor also failed to pay any attention
14. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
15. Former Employees of Sun Apparel of Texas v. United States Sec'y of Labor, No. 04-106, slip
op. at 11 (Ct. Int'l Trade, Aug. 20, 2003).
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whatsoever to the information provided by the workers. By the end of the
opinion, Chief Judge Restani, although she did not comment on the questionable
choice by Labor of which company official to contact, was actually composing
basic questions for Labor to use in its investigation, such as "what actual work
was performed?"' 6
It is hard to imagine both that questions like this would not be asked by
Labor, and that a CIT judge is so aware of the issue that she would feel the need
to actually draft specific questions for Labor, rather than rely on previous
practice, where the Court suggested general areas of a case that it had concerns
about. What can be done? The first is to issue guidance on the petition process.
In many situations, workers completing the initial petition may not understand
the full implications of the questions, or have access to the accurate information,
yet feel obliged to complete the document. GAO data shows that approximately
eighty percent of workers completing TAA petitions have not gone past high
school in their education, and twenty percent are not proficient in English. 7
Without the assistance of a guide to completing the petitions, or formal assis-
tance from a trained Labor official or an attorney, the process often begins with
unusable, or in some cases inaccurate or detrimental, information and just
deteriorates from there. With a streamlined petition process that provides
detailed instructions for workers so that the information they provide is worthy
of detailed review, we would certainly be better off.
Another part of this is to standardize who within a company completes the
Labor questionnaire. My suggestion would be to direct all questionnaires to in-
house counsel, or if there are none, to the company's outside legal counsel. By
directing the questionnaires in this way, with instructions to the attorney to
consult with all relevant company departments and requiring them to provide
a list of whom they spoke with, Labor can rely on the standards of professional
ethics in demanding that information be provided in a complete and accurate
form. It is also reasonable to assume that, in most cases, attorneys will research
the relevant standards and issues in order to provide Labor with usable answers.
Of course, it's always nice to give a presentation where you present a
problem, suggest solutions and then leave it to someone else to figure it out. I
am trying to respond differently. At present, an ad hoc committee of the
Customs and International Trade Bar Association, of which I am a part, is
currently developing a plan to identify what we can do to help change the situa-
tion. Similarly, advocacy groups like the TAA Coalition are bringing a wide
array of sectors together to advocate for, and bring more sweeping changes to,
16. Id. at 21.
17. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, U.S. SENATE-TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE: TRENDS, OUTCOMES AND
MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN DISLOCATED WORKER PROGRAMS 30 (2000).
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the TAA program, as well as working hard to insure that all workers who lose
their jobs are aware of the possible benefits out there for them. We can only
hope that the efforts of these organizations will be understood for what they are
by the Labor Department-offers of assistance to improve the program vis-A-vis
workers and the CIT. The sooner these issues are remedied, the more
effectively our nation and its workforce will be able to adapt to outsourcing and
the ever-changing global economy, relying less on political rhetoric and more
on real action, in the way our competitors have.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay addresses the conditions under which reactive and pre-emptive
military intervention are ethical, and whether adjustments can and should be
made in international law and institutions to establish the parameters of their
legality and to ensure that they are authorized by legitimate authority. Both
types of intervention can be multilateral or unilateral, and each needs to be
addressed in relation to the three major issues on the contemporary agenda:
mass killing within the borders of a state, international terrorism, and the illegal
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The essay also re-examines
the balance of authority and action among states, regional organizations, and the
United Nations (U.N.) in matters of military intervention and suggests how to
clarify their respective roles and responsibilities.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
This essay recommends that the Secretary Council and General Assembly
endorse the following principles and rules and take appropriate action to give
them effect.
* United States Foreign Service Officer (ret.); Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University
of Massachusetts Amherst. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2004.
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A. Mass Killing
That reactive multilateral military intervention authorized by a regional
organization, the Security Council, or, failing these, the General Assembly
under the Uniting for Peace procedure, is justified to halt mass killing within a
state when the state itself is the cause of the killing or is unwilling or unable to
stop it.
That pre-emptive multilateral intervention authorized by one of the
foregoing institutions is justified if there is abundant, well-corroborated, clear
and convincing evidence that mass killing is imminent and the state is unwilling
or unable to prevent it.
That reactive unilateral intervention by a state or coalition is justified to
halt mass killing underway in another state, if it is evident that efforts to secure
multilateral intervention or authorization are too slow or ineffective, provided
that post-facto authorization is sought promptly from the proper institution.
B. Intervention Against States and Terrorist Organizations
That reactive intervention, whether multilateral or unilateral, is justified in
cases such as Afghanistan in which a state has sheltered terrorists who have
mounted a series of international attacks.
That pre-emptive action against terrorist organizations is justified on the
authorization of the Security Council or a regional organization, failing the
cooperation of the state where terrorists are located.
That unilateral pre-emption by a state or coalition is justified when there
is abundant, well-corroborated, clear and convincing evidence that an attack by
an international terrorist organization sponsored by a state, or by a state itself,
against one's own territory is imminent and no multilateral institution is willing
and able to prevent it; as an extension of self-defense, pre-emptive action must
be proportionate and aimed solely at frustrating the attack.
That unilateral pre-emptive intervention is justified when necessary, by
means of clear and convincing evidence, to safeguard the lives of one's
nationals in another state and to evacuate them if appropriate.
C. Intervention Against Illegal Nuclear and Other WMD Programs
That pre-emptive military intervention authorized by the Security Council
or the General Assembly (under the Uniting for Peace procedure) is justified to
frustrate or otherwise neutralize the transfer to a terrorist organization of nuclear
weapons, and in many cases will also be justified in the case of chemical and
biological weapons.
That pre-emptive military intervention authorized by the Security Council
is justified as a last resort to neutralize an illegal program by a state to acquire
nuclear weapons.
III. FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES
Physical power simply exists in the world; it is there. One has to deal with
it, not act or think as if it were not present. It is always present. And it is, at
bottom, human power, enhanced by weapons and tools and technology made
and used by humans. It is primarily military power, including control over
communications and intelligence-gathering technology and systems. The other
basic reality one encounters always and everywhere is that human beings want
to live in a world that combines justice and order, at least enough both to
safeguard their lives and limbs and to enable them to work, learn, raise families,
worship and do other ordinary things on a reasonably predictable day-to-day
basis.
Looking at the world from above, as if from a point in space, the scene is
of over 190 individual authority communities-states-each possessing some
quantity of power. The leaders of one state can, if they wish, use their power
against another state, and groups of state leaders can pool their resources to do
the same. Power, and its potential for use at any time, often appears to be the
central reality in interstate relations.'
But even looked at from above, it is clear that the human desire for order
and justice is also part of the picture. This desire is as real as power. To live in
a world ofjustice means living in a world of law, which expresses the practical
meaning of justice in clear terms, and where those who hold power act in
accordance with law. To bring law from paper to life, institutions link power
with law. Today we need to add something to the existing architecture of
institutions and law, and it can be accomplished without amending the Charter.2
IV. MASS KILLING
Massacres occur because a regime or group believes that the world will be
a better place without certain people; they believe that the target group is the
main obstacle to creating a superior society or that it must be wiped out as
1. Physical power is of course not the same thing as influence. Some small states having little
physical power are able to exercise considerable influence in world affairs, that is, to affect the course of
events and the outcome of issues. Examples include Ireland, Costa Rica, Senegal and Ghana. It is important
to keep this in mind even while studying ways to channel and control military power.
2. It is not necessary to amend the Charter to accomplish such purposes. This has been emphasized
by many observers. See, e.g., MiNH-THu D. PHAM, THE UNITED NATIONS FOUND., THE UNITED NATIONS &
THE NEW THREATS: RETHINKING SEC. 12-14 (2004), http://www.un-
globalsecurity.org/pdf/reports/romeconference.rep.pdf.
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punishment for past crimes. Intervention to stop mass killing faced formidable
opposition in the 1960s through the 1980s in such places as Uganda, East
Pakistan, and Cambodia. Most states either kept silent or actually criticized the
intervention, because a fundamental principle of world order was being
breached: borders must not be crossed by military force except in self-defense
or to carry out a U.N. Security Council resolution under Chapter VII. Most
states saw their own survival jeopardized by acceptance of any intervention that
could be used as a precedent against themselves. "Order by borders" was for
them the main guarantee of their own sometimes recently-won independence,
and even for long-established states, the fact that two world wars had broken out
when borders were violated had embedded the view that the inviolability of
frontiers was the best safeguard of peace.
This began to change, fitfully, in the 1990s, as the conscience of human-
kind was newly shocked by the killing of Kurds in northern Iraq following the
first Gulf War and the subsequent slaughters in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Rwanda. In Rwanda, the horrific result of the Security Council's paralysis led
to a strong movement in many countries to search for ways to apply enough
flexibility to the principle of inviolability of state borders to save the lives of the
human beings whose security was the ostensible reason for those very borders
in the first place. People began to reason that the wall of sovereignty must be
strong enough to prevent aggression, but not so rigid as to protect mass
slaughter within it. Just as within a polity there is a need for public authority to
safeguard lives, there is also a need for authority on a broader plane to do this
when domestic authority fails or disappears or turns homicidal.
It is not difficult to argue that the purpose of self-determination, the right
of a people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development" (Article 1 (1) of both International
Covenants on Human Rights), is to enable a people to provide for the security
of their lives and to achieve, progressively, the multidimensional fullness of life
through their own laws, policies and institutions.3 Going further, one could
argue that self-determination has rational limits, specified first by its intrinsic
purposes and second by the principle of subsidiarity. If a government itself
becomes murderous or if it simply cannot provide a minimum of personal
security, it fails to achieve the first purpose of self-determination. In this situa-
tion, larger entities of which this state is a part as a member of the international
community, can and should come to the people's rescue. Intervention should
be limited to situations in which lives are actually being taken on a large scale
or there is clear and convincing evidence that such killing is about to com-
mence.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, § 1 993
U.N.T.S. 5; International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, § 1 999 U.N.T.S. 173.
The issue has been cogently presented by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty in its report, "The Responsibility to Pro-
tect."4 Released in December 2001, this is a document that merits close atten-
tion by the United Nations. The Commission rightly affirms the existence of a
responsibility to protect human life even in the face of the important norm of
nonintervention, and that appropriate action to carry out this responsibility
should be recognized as legal.
This paper stands in agreement with the first "just cause" criterion for mili-
tary intervention proposed by the Commission, namely "large scale loss of life,
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either
of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state
situation."5 However, the second proposed criterion is problematic: "large
scale 'ethnic cleansing,' actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.",6 The latter amounts to authorizing the
use of lethal force against acts for which police, in most countries, are not
authorized to use lethal force. The phrase "carried out by killing" is already
included in the first criterion, so it is the other elements we must evaluate:
evictions and rape, both of which are terrible crimes but not, in the view of this
writer, justifiable grounds for summarily killing the perpetrators, and vague
"acts of terror."
Intervening forces arrive with weapons and the authority to use them to
kill, if necessary, in order to stop the practices that led them to intervene. If rape
and illegitimate eviction are made bases for military intervention, they would
become in effect capital crimes under international law, punishable summarily
by death at the hands of intervening forces. This seems excessive, unwise and
unnecessary. The International Criminal Court can prosecute and try rapists and
those responsible for expelling people, or national courts can try them under
applicable extradite-or-prosecute provisions of international law.
Further over-stretching the limits of a rational responsibility to protect, the
Commission asserts that "situations of state collapse" and "overwhelming
natural or environmental catastrophes" are to be included in the two just-cause
criteria as "conscience-shocking situations" justifying military intervention.7
This merely creates pretexts for intervention. It would lead to a fundamental
weakening of the principles of international order, in a way that accepting inter-
vention only to halt large-scale killing would not. In a later passage, the Com-
mission perhaps recognizes that: "[i]t is a real question ... where lies the most
4. Ti INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 32 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 33.
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harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed
or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the
Security Council stands by."8 Only human life is mentioned here. This is the
right standard.
Moreover, the Commission endorses pre-emption, but unambiguously
limits it to lifesaving situations:
Military action can be legitimate as an anticipatory measure in
response to clear evidence of likely large-scale killing of civilians or
other noncombatants. Without this possibility of anticipatory action,
the international community would be placed in the morally unten-
able position of being required to wait until genocide begins, before
being able to take action to stop it.9
As the Commission elsewhere makes clear that in its view intervention
must be authorized by the United Nations or an established regional or sub-
regional organization, it follows that its endorsement of anticipatory action does
not encompass unilateral pre-emption.
The reference to "clear evidence" takes us to the question of imminence
and with it, to the reliability of intelligence. Here the Commission steps back
a bit and acknowledges that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any institutional
solution to the problem of evidence, of a kind that would put the satisfaction of
the 'just cause' criterion absolutely beyond doubt or argument in every case.
Despite the straw-man second clause, the recognition of a problem with evi-
dence is a bright yellow light, a powerful argument for great caution in
following the Commission's call to take "anticipatory action." If the standard
of evidence were set at abundant, well-corroborated, clear, and convincing, this
would at a minimum require information from multiple reliable sources, point-
ing unambiguously at the same conclusion. While there can never be 100
percent certainty or comprehensive knowledge about a developing situation, a
responsibility to protect must be exercised by decision-makers within a
framework of substantiated fact and professional analysis. There is no sub-
stitute for this.
V. POWER AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
To imagine what it would take to structure a world where power would be
used only to serve justice requires following two distinct but interdependent
lines of thought. The first would seek to articulate, in terms as close as possible
8. Id. at 55.
9. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 5, at 33.
10. Id. at 35.
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to a universal consensus, what justice means within and among political
societies, and for this we do not need to start from scratch. We already have
principles and norms that enjoy universal or near-universal acceptance. We find
them in the U.N. Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the two Covenants on Human Rights, and other landmark
documents adopted by the international community either as treaties or as
standards of conduct. Two relevant examples of the latter are the Declaration
on the Elimination of Religious Discrimination and Intolerance and the Declara-
tion on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities.
The second path invites us to design structures within which power can be
used in clearly bounded channels. Absent such channels, we are left with a
situation in which those who actually have power can use it as they wish unless
constrained by other power-holders, i.e., the world before 1945. To succeed,
these structures must represent an aggregation of strength that can come only
from the shared recognition by the powerful of a common interest in ensuring
that the use of power must be managed within a particular set of rules and
structures. The League of Nations demonstrated that commitments on paper are
not sufficient for this purpose, and the U.N. was designed to remedy that defect.
The U.N. can now make improvements in the design.
Some have argued that it is crucial to invest the U.N. with standing armed
forces to enable the Security Council to deal swiftly and decisively with mass
killing and other threats to peace and security. The current practice of building
every U.N. force from scratch, from voluntary ad hoc contributions, would give
way to a speed and regularity of application of appropriate force when and
where needed. Some massacres and even wars could probably be deterred,
others halted just after their outbreak." In time, the existence of an effective
standing multilateral armed force might allow some states to reduce their own
military establishments and rely for their security on the international force, a
huge saving that would permit unprecedented progress toward development.
Establishment of such a force in the near term would require a political will
that does not yet exist among the members of the Security Council, although it
might be possible to agree on steps to implement or expand the pre-positioning
of specialized logistical and communications staffs, facilities and supplies, to
further strengthen U.N. headquarters monitoring and early-warning capabilities,
and to broaden participation in standby forces. It might even be possible to
infuse life into the Charter provisions for a Military Staff Committee. Even
11. Had a standing United Nations force existed in 1994, the Rwanda tragedy could have been
stopped in its first phase. Moreover, on the Iraq issue, it is arguable that a robust standing U.N. force would
have added credibility to the Council's various pre-2003 resolutions, and might have induced Saddam Hussein
to cooperate with the U.N. much earlier than he did, thereby forestalling the U.S.-United Kingdom decision
to take matters into their own hands.
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perennial recommendations that cannot be put into place immediately should be
revisited from time to time, as political will evolves. But the most promising
avenue of near-term progress might lie in a different direction.
Intergovernmental activity takes place at four main levels: directly
between states, and through sub-regional, regional, and global institutions.
These official channels are complemented by transnational nonofficial networks
of labor unions, multinational corporations and banks, human rights organiza-
tions, political federations, and criminal and terrorist organizations. But states
have almost all of the military power and remain the fundamental authority
communities in the system. They and only they can commit themselves and
their resources to specific purposes, including creation of binding laws and law
enforcement structures. Today, their attention and energy are focused increas-
ingly on the regional level.
The wave of nationalism, although still strong, is giving way to region-
alism in most parts of the globe. Regional economic integration and federation
are already well-advanced, but what is new is that states within a region are now
increasingly willing to engage in military cooperation and coordination within
their area. This is another example of subsidiarity in action. One finds within
a region a greater commonality of culture and approach than in a global body.
A view can develop that it is better for "us" to resolve our own problems toget-
her than for "us" to allow them to get worse or to invite the possible interven-
tion of extra-regional powers.' 2
The Security Council could capitalize on the regionalist trend by granting
regional security institutions more decision-making autonomy to deal with
crises as they arise. The evolving Darfur and Congo crises are examples of the
potential usefulness of a regionalist approach, a solution that Africans have
turned to in other recent crises, notably in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Ivory
Coast, Liberia). The actual force can be sub-regional, but should be authorized
(even post-facto) by the African Union. In the Western Hemisphere, the
Organization of African States (OAS) has authorized and managed successful
interventions in several crises of the last two decades.
NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo has demonstrated its ability to
act effectively in humanitarian crises. In Afghanistan, NATOs post-conflict role
demonstrates the utility of further developing its collective security potential
under the U.N. umbrella. The European Union is well on the way to developing
an analogous capability. The Security Council should work with both organiza-
tions to develop clear rules and procedures for future out-of-area involvement.
12. See MARTA DASSU & ROBERTO MENOTrI, ASPEN INSTITUTE-ITALIA, COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO
CRISIS SITUATIONS: THE EU, NATO, AND UN AND MORE EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION (2003-2004),
http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Dassu_papercolelctive-response.pdf.
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In general, the Security Council should encourage the expanding security
role of regional institutions by adopting resolutions interpreting Chapters VII
and VIII in such a way as to establish specific criteria under regional inter-
governmental organizations, designated in advance by the Council, would be
authorized to intervene without advance Council authorization in cases of mass
killing of civilians and noncombatants. 3
The Security Council could draft and approve a set of principles and
procedures for regional action that would include advance authorization for the
pre-designated regional intergovernmental organizations to act at once in
response to an outbreak of large-scale killing (or to clear and convincing evi-
dence that such killing is about to begin) and seek subsequent Council approval
for that action. The language of Articles 47 and 53 of the Charter seem to offer
enough flexibility for this purpose, particularly when taken together with
Articles 33, 34, and 39. This would codify what has largely developed as
accepted practice in recent years, and it would arm the international community
with instruments that could be activated quickly to save lives, as an alternative
to unilateral or coalitional action. The advance authorization would commit the
regional institutions to certain obligations to the Council in the areas of
reporting, time limits, and ongoing coordination.
Would this be legal? Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council
has interpreted its responsibilities for international peace and security to include
things never before thought to be encompassed within the meaning of those
terms. On occasion the Security Council has, acting on its own authority under
Chapter VII, taken temporary charge of state administration, including police,
prisons, and judicial institutions, organized and conducted elections, assisted in
the writing of constitutions and in general overseeing the reshaping of political
life and law. It has, in short, acted in these situations as a kind of international
legislature, in the process taking on new powers to meet urgent humanitarian
requirements where there was no other solution at hand. In addition, recent
Council resolutions on terrorism (1373) and WMDs (1540) impose on all states
obligations to take specific actions to confront these problems, via legislation,
law enforcement and prosecution. Although some critics have warned that a
continuation of this legislative trend could erode state sovereignty, it is currently
the case that decisions of the Council under Chapter VII stand as law.
Checks and balances are crucial to the success and justice of any system
of governance. In the Security Council, the principal checks are the super-
majority requirement for substantive decisions, the veto power of the five
permanent members, and the fact that the non-permanent members turn over so
13. This paper does not advocate giving regional organizations authority to deal with every kind of
threat to peace and security. In the case of a state that is developing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons,
responsibility must remain with the Security Council.
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frequently that the General Assembly could possibly reverse a prior decision of
the Council by electing enough new non-permanent members who oppose the
decision, assuming no veto of the override by a permanent member. Given
these checks, this paper endorses the view that the need to fill the gap in inter-
national responsibility to protect human life outweighs the risk of abuse of
power in cases of mass killing.
The "Responsibility to Protect" Commission recommends that in cases
where no regional agency has acted and the Security Council has failed to deal
with a situation of mass killing, the General Assembly's "Uniting for Peace"
procedure should be invoked.
In granting a carefully delimited general advance authorization to regional
agencies to intervene to halt or prevent mass killing, the Security Council would
retain authority to overrule a regional decision to intervene and could even
demand withdrawal of an intervening force or its replacement by another force.
VI. TERRORISTS AND PRE-EMPTIVE INTERVENTION
U.S. officials have argued, before and after the Iraq intervention, that the
apocalyptic power of WMDs, combined with the growth of anti-Western
terrorist organizations, justifies and even requires governments to act pre-
emptively to defend the lives and fundamental rights of their people.
Except for a subway attack with poison gas in Japan, terrorists have not yet
employed WMDs, but they have tried to obtain the weapons themselves and
their key components from certain states and criminal networks. 4 That a group
might succeed in acquiring such a weapon was put forward as justification for
unilateral pre-emption against a prospective supplier state. It was argued that
Saddam Hussein might use WMDs to attack the U.S. (although there was no
evidence that he had the required delivery capability), or his neighbors (since
he had done so before), and that he would have incentive to hand over WMDs
to terrorists.15 It was thought that he could, for instance, supply terrorists with
enough nuclear material to wrap around a conventional explosive to make a
"dirty bomb" and kill thousands via radiation. The absence of evidence at the
time of any meaningful Iraqi links with Al-Qaeda was glossed over, apparently
on the assumption that the two could not possibly pass up a chance to
collaborate. The U.S. concluded that something must be done, that the Security
Council was hamstrung, and that once the U.S. had taken charge of Iraq, the
14. AI-Qaeda used four airliners as flying bombs to kill thousands of people in the United States,
and they carried out earlier attacks with conventional weapons on the World Trade Center, U.S. embassies
and the U.S.S. Cole, and have continued to strike in different parts of the world since September 11, 2001.
For instance, they have attacked in parts of Indonesia, Spain, and Saudi Arabia.
15. See e.g., H.J. Res. 14, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of the United States Armed Forces
Against Iraq, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (The Bush Administration's request for authorization to use force in Iraq).
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proof of Iraqi WMD programs and Al-Qaeda ties would come to light. The
subsequent public record shows quite clearly that these conclusions were based
on extremely faulty intelligence collection and analysis, but even had they been
accurate there would remain the question of whether military intervention would
be justified.
For purposes of analytical clarity it is useful to look at how one can
confront terrorist organizations as distinct from states. Terrorist organizations
are groups of volunteers, analogous to crime syndicates, not to states. A state
is not a voluntary organization; all kinds of people, most of whom have nothing
to do with terrorists, live within its borders under a common authority and go
about their lives in all kinds of normal ways. The population may include
terrorists (every terrorist group is located within some state) but it is vital to
remember that they are not identifiable with the state or with the general
population. In almost every state, the authorities look upon terrorist groups as
problems to be solved. 6
Conventional military operations (tanks, artillery, bombers, large infantry
units) are generally less effective in disrupting terrorist organizations than other
means. On its own territory, a country first needs to strengthen its domestic
intelligence, investigative and law enforcement capabilities, including especially
control of its borders. Second, it needs to cooperate with as many others as
possible in the same ways, including information-sharing and joint operations.
None of this involves unilateral pre-emptive intervention or raises legality
issues, because states are free to deal with each other on such matters, as for
instance in the ongoing U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Philippines campaigns.
Conventional military intervention to fight terrorists makes sense if a
country is sheltering terrorists who have mounted previous international attacks,
because one must first defeat the sheltering state's armed forces in order to get
at the terrorists (as in Taliban Afghanistan). The main question becomes
whether intervention can be unilateral or must be multilateral. As the Afghan
case was one of self-defense by the U.S. against the manifest danger of renewed
attacks by Al-Qaeda operating under Taliban protection, unilateral intervention
was justified; the Security Council agreed. Pre-emption arose only in the sense
that there was a moral certainty of new attacks from the same source, and that
these attacks must be pre-empted by disrupting the organization. If there had
been no previous attack, but there was well-corroborated, clear and convincing
evidence that a group was preparing an imminent attack, pre-emption would
also be justified -preferably with multilateral authorization, but unilaterally if
time constraints so required. Note that whether or not the terrorists possessed
WMDs was irrelevant in the actual Afghan case and would be irrelevant in the
hypothetical case just described.
16. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a notable exception.
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Coalitions of the willing formed for pre-emptive purposes, as in the
U.S./U.K. coalition that invaded Iraq, are equivalent to unilateral pre-emption
and need to meet the same criteria for justification. While a coalition provides
a framework for interchange of perspectives and rational deliberation between
analysts and leaders of two or more states and is therefore more likely than a
single state to base its actions on established facts and agreed analyses, coali-
tions are not officers of the law unless authorized to act as such. Unauthorized
unilateral or coalitional pre-emption tends to undermine the network of laws
that states have imposed on themselves to regulate their interactions, and to
undermine respect for law itself. Coalitional intervention, whether reactive or
pre-emptive, must be limited to rare cases of extreme emergency when no other
solution is available, as outlined elsewhere in this essay.
It is also important to note that any force combating terrorism must make
every effort to maintain respect for internationally-recognized basic human
rights, above all those that are non-negotiable even in situations of national
emergency (Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights). In the 1970s and early 1980s, some governments confronting critical
situations tried to control terrorists by sweeping aside respect for all human
rights standards and killing and torturing suspects at will, claiming that terrorist
violence justified any and all methods to defeat them. But when terror becomes
state policy, a government loses legitimacy, and it can also lose focus, as some
of the regimes just described soon failed to distinguish between terrorists and
nonviolent political opponents.
VII. STATES AND WMDs
A state has many channels of ongoing contact and communication with
another state, legal, political, diplomatic, economic, social, technological,
official and private, bilateral and multilateral. They are all channels of influence
through which states deal with each other, and they do not exist in the relation-
ship between a state and a terrorist organization. These channels do not exclude
the reality of power; rather, they presuppose, discipline and channel it. They do
not exclude the possibility of military intervention.
Every rational government takes measures to defend its people, and those
of its allies, from external attack. Governments discharge this task through a
defense establishment, diplomatic and intelligence services, border controls and
alliances. Professionals must tell policymakers frankly what they know for sure
about a particular threat and what they don't know, how certain they are as to
what it means, and why they reach the conclusions they do. But it is policy-
makers who have to decide what to do about it, and when to wait for more infor-
mation before deciding on a course of action, understanding that it is never
possible to know everything about a developing situation and that time for
decision can be very short. 7
Regarding imminence, it is widely accepted that a state has a right, as a
logical extension of self-defense, to use military force to defend itself against
an imminent attack. Classically, this has meant that the pre-empting state had
abundant, well-substantiated, clear and convincing information that a neighbor
whose forces were massed along the border had gone into final preparation for
immediate attack; tanks and infantry were in position to move, warships
entering territorial waters were in battle formation, planes were in the air and
headed in your direction." During the 2002 U.S. Congressional debate on
whether to authorize the use of military force against Iraq, proposals were
introduced to restrict the President's authority. The Administration and its
supporters replied that in today's world, technology has made traditional notions
of imminence obsolete, and that an attack with a WMD would most likely take
place without warning.'9
Admittedly, there are difficulties with imminence as a criterion. On an
individual level, there are situations in which it is unmistakable that an armed
individual is about to attack another with lethal intent. Police officers and crime
victims face these situations frequently, and there are times when it would be
irrational not to shoot first to save one's own life or the life of another
immediately threatened person. In state-to-state situations, one needs solid facts
about intentions, capabilities and actions in progress. There is the danger that
the doctrine of pre-emption in the face of imminent attack can be stretched to
a point where it blends seamlessly into a strategic doctrine of preventive war:
"strike first as soon as possible and gain the advantage of surprise and the
momentum of offense, because sooner or later they will probably make war on
us anyway." This thinking characterized both pre-war strategic planning and
the last-minute crisis phase of the outbreak of the First World War.20
17. In Iraq's case, time was not this limited, as onsite inspections were producing valuable
information, onsite monitoring equipment was being repaired or installed, and conventional missiles were
being destroyed when the decision was made to invade.
18. In American diplomatic history, the classic formulation of criteria for imminence is by Secretary
of State Daniel Webster protesting a British attack on the Caroline, which was carrying a cargo of arms toward
Canada. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1920, 1634-35 (1984).
Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix, UN Secretary
Council 7 March 2003, www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm. Also daily UNMOVIC IAEA Press
Statements on Inspection Activities in Iraq, March 10-17, 2003, UN News Service,
www.un.org/apps/news/printinfocusnews.
19. This rested on the claim that Iraq was working hand in glove with Al-Qaeda and similar groups,
who would carry out the attack through their yet undetected agents in the U.S.
20. In the planning phase, both France and Germany had decided well before 1914 that war between
them was sufficiently probable that, in light of modem developments in weaponry, transportation and
communications, it would be crucial to strike with full force as rapidly as possible once hostilities began.
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During the Cold War, for both NATO and the Soviet Union attack was
always "imminent" in the sense that both sides were ready and able to mount an
attack with just a few minutes notice; hostility and capability were givens, and
the only questions were about short-term intent and the meaning of specific
moves by the other side. World War III did not break out because both sides
developed formal structures of round-the-clock communication, and a code of
conduct that ensured that any given action by one side was explained to the
other in a way that the intent and meaning were clear. During this period, when
everyone lived with the knowledge that modem weaponry and means of
delivery could destroy nations in an hour, a structure of communication and a
code of conduct promoted transparency and helped to manage the problem.
Fear that a state might use a WMD against another country is still focused
mainly on nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, despite the fact that
chemical weapons have been used in recent decades as well as in World War I.
Biological and chemical weapons are thought to be difficult to use in interstate
war, in that they are so unstable that in certain conditions they are as likely to
kill those who use them as their intended victims. Also, most states do not
regard acquiring chemical or biological weapons as a prestigious accomplish-
ment. On the other hand, some states suspected of clandestine nuclear weapons
programs already have or are on the way to obtaining transcontinental delivery
capabilities, and there is also rapidly growing recognition of the difficulty of
preventing the smuggling of a "dirty bomb."
Nuclear weapons are produced by states. IAEA Director General
Mohammed El-Baradei told that organization's General Conference in
September 2004 that the agency has reason to believe that some forty states
have or are on the way to developing the means to produce weapons-grade
nuclear material or actual weapons, and that this means that substantial im-
provement is needed in existing international controls on nuclear proliferation.
He pointed out that slippage in the nonproliferation regime has undeniably
occurred since the end of the Cold War, and that strengthening it is one of the
most urgent tasks of the international community.2 As noted above, possession
of missiles by a state that is found to be developing or has developed a nuclear
weapon further complicates the problem.
In most and perhaps all countries the facilities that produce, use, and store
nuclear material are under government control. It is good security procedures
They thereupon began to train, equip and position their forces to carry out this strategy. In the last-minute
crisis, multiple mobilizations on the continent persuaded all major powers that attack was imminent; it was
only misperception and fear caused the false perception to become real.
21. Id. (discussing several gaps in the existing system, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of
recent efforts to close them, and recommending new multilateral legal initiatives and institutional controls,
accompanied by a shift in aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy).
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that will prevent the theft of this material, good police work that will investigate
any theft, good intelligence, and international cooperation that will halt its
transport across borders.
If a terrorist organization is found to have acquired a nuclear weapon or the
components of a nuclear weapon, the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII, or the General Assembly acting under Uniting for Peace, should regard this
fact as an imminent threat to international peace and security and take
immediate action to neutralize the threat, including military action if necessary,
with or without the cooperation of the state where the terrorists and the weapons
are located. If neither the Council nor the Assembly is able to act in a timely or
effective way, a state that has suffered previous attacks by the same terrorist
organization would have the right in self-defense to seize or destroy the nuclear
weapon(s) or components. Terrorists acquisition of biological or chemical
warfare agents demands appropriate and immediate Security Council action
under Chapter VII, with General Assembly action under Uniting for Peace as
an alternative in case the Council is unable to act promptly or with effect. The
Council must also take appropriate measures against any state that is found to
have supplied a WMD to a terrorists group.
The quality of intelligence supporting the conclusion that terrorists have
acquired nuclear weapons or other WMDs is a key determinant of whether pre-
emptive action is warranted. Mere suspicion is not enough, as all have seen in
the case of Iraq. As has been said elsewhere in this essay, the evidence must be
abundant, well-corroborated, clear and convincing. This requires multiple
reliable sources and as wide a circle of cross-checking and joint assessment
among national services as is consistent with security requirements for intelli-
gence sources and methods.
Flood2005]
JUS AD BELLUM: THE NEXT IRAQ
Ian Johnstone*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 395
II. Kosovo: HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY AS AN EXCUSE ........... 396
III. THE EVOLVING LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE ...................... 396
IV. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL
DECISION-M AKING ...................................... 398
A. Substantive Principles/Considerations ................... 399
B. Procedural Innovations .............................. 400
V . CONCLUSION ........................................... 401
I. INTRODUCTION
Our chairman said that the task of this panel is to discuss preemptive
military intervention to combat either: the threatened use of force, for example,
by terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction; or outrageous human
rights violations, like genocide. While these two categories of threat look quite
different, I think it is instructive to discuss them together in the context of
preemption, and I am glad we are doing so.
In my presentation, I plan to do the following three things: outline where
the law relating to humanitarian intervention stands post-Kosovo; outline where
the law relating to preemptive self-defense stands post-September 11 th (9/11);
and offer a few modest proposals on how to improve the quality of the United
Nations Security Council (Security Council) decision-making on these issues.
My central argument is that the law is less restrictive than meets the eye, but
there are substantial weaknesses in the existing legal and institutional regimes.
Those weaknesses can be addressed through a number of substantive and
procedural steps, which would constitute a politically viable evolution, but not
a revolution in the existing legal order. My proposals focus on the Security
Council, not because I believe it has any inherent claim to legitimacy, but
because I do not think I can properly defend a more radical transformation of
the international legal order in only ten minutes. However, I will conclude with
one somewhat radical suggestion, which we may be able to take up in the
discussion period.
* Associate Professor of International Law Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts
University. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend
2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
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II. Kosovo: HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY AS AN EXCUSE
I do not intend to review the law relating to humanitarian intervention at
length, but rather focus on the international reaction to the Northern Alliance
Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In my view,
that is the most illuminating way of understanding where the law currently
stands.
The weight of scholarly and official opinion is that the intervention was
illegal.' None of the three principal legal justifications: authority based on
existing Security Council resolutions; a customary right of humanitarian inter-
vention; or self-defense, was persuasive. However, my reading of the inter-
national reaction to the intervention is that NATO's violation of the law was in
effect excused.
The best way of characterizing what happened from a legal point of view
is that an interpretive community of governments and actors represented on the
Security Council, along with other interested governments, such as lawyers,
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and blue ribbon panelists, deemed
the intervention illegal, but turned a blind eye to the violation of the law given
the extreme circumstances.
Without going into details, I would argue that this reading is supported by
the many statements of government representatives who were disinclined to
accept the legality of the intervention, but reluctant to condemn it. This
includes many Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Islamic countries, and even
some NATO countries who stressed the exceptional nature of the action and
down-played its relevance as a precedent.
Therefore, the law on humanitarian intervention post-Kosovo is as follows:
it is legal with Security Council approval and illegal without it as a general
matter, however there may be rare cases of extreme humanitarian necessity
when unauthorized action will in effect be excused by the international com-
munity.
III. THE EVOLVING LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
What about preemptive self-defense? An instructive way of looking at
where that law stands post-9/11 is by comparing the reactions to the US-led
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.2
1. For a review of the literature and analysis of the arguments put forward to justify the
intervention, see Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument, 14 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 437, 464-75 (2003).
2. See Ian Johnstone, US-UNRelations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order) As We Know It?,
15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 813, 827-36 (2004).
Johnstone
The official justification for the US and allied attacks on Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in October 2001, was self-defense in connection with the events of
9/11.3 This was a substantial stretch of the concept of self-defense in a two
respects: it was invoked against a non-state actor (Al-Qaeda); and in exercising
its right of self-defense, the US and its Afghan allies changed the regime in
power in Afghanistan.
What is most interesting from a legal point of view is that the world was
largely prepared to accept this interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter (UN Charter). There is ample evidence of this acceptance in the reac-
tions of the Security Council itself and other international organizations such as
NATO; the Organization of American States (OAS); the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC); and even the Organization of Islamic Countries
(OIC), which bent over backwards to avoid condemning the military action as
a violation of international law.
Moreover, many states participated directly or indirectly in Operation
Enduring Freedom, or at least expressed support for it, and they are participating
in the economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan to this day.
However, when self-defense against terrorism was invoked eighteen
months later as one of the justifications for military action against Iraq, the
international reaction was quite different. Few states or knowledgeable
observers were persuaded that the links between Al-Qaeda and the regime of
Saddam Hussein were sufficiently tight to justify the invasion of Iraq on that
basis. When that became obvious, the Bush Administration largely gave up
trying to make its case on the grounds of self-defense, at least to international
audiences. There is no better evidence than the letter of March 20, 2003 that the
United States sent to the President of the Security Council setting out the legal
justification for the war.' It does not contain a word about terrorism, self-
defense, or preemption.' The legal case is based entirely on the enforcement of
existing Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction.6
A broader legal question, which was not directly raised by the Iraq case
since self-defense was not the official justification, is whether the doctrine of
preemption, as articulated in the National Security Strategy of 2002, is
3. Letter dated 7 October 2001from the Permanent Representative of the United States ofAmerica
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (2001).
4. Letter dated 20 March 2003from the Permanent Representative of the United States ofAmerica
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/2003/351 (2003).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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consistent with the law of self-defense as traditionally understood? The central
argument is that Article 51 of the UN Charter permits "anticipatory self-
defense," and that the notion of anticipatory self-defense can and does encom-
pass preemptive strikes against terrorists.
There is a long history to the doctrine of "anticipatory self-defense," going
back to the Caroline case of 1842.' At that time, US Secretary of State Daniel
Webster claimed that self-defense was permissible when the threat of attack was
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation.",8 Although, that is still good law, my reading of the Bush Admini-
stration's version of the doctrine of preemption is not consistent with even the
most liberal interpretation of that law. What some of the language in the
National Security Strategy seems to contemplate is not preemption of a truly
imminent attack when there is clear and convincing evidence that it is about to
be launched, but rather preventive action. There is no self-evident line between
preemption and prevention, but starting a war now in order to prevent some
future, but not well-specified threat from materializing, is not what Secretary of
State Webster had in mind. If accepted in its most expansive form, the doctrine
stretches the term "armed attack" so far, that it becomes virtually meaningless
as a legal concept.
This is not to say that self-defense can never be invoked to forestall future
terrorist attacks. If the attack is truly imminent, or if there is a pattern of attacks
and credible evidence of both their source and the threat of further attacks, then
a state can take defensive military action. This formulation, sometimes called
the "accumulation of events theory,"9 offers a gloss on the notion of anticipatory
self-defense, relaxing the test of "imminence" slightly when there is a pattern
of attacks. The action against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan could be justified on
that basis. The invasion of Iraq could not!
IV. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING
As a result, I read existing law on "unilateral intervention" (intervention
not authorized by the Security Council) as less restrictive than meets the eye;
humanitarian intervention will be excused in some circumstances and preemp-
tive self-defense against some terrorist threats is lawful.
However, in setting up the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change, the Secretary General was motivated by a sense that, while unilateral
7. See LORI FISLER DAMROSH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 969 (4th ed.
2001).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, "The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another
Country," 19 Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights 209, at 220 (1989); STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1996).
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action is necessary and appropriate to deal with some of these threats, greater
collective action is also required. More specifically, the Security Council must
do more to face its responsibilities in dealing with both kinds of threats.
The Security Council has not been idle in either field. Throughout the
1990s, it was increasingly willing to label human rights or humanitarian crises
as threats to international peace and security, and to authorize coercive action
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in response. While it has not authorized
military action against a terrorist threat to date, it imposed economic sanctions
three times in respect of terrorism: against Libya in 1992; against Sudan in
1996; and on the Taliban in 1999. It has also adopted resolutions 1373 regard-
ing financing and other forms of support for terrorism, and 1540 in order to
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists.
These acts of law-making by the Security Council are unprecedented in the
sense that they impose binding obligations on all states in a general issue area
for an indefinite period.
Is it reasonable to think the Council will do more? Without trying to
anticipate what the High Level Panel might say, it seems to me that two steps
could be taken to improve how these threats are dealt with: the adoption of a
set of substantive principles or "considerations" to guide deliberations on
intervention; and procedural innovations to make it more likely the Security
Council will act, and will do so on a principled basis.
A. Substantive Principles/Considerations
The broad outline of substantive principles for intervention was fore-
shadowed in The Responsibility to Protect Report.'0 Those criteria related to
humanitarian intervention alone, but it is not hard to imagine how they might
be converted into more generic principles.
However, instead of hard and fast criteria, I would argue that a more viable
and politically realistic way of proceeding would be for the Security Council,
General Assembly, and/or any other body engaged in this inquiry, to ask itself
a set of questions each time the issue of intervention arises." Questions such
as:
1) What is the magnitude of the threat or emergency?
2) Is the very existence of a state or ethnic group at risk?
10. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 31 (2001).
11. There is a precedent for this. In 1994, the Council adopted a list of considerations to be taken
into account before establishing a peacekeeping mission. Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3372nd mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/22 (1994).
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3) Short of that extreme situation, is there a pattern or history of
actions to suggest that the threat will materialize?
4) How good is the evidence of the threat or emergency? Can it be
verified by credible sources?
5) Are alternatives to preemptive military action available? Have
viable measures short of the use of force been exhausted?
6) What are the prospects of success? Are the interveners willing
to see it through?
These sorts of considerations would not serve as an automatic trigger or set
a threshold for action, but they would structure deliberations and impel the
Council to deal with these threats in a more systematic, norm-based way. They
would force governments proposing intervention to state their case in terms that
are agreed upon in advance. In addition, it would force governments who
oppose action to justify their opposition in those same terms.
B. Procedural Innovations
However, substantive guidelines will not go far towards stimulating
Security Council action, as long as the veto power stands in the way. There is
no self-evident reason why the veto should stand in the way and why each of the
five permanent members (P5) should be the final court of appeal on these sorts
of decisions. However, the Security Council is the only institutional safeguard
that currently exists as a check on abuses. The resulting dilemma is that veto
power can block all attempts at preemptive action and yet a right of unilateral
intervention, other than in self-defense, is too open to abuse.
A procedural way out of this dilemma, suggested by Thomas Pickering at
a recent speech at the Fletcher School, is for the P5 members of the Security
Council to reach a gentleman's agreement providing that decisions about the
preemptive use of force will be put to a straw poll, and unless two of the P5s
signal that they will vote no, the sole objector will abstain on the resolution
rather than veto it.12 In other words, a veto on preemptive action to combat
either terrorists' threats or massive human rights abuses, require that two of the
permanent members vote no.13
An additional safeguard that was not suggested by Mr. Pickering would be
for the Council to appoint an impartial commission to assess whether the factual
premises employed to justify the intervention were accurate. This assessment
12. The Honorable Thomas Pickering, Convocation Address at The Fletcher Law School at Tufts
University (Sept. 9, 2004). Mr. Pickering was not referring to humanitarian intervention or preemptive action
against terrorist threats per se, but his proposal could usefully be adapted to deal with those kinds of threats,
where the twin problems of Security Council paralysis and unilateral abuses are especially acute. Id.
13. Id.
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would have to come after-the-fact, but it could still reduce the risk of abuse by
those in favor of intervention while putting pressure on those who oppose it to
do so for non-arbitrary reasons. 4 Accountability derives from the need to
provide accurate information to justify preemptive intervention, and to do it on
the basis of accepted standards.
Obviously neither of these suggestions would be easy to implement, but
they offer a plausible starting point for discussion about how to improve the
quality of Security Council deliberations and decisions. They are designed to
make Council members more accountable for decisions to act and for decisions
not to act.
V. CONCLUSION
The more radical proposal, which I am not confident I can defend, is to
forget the gentleman's agreement on the veto and instead turn to some other
body for collective endorsement when a veto is cast. The other body could be
a self-constituted group of twenty to twenty-five major powers. Their decisions
would have to be by qualified majority vote, for example, fifteen-twenty, since
all of the P5 members of the Security Council would likely be among the group.
Endorsement by this body would not render the action legal, but might reinforce
claims that it is excusable in the circumstances.
14. See Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1 (2004).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In nineteenth century criminal procedure in the United States, extradition
treaties impacted the treatment of a person surrendered by a foreign state. In a
series of cases in state supreme courts, and one in the United States Supreme
Court, persons surrendered invoked extradition treaties to annul criminal
indictments. The cases involved persons who were surrendered pursuant to a
request based on a particular criminal charge, but then were charged with
additional offenses after being surrendered.
That additional charging violated a concept of extradition law called the
Rule of Specialty. A state that gains surrender on an extradition request is
deemed to violate the rights of the surrendering state if it prefers charges
additional to that on which the extradition request was based. For the United
States courts, the issue was whether this was an obligation that ran only between
the two states, or whether it could be invoked by the individual.
In an Ohio case, a county prosecutor added an additional charge to a man's
previous charge, although he was already surrendered and extradited for that
charge by England.' The Ohio Supreme Court annulled the additional charge
* President's Club Professor in Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard
University. The author has been counsel to the Government of Mexico in filing amicus curiae briefs in U.S.
court cases on consular access. He testified as an expert witness, called by the defense, in Commonwealth
v. Malvo, Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, a case involving consular access. He was Co-Petitioner
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Fierro case, cited herein. This article is a
revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. See State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 3d 273 (Ohio 1883).
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as a violation of the Rule of Specialty.' Citing the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, the court said the individual could invoke the treaty:
This treaty is ... the law of the land, and the judges of every state are
as bound thereby as they are by the constitution and laws of the
Federal or State governments. It is ... the imperative duty of the
judicial tribunals of Ohio to take cognizance of the rights of persons
arising under a treaty to the same extent as if they arose under a
statute of the state itself.3
The court reached this conclusion even though the extradition treaty was silent
on the question of whether the individual could benefit from the Rule of
Specialty.
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court relied on the Ohio
decision when a similar issue came before it. The Court found that allowing an
additional charge following extradition would violate the treaty.4 Like the Ohio
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court inferred the right of an
individual to invoke the treaty and fashioned a remedy.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), a multilateral
treaty regulating the activity of consuls of a sending state in a receiving state,
similarly affects the treatment of persons charged with a criminal offense. One
of a consul's functions is to assist nationals charged with crimes. The VCCR
creates a triggering mechanism for such assistance by giving a detained foreign
national a right of access to a home state consul and by requiring the detaining
authorities to advise the foreign national of the right of access.5
Additionally, the VCCR requires a receiving state to provide a remedy if
the obligation is violated:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.6
Thus, unlike the extradition treaty at issue in Vanderpool and Rauscher, the
VCCR prescribes rights for the individual and requires a remedy if those rights
are violated. Despite this greater specificity on these two key issues, courts of
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
5. Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1969, art. 36, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
6. Id.
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the United States have been hesitant to accord rights to a detained foreign
national who is not provided information about consular access and even more
reluctant to give a remedy for violation of that right. That reluctance has
resulted in three cases filed against the United States in the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) by sending states whose nationals were not informed of the right
of consular access, but who were, nonetheless, convicted of a crime. In all three
cases, the foreign nationals were sentenced to death.
In the second of the two cases, brought by Germany, the ICJ said that in
the event of a violation the receiving state must provide "review and
reconsideration" of the conviction and sentence.7 The court stated:
if the United States ... should fail in its obligation of consular
notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology would
not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have been
subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be
incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of
the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.!
In the third case, brought by Mexico, the ICJ elaborated on the requirement
to review and reconsider. The ICJ reiterated that "review and reconsideration"
must be undertaken to "take account" of the violation. 9 The court said:
The question of whether the violations of Article 36, paragraph 1, are
to be regarded as having, in the causal sequence of events, ultimately
led to convictions and severe penalties is an integral part of criminal
proceedings before the courts of the United States and is for them to
determine in the process of review and reconsideration. In so doing,
it is for the courts of the United States to examine the facts, and in
particular the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation
of the rights set forth in the Convention."
In the United States, most courts entertaining VCCR claims have not
reached this question because, as indicated, they have found either that no right
exists invocable by the foreign national or that no remedy is required. Those
United States courts that have found in favor of the foreign national on these
two points have then faced the question of whether, and to what extent,
7. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27).
8. Id. at 513-14.
9. Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1, 131 (Mar. 31).
10. Id. 122.
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prejudice must have flowed from the violation before relief is granted. A
spectrum of possibilities presents itself. At one end would be no requirement
of prejudice, i.e., if there has been a violation of the right of consular access,
reversal follows. At the other end, one could construct a substantial barrier to
relief by requiring the foreign national to sustain a burden of persuasion that the
case would have ended in an acquittal had the information about consular access
been given at the time of arrest. Between these two possibilities lie potential
rules that would impose only a burden of production on the foreign national.
This would not require a finding that there would have been a different
outcome, but rather only a finding that consular assistance might have been
provided, and that it might have had an impact.
A. Standards as Found by Agencies of the Inter-American System
The ICJ did not further explain how a court is to determine whether a
violation requires reversal. Additional learning on that question, however,
comes from the inter-American human rights system that operates under the
Organization of American States (OAS). The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights issued an advisory opinion in 1999 on the question of whether,
specifically in the context of capital cases, a failure to comply with consular
access rights violates Due Process.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, after finding that a judicial
remedy is required for a consular access violation, stated that "non-observance
of a detained foreign national's right to information, recognized in Article
36(a)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the
guarantees of the due process of law."11 The court's view was that the oppor-
tunity for consular assistance is critical and may impact criminal proceedings
in a variety of ways and, therefore, is an important safeguard.
The court said that "notification to a detained foreign national of the right
to communicate with a consular official of his country will materially improve
the possibilities of a defense," and "procedural measures, including those taken
by the police will be done with greater concern for legality and greater respect
for the dignity of the person."' 12 The court said that the right to be informed
about consular access is a means of defense for the accused that is reflected, on
occasion in a determinative way, in the respect shown for his other procedural
rights. "3
11. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the
Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 137 (Oct. 1, 1999).
12. Id. 1121.
13. Id. 123.
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B. Burden of Proof
Two cases were subsequently decided by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR), also a part of the OAS, and which is a body
subsidiary to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The IACHR took its
task as one of implementing, in regard to specific cases, the standard set by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Each case concerned a Mexican national convicted of murder and
sentenced to death: Ramon Martinez Villareal in Arizona, 4 and Cesar Fierro
in Texas. 5 In each case the commission found that the foreign national had not
been informed about consular access and that this failure required a reversal of
the conviction.1
6
The IACHR did not state that it needed to find that the failure to inform
had led to an identifiable negative result for the foreign national, or that consular
assistance would have benefited the foreign national in a particular way. Since
it did not find a need for such a finding the IACHR did not impose any proof
burden, either of production or of persuasion, on the petitioners to demonstrate
a prejudicial impact.17
To evaluate the effect of a violation of an ensuing conviction, the IACHR
used a presumption. In the Fierro case, it stated:
As the Commission has previously held, fundamental due process
protections, such as the right to prior notification in detail of the
charges against a defendant and the right to effective counsel, are of
such a nature that, in the absence of access to consular assistance, a
foreign national could be placed at a considerable disadvantage in the
context of a criminal proceeding taken against him or her by a state.
Each case must be evaluated on its individual circumstances. Once
a failure to inform a foreign national of his right to consular
notification and assistance has been proven, however, a formidable
presumption of unfairness will arise unless it is established that the
proceedings were fair notwithstanding the failure of notification. 8
The IACHR thus requires an affirmative showing of fairness in the face of
the consular access violation. By this standard, it would appear that if a consul
14. Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 821, OEA/ser. L./V./I1.117, doc. 5, rev. 1 (2002).
15. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, OEA/ser. L.N./IH.1 18, doc. 5, rev. 2 (2003).
16. Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 821, 21; Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, 42.
17. Under the commission's procedures, the foreign national detainee is not a party to the
proceedings. A petition may be filed by any person, to inform the commission of a violation of rights. That
petitioner, whoever it may be, argues the case.
18. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, 166.
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might have played a constructive role in the defense, the "formidable
presumption of fairness" would remain unrebutted.
Applying this presumption to the facts of the Fierro case, the IACHR said,
"it is also not apparent, from the state's observations or otherwise, that Mr.
Fierro's proceedings were fair notwithstanding the state's failure to comply with
the consular notification requirements."' 9
C. Standard for Rebutting the Presumption of Unfairness
The Fierro case does not provide guidance on the limits of what an
affirmative showing of fairness must reveal, because the harm to Fierro from
lack of consular access was quite obvious. Shortly after arrest, a murder
confession was taken that likely could not have been obtained had a consul been
involved.2" The El Paso, Texas, police who detained Fierro had pre-arranged
with police in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, for Fierro's mother and step-father to be
arrested in Ciudad Juarez.2 The El Paso police used Fierro's fear of what
would befall his mother and step-father to convince him to confess.2 A Texas
court found the confession inadmissible but upheld the murder conviction on
other evidence.23 The commission noted the Texas court's conclusion that the
El Paso officer who testified to not having coerced Fierro had perjured
himself.2 4
The IACHR thought that a consul's participation might have averted the
coerced confession:
Mr. Fierro's confession was taken at a time when consular
notification and assistance may have been highly significant in the
circumstances. The consulate could, for example, have verified the
status of Mr. Fierro's mother and step-father, who were being held in
Mexico by the Mexican police, and thereby mitigated any detrimental
impact that their detention may have had on Mr. Fierro's
interrogation and the veracity of the resulting confession."
The IACHR thus engaged in analysis of how a consul might have impacted
the proceedings, but only by way of determining whether the presumption of
unfairness might be overcome on the facts of the case. The commission did not
19. Id.
20. See Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771,1 18.
24. Id.
25. Id. 39.
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require that there would have been a different outcome had a consul
participated.
Similarly in Martinez Villareal, the commission considered that the
proceedings had failed to satisfy Due Process, but again the deficiency was so
significant as to provide little indication of the outer limit. Martinez Villareal
apparently had little idea of what was occurring during this trial. In the
commission's finding:
the absence of notification under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations could on the information available
have had a significant effect on the fairness of Mr. Martinez
Villareal's criminal proceedings. According to the record, Mr.
Martinez Villareal was a Mexican national who was arrested and tried
in the United States, but who did not speak English and was
represented by an attorney who did not speak Spanish. The record
also indicates that Mr. Martinez Villareal was not familiar with the
U.S. legal system and that this, together with his linguistic limitations,
affected his understanding of and participation in the criminal
proceedings against him despite the presence of a translator. The
Petitioners claim, for example, that Mr. [Martinez] Villareal did not
understand which people in the courtroom comprised the jury or what
the purpose of the jury was, and that the voir dire proceedings were
not translated into a language that he could understand. The record
also indicates Mr. Martinez Villareal's attorney failed to contact his
family in Mexico and, moreover, personally attested through an
affidavit as to his overall inexperience and ineffectiveness in handling
Mr. Martinez Villareal's case. Further, there is evidence suggesting
that Mr. Martinez Villareal suffered from some degree of mental
deficiency during at least certain stages of the criminal proceedings
against him.26
D. Standard Applied by United States Courts
United States courts have not definitively addressed the issue of how to
assess a violation of the obligation to inform a foreign national about consular
access. In the only Article 36 case to reach the United States Supreme Court,
the matter was heard only on a last-minute request for a stay of execution and
without full briefing. The court rejected the request for a stay on grounds that
the applicant had not raised the Article 36 issue in a timely manner.27
The court, nonetheless, speculated on the impact of an Article 36 violation.
It said by way of dictum, "it is extremely doubtful that the violation should
26. Case 11.753, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 821,1 82.
27. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some
showing that the violation had an effect on the trial."'28 The court did not specify
whether by "effect" it meant a decisive effect, namely that the accused would
have been acquitted, or whether it meant that a consul might have played some
role. Neither did it specify who would carry proof burdens on the issue.
In a case from Illinois involving a Polish national convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, a United States district court, purporting to follow the
United States Supreme Court's dictum, said, "[t]o gain relief on a Vienna
Convention violation, then, a Petitioner must show: that his Vienna Convention
rights were violated; and that the violation had a material effect on the outcome
of the trial or sentencing proceeding."29 Applying this standard to the facts
before it, the court found little reason to believe that a consul could have had an
effect on the trial, because "evidence of Madej's guilt was substantial."3
Continuing, the court said:
It is possible, though, that the Consulate's participation would have
had an effect on the sentencing hearing ... Particularly in this case,
where trial counsel failed completely to undertake any investigation
of the client's life, character, and background in preparation for the
sentencing phase, the participation of the Consulate could possibly
have made a difference.3'
That formulation suggested that a proof burden rested on the foreign national,
but only to raise a possibility that consular assistance might have had an effect
on the outcome.
In an earlier case, U.S. v. Rangel-Gonzales, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed more precisely the proof burden.32 This
case was decided in 1980, at a time when that circuit found a remedy to be
required for an Article 36 violation.33 The court of appeals said that while it is
incumbent on a foreign national to raise the issue, the government must
disprove that the failure of notification did not prejudice the foreign national.
Applying the test to the case at bar, the court of appeals said:
the appellant in this case carried his initial burden of going forward
with evidence that he did not know of his right to consult with
28. Id. at 377.
29. United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F.Supp.2d 968, 980 (N.Dist.llI. 2002).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980).
33. The circuit's position changed with the decision quoted above, see United States v. Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000).
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consular officials, that he would have availed himself of that right had
he known of it, and that there was a likelihood that the contact would
have resulted in assistance to him in resisting deportation.34
The court of appeals, moreover, did not require a decisive effect on the
outcome of the proceedings. Rather, prejudice would be present if the foreign
national's contact with a consul, had it occurred, "would have resulted in
assistance to him," and if it appears that the foreign national was unaware of the
right of consular access and would have requested it if informed about it." That
approach is consistent with that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
which as indicated, considered a denial of the possibility of consular assistance
through non-notification as affecting multiple aspects of the proceedings.
The standard employed by United States courts in more recent cases comes
from the United States court of appeals in Rangel-Gonzales." Those courts that
have addressed the distinction between burden of production and burden of
persuasion have, as in Rangel-Gonzales, made clear that the evidentiary burden
on the foreign national is one of production only.
37
These courts have not construed "prejudice" to mean that the case would
have ended in an acquittal instead of a conviction. The Department of State has
made clear that such an approach would be unworkable and inconsistent with
the VCCR. In oral argument in Paraguay's case against the United States, the
Department said that it would be:
problematic to have a rule that a failure of consular notification
required a return to the status quo ante only ifnotification would have
led to a different outcome. It would be unworkable for a court to
attempt to determine reliably what a consular officer would have done
and whether it would have made a difference.3 8
In a case decided in light of the ICJ rulings, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals indicated deference to the ICJs decisions and a standard of
review similar to that of the United States court of appeals in Rangel-Gonzales.
34. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 533.
35. Id.
36. United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1097 (S.D.Cal. 1998); United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1126 (C.D.IU. 1999).
37. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F.Supp.2d at 1097 (citing Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 530-31, for the
proposition that the defendant must "produce evidence"); State v. Cevallos Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (stating that defendant "must produce evidence...").
38. Request for the indication of provisional measures, verbatim record, public sitting of 7 April
1998, para. 2.18 (statement of Catherine Brown, Assistant Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs), Concerning
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
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Hearing the case of Osvaldo Torres, a Mexican national facing imminent
execution in Texas, the court stayed the execution and ordered a trial court to
hold a hearing to determine "whether Torres was prejudiced by the State's
violation of his Vienna Convention rights in failing to inform Torres, after he
was detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate., 39 The
court issued its order without an explanatory opinion, but in a concurring
opinion, Judge Chapel said that by virtue of the United States' ratification of the
Optional Protocol, his court was obligated to comport with the ICJ judgment in
the Avena case.40 Prejudice would be present, Chapel, J., wrote, if Torres was
unaware of his right to consular access, if he would have availed himself of it
had he been informed about it, and if a Mexican consul would have provided
consular assistance.41
II. ANALYSIS
A requirement is unrealistic if it would involve a court finding that a consul
might have acted in a way that would have averted the conviction. The United
States' position in oral argument in the Paraguay case is sound. When a
detainee has not received consular assistance for not having been informed of
the right, one can never know what a consul might have done that would have
affected the proceedings in the foreign national's favor.
The approach taken in the inter-American system, and that taken in the
cited United States cases, is more realistic. A violation of the obligation to
inform a foreign national of the right of consular access gives rise to a
"formidable presumption of unfairness," in the words of the IACHR, because
of the myriad ways in which a consul may affect proceedings.42 Where the
foreign national was not informed, and where a consul did not participate, one
is left only to speculate on what a consul might have done. One can, as the
IACHR did in its two cases, cite unfair aspects of a particular proceeding as an
indication of problems a consul might have averted. Any decision-maker
seeking to make its decision as solid as possible would do so. However, once
the presumption of unfairness arises, the presumption should remain unless it
can affirmatively be shown that a consul would not have participated in the
case. So long as it appears that a consul might have participated had the
obligation to inform been met, the presumption of unfairness stands.
39. Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hearing, Torres v.
Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at9.
42. Case 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 771, 66.
The Rangel-Gonzales approach is more consistent with international
practice than is the Madej approach. An international law violation must be
remedied by putting the situation in which it would have been if no violation
occurred. If information was not given to a foreign national at the time of arrest
about consular access, there should not need to be a finding that a consul might
have impacted the case in a particular respect. As the United States argued in
the Paraguay case, that approach requires too much speculation. In a case in
which no information was given to the foreign national and in which no consul
participated, one cannot surmise what role a consul might have played, or how
a consul's participation might have altered the course of the proceedings.
Criminal trials can result in a variety of outcomes, not limited to simply
acquittal or guilt on the charges filed. Charges can be reduced before or during
trial, plea bargains can be reached, and prosecutors can agree to recommend a
particular sentence. One can never know how a consul might have taken action
that could have affected these determinations. The presumption of unfairness,
as the IACHR put the matter, is "formidable." '43
43. Id.
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LAGRAND AND AVENA ESTABLISH A RIGHT, BUT
IS THERE A REMEDY? BRIEF COMMENTS ON
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF LAGRAND AND
AVENA IN THE U.S.
By Malvina Halberstam*
The United States is obligated under international law to review and
reconsider the conviction and sentence of persons who were not informed of
their right to request that their Consul be notified of their arrest and to meet with
him, as provided for by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.'
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) so ruled in Avena 2 and LaGrand3.
The ICJ had jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention.4
Unlike the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case5 and the recent 1CJ advisory
opinion on the Israeli security fence,6 both of which raise serious questions
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The author served
as Counselor on International Law in the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor. The author
wishes to thank Cheryl Fuchs, Cardozo '05, and Philip Segal, Cardozo '06, for their assistance with the
research for this article. These comments were presented at International Law Weekend 2004, panel on The
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations After Avena, held in New York City, October 15, 2004. Professor
Valerie Epps, who organized and moderated the panel, summarized the decisions in Breard, LaGrand, and
Avena, in her introductory remarks. The comments that follow assume familiarity with these decisions.
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, para. 1 (b), (c), 596 U.N.T.S.
261, 292 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967).
2. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (March 31).
3. LaGrand Case (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
4. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1964, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 326, 500 U.N.T.S. 241, 242 [hereinafter Optional
Protocol]. ("Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court
by an application made by any Party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.").
5. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
6. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J. - 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal Consequences].
416 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:415
about the propriety of the Court's assertion ofjurisdiction,7 there was no serious
question of the Court's jurisdiction in this case.
The United States conceded, with respect to most of the defendants, that
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention had not been complied with.' The remedy
determined by the Court is not unreasonable. It does not require reversal and
retrial. It only requires "the United States of America to provide, by means of
its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences." 9
The ICJ ruling is binding on U.S. courts, state and federal. Article VI of
the U.S. Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding. °
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, establishing the right of an
arrested foreign national to be informed, and the Optional Protocol, giving the
7. Although it was undisputed that Nicaragua had never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ, the Court ruled that it had jurisdiction under article 36(5) of the ICJ Statute, which provides:
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties
to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance
with their terms.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 169, 200, 204(May 10).
The problem was that there was no record of Nicaragua ever having accepted the jurisdiction of the
PCU either. Id. at 201. Nicaragua had indicated in 1939 that it would send its "instrument of ratification"
accepting jurisdiction of the PCIJ. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392,400 (Nov. 26). The ICJ acknowledged in its opinion that the "files
of the League of Nations however contain no record of an instrument of ratification ever having been received.
No evidence has been adduced before the Court to show that such an instrument of ratification was ever
dispatched to Geneva."
In the case involving the wall, the Court improperly used its advisory jurisdiction to rule on a
contentious matter without the consent of one of the parties. A number of states, including the United States
and the European Union, urged the Court not to exercise jurisdiction. Id. For an excellent discussion of the
ICJ's exercise of the advisory function in this case, see Michla Pomerance, The Advisory Function and the
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (2005).
8. See supra note 2. In Avena the U.S. challenged Mexico's suit on jurisdictional and procedural
grounds, but did not contest Mexico's claim that it had failed to inform the defendants of their rights under
article 36 of the Vienna Convention in most of the 52 cases.
9. Id. at 55.
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
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ICJ jurisdiction to interpret that right, are treaties of the United States." There
is no dispute about the self-executing nature of these treaties. While I and a
number of other commentators have argued that non-self-executing declarations
violate article V1, 12 that question does not arise here. The United States
acknowledged at the time of ratification that the treaty is "entirely self-
executing."' 3
It has been argued that "the ICJ does not exercise any judicial power in the
United States, which is vested exclusively by the Constitution in the United
States federal courts."' 4 That is indisputable. But, as Justice Breyer points out
in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Torres, "it fails to address the
question whether the ICJ has been granted the authority, by means of treaties to
which the U.S. is a party, to interpret the rights conferred by the Vienna
Convention."' 5 The answer is yes; the Optional Protocol gives the ICJ that
authority. 6 The ICJ judgment is binding in the United States not because the
ICJ has judicial authority in the United States, but because the Vienna
Convention as interpreted by the ICJ is binding on the United States under
article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
The problem is implementing the ICJ ruling. If the state has a procedure
under which it provides review, there is, of course, no problem. Oklahoma did
so in the Torres case. 17 If the state does not have a procedure that can be
invoked by the defendant, it has an obligation to create one. That is so, because
article VI of the Constitution requires state judges to implement the treaty
obligations of the United States, and the Vienna Convention, as authoritatively
interpreted by the ICJ, requires the United States to provide review. Ideally,
states whose laws bar judicial review in these cases will change their laws.
Nevertheless, if a state fails to establish a procedure for review,
considerations of federalism would probably preclude the federal government
11. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at 292; Optional Protocol, supra note 4, at 326. The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol entered into force for the United States on April 24,
1963. Id.
12. Malvina Halberstam, Alvarez-Machain H: The Supreme Court's Reliance on the Non-Self-
Executing Declaration in the Senate Resolution Giving Advice and Consent to the International Covenant on
Civil & Political Rights, I Journal of National Security Law & Policy 89 (2005);United States Ratification
of the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 49, 64-69 (1997) (quoting a number of commentators).
13. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1039 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Edward Lyerly,
State Dep't Deputy Legal Advisor, Testimony at Senate Hearing on the Ratification of the Vienna Convention
(Mar. 19, 1967)).
14. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1041.
15. Id.
16. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4.
17. Torres v. Oklahoma, 58 P.3d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
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from compelling states to provide a remedy. 8 The alternative is for the federal
government to provide review. The difficulty, of course, is that in recent years
Congress and the Supreme Court have greatly narrowed the scope of federal
habeas corpus. 9 Nevertheless, some federal courts have held that federal courts
may review such cases under §2254,20 notwithstanding the failure to raise the
claim as required by state law. For example, in the Madej case the federal
district court took the position that a state's procedural default rules would not
bar federal review.2' It distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Breard,2"
saying,
The Supreme Court's declaration in Breard that the procedural default
rules apply equally to Vienna Convention violations operated on the explicit
assumption that "those rules enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended." The I.C.J. has now
declared that those rules do interfere with giving full effect to the purposes of
the treaty, undermining a major premise of the holding. 3
But other federal courts have held that such an action would be foreclosed.
The Fifth Circuit has so held in the Medellin case, which involves one of the
petitioners in the Avena case.24 A petition for certiorari has been filed in that
case.2 5 If the Supreme Court interprets §2254 to permitjudicial review in all the
18. See, e.g. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997). But see Torres v. Mullin, 124 S.Ct. 919, 920 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
Article VI, cl. 2, of our Constitution provides that the "Laws of the United States,"
expressly including "all Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land." The Court was unfaithful to that command when it
held that Congress may not require county employees to check the background of
prospective handgun purchasers, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365,
138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), that Congress may not exercise its Article I powers to
abrogate a State's common-law immunity from suit, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), and that a State may not be
required to provide its citizens with a remedy for its violation of their federal rights,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706. 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). The Court is
equally unfaithful to that command when it permits state courts to disregard the
Nation's treaty obligations.
19. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244 (2004)); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
21. United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D.111. 2002).
22. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
23. Made, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
24. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004).
25. A petition for certiorari was filed on Aug. 18, 2004. Petition for Certiorari at i, 2004 WL
2851246, Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. (Tex.) May 20,2004) (No. 04-5928). The questions
presented in the petition are the following:
1. In a case brought by a Mexican national whose rights were adjudicated in the
[International Court of Justice's] Avena Judgment, must a court in the United
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cases required by the Vienna Convention as interpreted by the ICJ, that will
resolve the remedy problem. But, if the Supreme Court interprets §2254 more
narrowly, there will still be cases for which the United States is required to
provide review under the Vienna Convention but cannot do so under existing
U.S. law.
IV. CONCLUSION
A state's domestic law is, of course, not a defense to non-compliance with
its international obligations.26  The solution, in my view, would be an
amendment to §2254, giving federal district courts jurisdiction in those cases
where the United States is obligated to provide review under a treaty and no
state forum is available. Such an amendment would not impose a great burden
on the federal courts, as the number of cases is not very large (and hopefully
will be fewer as state officials become more knowledgeable about the Vienna
Convention requirements). Such an amendment would probably also be good
for the United States politically. At a time when the United States is being
criticized for not adhering to various treaties-which under international law it,
of course, has every right not to ratify-it would demonstrate that the United
States takes its international obligations seriously and respects those treaties that
it has ratified.
States apply as the rule of decision, notwithstanding any inconsistent United
States precedent, the Avena holding that the United States courts must review
and reconsider the national's conviction and sentence, without resort to
procedural default doctrines?
2. In a case brought by a foreign national of a State party to the Vienna
Convention, should a court in the United States give effect to the [International
Court of Justice's] LaGrand and Avena judgments as a matter of international
judicial comity and in the interest of uniform treaty interpretation?
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 10, 2004. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
It dismissed the petition as improvidently granted on May 23, 2005 in a per curiam opinion, 544 U.S. -
(2005).
26. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty"). The U.S. has not ratified the Convention, but accepts it as generally
reflecting customary international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than two million American citizens work in civilian jobs outside of
the United States.' Those expatriate workers are employed in a variety of
industries, including banking, technology, education, and construction. Many
of them work in foreign offices of American-based corporations; others are
employed by foreign corporations. While federal and New York State laws
prohibiting employment discrimination generally apply to workers employed
* Presented at International Law Weekend 2004, sponsored by the American Branch of the
International Law Association and held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
on October 15, 2004. Originally printed in 29 NYSBA L&E Newsletter No. 2 (Summer 2004), a publication
of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the New York State Bar Association.
** Robert B. Stulberg is a partner and Amy F. Shulman is an associate in the New York City law
firm Broach & Stulberg, LLP. Broach & Stulberg, LLP, Eleven Penn Plaza, Suite 915, New York, New York
10001,(212) 268-1000, rstulberg@brostul.com. The firm represents public and private sector labor unions,
employee benefit funds, and individuals in employment-related matters. The firm's practice includes
representation of United States citizens employed in investment banking and other industries in foreign
workplaces.
1. LAY & LEERBURGER, JOBS WORLDWIDE 1 (Impact Publications 1995),
http://www.uc.edu/news/ebriefs/new.htm. More precise data on America's foreign-based civilian workforce
are unavailable, as, surprisingly, the United States Census Bureau, Labor Department and State Department
do not maintain such data.
2. See generally id. at 37, 44, 55 & 72.
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in the United States or New York State, respectively, those laws may or may not
protect American citizens employed abroad. Whether those laws apply outside
of the United States can turn on a number of factors, including: the type of
discrimination alleged; the structure of the corporate employer; the residence of
the affected employee; the nature of the foreign assignment; and/or the locus of
the discriminatory acts.
In this article, we will examine the principal federal and New York State
laws prohibiting employment discrimination3 and their application to American
citizens working outside of the United States. This examination is more than
academic. Americans who suffer discrimination while employed abroad may
find remedies under American laws that are unavailable under the laws of their
host country.4 Moreover, such victims of discrimination may be able to assert
concurrent claims under American and foreign statutes, and thereby gain
strategic and substantive advantages. Assertion of such concurrent claims, in
our experience, can broaden an expatriate claimant's discovery rights, potential
damages, and leverage in settlement negotiations. As a general matter, federal
courts faced with such concurrent claims will exercise their jurisdiction
concurrently with the foreign courts handling the related litigation.5
Because the extraterritorial application of anti-discrimination laws depends
in large measure on statutory language and legislative history, we will address
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000) (prohibiting age
discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (prohibiting race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, and sex discrimination); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991("ADA") 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (2000) (prohibiting disability discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") (prohibiting
race and color discrimination); New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. (NYSHRL) § 296(1)
(2000) (prohibiting race, color, religion, sex, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, and age
discrimination).
4. The United Kingdom, for example, has no law prohibiting age discrimination. In October 2000,
however, the U.K. government supported the European Union Directive on Equal Treatment, and committed
to implementing such legislation by 2006. Age Legislation S Diversity, British Council United Kingdom, at
http://www.britishcouncil.org/diversity/age-legislation.htm; see Council Directive 2000/78/EC, art. 18, 2000
O.J. (L303) 21. The E.U. Directive required all member states to introduce legislation prohibiting direct and
indirect age discrimination in employment and training. 2000 O.J. (L303) 21. It remains to be seen how the
U.K.'s legislation will compare to federal and New York State age discrimination laws.
5. See Sapient Corp. v. Singh, 149 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In Sapient, the American
defendant (Singh) had worked in the English operations (Sapient Ltd.) of the American plaintiff (Sapient
Corp.). Id. at 56-7. Singh commenced an action in the United Kingdom against Sapient Ltd. for wrongful
termination and wrongful cancellation of his stock options. Id. at 57. Sapient Corp. then commenced an
action in the United States against Singh for injunctive relief for breach of a non-disclosure, non-compete
agreement. Id. at 59. The court refused to stay the U.S. action pending resolution of the U.K. action, because
the U.S. action presented broader issues than those presented in the U.K. Id. at 57. Specifically, while Singh's
pre-termination conduct was at issue in both actions, his post-termination conduct was at issue only in the U.S.
The court also noted that injunctive relief was not available in the U.K. and that American witnesses could
only be compelled to appear in the U.S. action. Sapient, 149 F. Supp 2d at 59.
Stulberg and Shulman
each law separately (except for Title VII and the ADA, which will be addressed
together because they are applied in the same manner outside of the United
States).
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT ("ADEA"),
29 U.S.C. § 621. ET SEQ.
The ADEA was the first of the federal employment discrimination statutes
to apply beyond United States borders. Enacted in 1967, the ADEA prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of age, providing at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a):
"It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age."
The ADEA allows recovery of consequential damages (amounts owing as
a result of the ADEA violation),6 liquidated damages for willful violations of the
ADEA by a private sector employer,7 and attorneys' fees and costs.'
The ADEA defines "employer" as a "person in an industry affecting
commerce" and having a certain minimum number of "employees," now set at
20.9 The ADEA originally defined "employee" as "an individual employed by
any employer," with certain exceptions.'" As originally enacted, the ADEA did
not explicitly permit or preclude extraterritorial application."
Prior to 1984, several federal courts of appeal held that the ADEA, as
originally enacted, did not apply to Americans employed abroad by American
employers.' 2 Those courts based their rulings on Section 7 of the ADEA, 29
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000).
7. Id.; see Grandison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 696 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) (incorporating remedies available under The Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2000), which allows for recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees); see Detje v. James
River Paper Corp., 167 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Conn. 2001).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000). Under the original language of the ADEA, an entity was deemed
an employer if it employed at least 25 employees; See Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1998). In
1974, that threshold was lowered to 20 employees. Id. For a brief period of time prior to 1974, the threshold
was set at 50 employees. Id.
10. Morelli, 141 F.3d at 44.
11. Denty v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 109 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1997).
12. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1984) superseded by statute as
stated in Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1998); Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827,
828-29 (10th Cir. 1984) superseded by statute as stated in Morelli, 141 F.3d at 39; Thomas v. Brown and
Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1984) superseded by statute as stated in Morelli, 141 F.3d at 39; see also
Pfeiffer v. W.M. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'g, 573 F.Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Osborne v. United Technologies Corp., 1977 WL 15422, 16 Fair Employment Practice 586 (D.Conn. 1977);
see also Lopez v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1118 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding that the ADEA did not
have extraterritorial effect prior to its amendment); S.F. De Yoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d
20051
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U.S.C. § 626, which incorporates certain remedial provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), including Section 216(d), 29 U.S.C. § 216(d), which
exempts from FLSA coverage work performed in a foreign country. 3 The
courts rejecting extraterritorial application of the ADEA reasoned that the
ADEA's reference to 29 U.S.C. § 216(d) evidenced congressional intent to
exempt foreign workplaces from ADEA coverage. 4
In response to those decisions, Congress, in 1984, amended the ADEA "to
assure that the provisions of the ADEA would be applicable to any citizen of the
United States who is employed by an American employer in a workplace
outside the United States."' 5 The 1984 amendments accomplished this objective
by expanding the definition of "employee" in Section 11 (f) of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 630(f), to include "any individual who is a citizen of the United States
employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country."' 6
The 1984 amendments, however, restricted the extraterritorial reach of the
ADEA to employees working in a foreign country for an employer controlled
by an American corporation. 7 Specifically, the 1984 amendments added a new
subsection (h) to Section 4 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(h), 18 which provides:
1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of
incorporation is in a foreign country, any practice by such
corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed to
be such practice by such employer.
2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the
employer is a foreign person not controlled by an American
employer.
3) For the purpose of this subsection the determination of whether
an employer controls a corporation shall be based upon the:
a) Interrelation of operations;
b) Common management;
c) Centralized control of labor relations; and
d) Common ownership or financial control of the employer
and the corporation.
1282 (5th Cir. 1986); Ralis v. FRE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617
F.Supp. 858 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(d) (incorporating the foreign country exemption of 29 U.S.C. § 213(0).
14. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610; Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 828-29.
15. Denty, 109 F.3d at 149; Morelli, 141 F.3d at 42-3.
16. Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 98-459, §
802(a) (1984)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630); see Denty, 109 F.3d at 150.
17. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, P.L. No. 98-467, § 802(a) (1984) reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3000; Morelli, 141 F.3d at 43.
18. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, P.L. No. 98-467, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2974, 3000.
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Thus, the ADEA covers employment in a foreign country when the
employee is an American citizen working or applying for work with an
employer that is, or is controlled by, an American corporation. 9 The ADEA
will not protect an American (or foreign) citizen working abroad for a foreign
employer, including a foreign parent of an American subsidiary.20 Nor will the
ADEA protect a non-American citizen working abroad for an American
corporation.2
The extraterritorial application of the ADEA will not be affected by the
locus of the claimed discriminatory conduct. In Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, for example, a Chinese citizen legally residing in the
United States applied and interviewed in New York City for a position as an
attorney with the defendant in Beijing and Hong Kong.22 The plaintiff brought
an ADEA claim for the defendant's refusal to hire the plaintiff for those
positions. The Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff, as a non-
citizen, could not bring an ADEA claim for employment to be performed
outside of the United States, even if the defendant made its allegedly
discriminatory hiring decision in New York.23
In sum, an American citizen who is subject to age discrimination in his or
her employment abroad for an American company or an American-controlled
company can, assuming he or she meets the other jurisdictional requirements of
the statute, bring an action in the United States under the ADEA to redress that
discrimination.
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E, ET
SEQ. ("TITLE VII") AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1991,42
U.S.C. § 12111 ("ADA")
Title VII and the ADA also apply, in certain circumstances, to American
citizens working abroad. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), makes it an:
unlawful employment practice for an employer: 1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
19. Denty, 109 F.3d at 151.
20. Id. (holding that the ADEA did not cover American citizen who worked abroad for foreign
parent of American subsidiary.) The ADEA also protects citizens and non-citizens working for the U.S.
operations of foreign corporations. Morelli, 141 F.3d 39; Hansen v. Danish Tourist Board, 147 F. Supp. 2d
142 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
21. Denty, 109 F.3d at 147, 150-5 1 (affirming the district court's ruling that the "relevant work site
is the location of [the position for which the plaintiff applied], not the location of [the plaintiff's] employment
at the time of the alleged discrimination.").
22. Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, 76 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
23. Hu, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
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conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.24
The ADA prohibits discrimination:
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.25
Title VII and the ADA authorize the recovery of compensatory damages,
including front pay and emotional pain and suffering, punitive damages, conse-
quential damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.26 The amount of compensatory
and punitive damages, however, are capped according to the size of the
employer. For an employer with more than 500 employees, the sum of com-
pensatory and punitive damages cannot exceed $300,000 per plaintiff.27
Like the ADEA, Title VII and the ADA, as originally enacted, did not
expressly authorize or preclude extraterritorial application of those statutes.
Both Title VII and the ADA prohibit discrimination by an "employer," which
is defined as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fif-
teen or more employees."2 8 The original language of Title VII and the ADA
defined an "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer," with
certain exceptions."
In 1991, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., the Supreme Court held that Title VII did not protect United States
citizens working abroad.3" The Court held that federal laws may be applied
extraterritorially only if they expressly authorize such application, and that the
language of Title VII contained no such authorization." Shortly after the
Arabian Am. Oil Co. decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1) (2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 1988, 2000e-5(g),(k) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a) (incorporating
remedies available under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, 1981a(a)(2), 1988 (2000)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000); Oliver v. Cole Gift Ctrs, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Conn.
2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000).
29. Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002); Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)).
30. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 256-57
(1991).
31. Id. at 256-57.
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in part to "strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws."32 Section 109 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, entitled "Protection of Extraterritorial Employ-
ment," expressly extended the reach of Title VII and the ADA to American
citizens working in foreign countries.33
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the definition of "employee" in
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and in the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)), by
adding, "[W]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term
[employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. 34 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 also authorized extraterritorial application of Title VII
and the ADA by adding the following language to those statutes: "If an
employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign
country, any practice prohibited by [this statute] engaged in by such corporation
shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer."35 Whether an employer
"controls a corporation," within the meaning of the foregoing provision,
depends upon the "interrelation of operations," "common management," "cen-
tralized control of labor relations," and the "common ownership or financial
control" of the employer and the corporation.36 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
also added language to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 and 42 U.S.C. § 12112, respec-
tively, stating that Title VII and the ADA "shall not apply with respect to the
foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an
American employer."37
Title VII and the ADA, therefore, apply extraterritorially when "the
employee is a United States citizen and the employee's company is controlled
by an American employer. 3 8  Title VII and the ADA do not apply to an
American (or foreign) citizen working abroad for a foreign employer, including
32. Civil Rights Act of 1991, P. L. No. 102-166, § 109 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e. 12111).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1991, P. L. No. 102-166, § 109 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)). Other than the title of Section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
"Protection of Exterritorial Employment," the legislative h story of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not
explain Congress' intent in enacting the amendments. See Shekoyan, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 64-5.
34. Shekoyan, 217 F. Supp. 2d 59 at 65; Torrico v. International Bus. Machines Corp., 213 F. Supp.
2d 390, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, P. L. No. 102-166, § 109(c) (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(3) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(C) (2000).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, P. L. No. 102-166, § 109(c) (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1(c)(2) (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B) (2000)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000)
(exempting aliens working outside of the United States for a foreign or American employer from coverage
under Title VIl).
38. Shekoyan, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 65; Iwata v. Stryker Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(Title VII applies abroad only to American citizens working for American companies or their foreign
subsidiaries).
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a foreign parent of an American subsidiary." Further, although non-citizens
working in the United States are covered by Title VII and the ADA,40 non-
citizens working abroad for an American company are not protected by those
statutes.4 '
In Torrico v. International Bus. Machines Corp.,42 the Southern District of
New York considered whether a temporary assignment abroad constituted
foreign employment for the purpose of applying the ADA extraterritorially. The
plaintiff, a non-United States citizen who was employed in the United States by
an American corporation, had been temporarily assigned to work in Chile. The
issue presented was whether the foreign assignment rendered the plaintiff a non-
citizen employed abroad, who would not be covered by the statute, or a non-
citizen employed in the United States, who would be covered by the statute.
Applying traditional contract law principles, the court examined the totality of
the circumstances to determine the "center of gravity" of the employment
relationship.
Although Torrico involved a non-United States citizen, the "center of
gravity" test employed in that case could be used to ascertain the place of
employment of a United States citizen employed in the United States by a
foreign corporation, but temporarily assigned to work abroad. If the "center of
gravity" of such an employment relationship was found to be the United States,
then the United States citizen could assert claims under Title VII and the ADA.
If the "center of gravity" was found to be the foreign workplace, then Title VII
and the ADA would not apply to the foreign corporation's discriminatory acts.
In sum, an American citizen who is subject to discrimination on the basis
of sex or disability while employed abroad by an American company or a
company controlled by an American employer can, assuming he or she meets
the other jurisdictional requirements of those statutes, bring an action in the
United States under Title VII or the ADA, respectively, to redress that dis-
crimination.
39. Shekoyan, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
40. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,95 (1973) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1606. l(c) (1972) ("Title
VII.. . protects all individuals, both citizens or non-citizens, domiciled or residing in the United States" from
unlawful discrimination in the United States.)).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000); Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 400-402; Torrico, 319 F.Supp. 2d 390,
2004 WL 439493 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004); Mithani v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 2002 WL 14359, 87; Fair
Employment Practice Cases, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
42. Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
43. Id. at 409.
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IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (SECTION 1981)
Section 1981 is a general civil rights statute which prohibits race dis-
crimination in, among other contexts, employment.44 Section 1981, which was
enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and amended by the Voting Rights Act
of 1870, grants "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States... the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts...."
Section 1981 allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover consequential damages,
uncapped compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.45
The Supreme Court, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,46 held that
Section 1981 did not prohibit racial harassment or other forms of racial dis-
crimination in the employment context. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, in part, to overrule Patterson and amend Section 1981 to expressly
prohibit all forms of racial discrimination in employment. Specifically, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly defined the phrase "make and enforce
contracts" in Section 1981, to include the "making, performance, modification
and termination of contracts and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms
and conditions of the contractual relationship.', 47 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
strengthened Section 1981 by amending it to cover, in the employment context,
"the claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, [lack of] promotion, transfer,
retaliation, and hiring" based on race.48 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however,
did not address extraterritorial application of Section 1981, as it did for Title VII
and the ADA.
The federal courts have refused to apply Section 1981 to persons working
outside of the United States. 9 Courts have held that the plain language of
Section 1981, granting rights to all "persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States" and "in every State and Territory," expressly confines the reach of
Section 1981 to the United States.5
44. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, *69.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(bX4) (1988); Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1998).
46. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
47. Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166 § 101 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981(1991)).
48. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 731. The word "contract" in
Section 1981 has been held to cover an employment relationship, whether pursuant to a written contract or
at-will. Lauture v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 216 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2000).
49. De Lazzari Barbosa v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2002 WL 32348281 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Mithani v. J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., 2001 WL 1488213,87 Fair Employment Practice Cases 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Gantchar
v. United Airlines, Inc., 1995 WL 798600 (N.D.IIl. April 21, 1995); Theus v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 738
F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (S.D. Iowa 1990).
50. Theus, 738 F. Supp. at 1254.
2005]
430 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:421
Courts have also examined the legislative history behind Section 1981 and
found that it evidenced no congressional intent to apply Section 1981 outside
of the United States. In Theus v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., the Southern Dis-
trict of Iowa examined Section 1981 's enabling statute, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which granted "citizens," defined as persons born in the United States,
certain rights within the United States. 5' The court observed that, although the
Voting Rights Act of 1870 amended Section 1981 to change "citizens" to
"persons" and thereby extended the protections of the statute to aliens, the 1870
amendment did not change the statute's reference to "every State and Terri-
tory. '52 Therefore, the court concluded, the legislative history of Section 1981
does not show a congressional intent to expand the statute's scope beyond
United States boundaries.53
In sum, Section 1981 cannot be applied to American citizens employed
outside of the United States, and an employment discrimination claim under that
statute must arise out of occurrences within the United States.54
V. NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,
N.Y. EXEC. L. § 296 ("NYSHRL")
The NYSHRL is the central anti-discrimination statute under New York
State law. That statute provides, at N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1)(a), that it shall be
"an unlawful discriminatory practice":
[flor an employer or licensing agency because of the age, race, creed,
color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, dis-
ability, genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital status of any
individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment such individual or to discriminate against such indivi-
dual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment.
The NYSHRL authorizes the recovery of uncapped compensatory and
consequential damages, but no punitive damages or attorneys' fees.55 Thus, the
NYSHRL, which may be enforced through a plenary action in state court, a
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court also analogized Section 1981 to its "legislative cousin," the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which contains language similar to Section 1981 (No state shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) and
relied on the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially. Theus, 738 F.Supp. at 1254.
54. Ganichar, 1995 WL 798600; Theus, 738 F. Supp. at 1254.
55. N.Y. Exec. L. § 297(9) (2000); Abdallah v. City of New York, 2001 WL 262709 (S.D.N.Y.
March 16, 2001).
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pendent state claim in federal court or a state administrative proceeding, offers
claims and damages unavailable under federal anti-discrimination laws, i.e.,
unlimited compensatory damages and protection from discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and genetic predisposition.
The NYSHRL can be applied extraterritorially, i.e. outside of New York
State, in circumstances quite different from those that permit extraterritorial
application of the ADEA, Title VII and the ADA. Section 298-a of the
NYSHRL states that the law applies to acts of discrimination: committed in
New York State; or committed extraterritorially by a state resident or a non-state
resident against a New York State resident.56 Discrimination committed extra-
territorially by a non-resident gives a state resident the right to an administrative
proceeding before the New York State Division of Human Rights,57 while
discrimination committed extraterritorially by a state resident against a state
resident gives the state resident the right to a private civil action.58
To show that discrimination was "committed" in New York State for the
purposes of Section 298-a of the NYSHRL, a plaintiff employed outside of New
York must show that the decision to act in a discriminatory manner originated
in New York.5 9 This is a difficult standard to meet. In Iwankow v. Mobil Corp.,
the plaintiff claimed that he was discriminated against on the basis of age after
he was employed by the defendant in England for three and one-half years and
then terminated as part of a world-wide reduction in force.6" The Appellate
Division, First Department held that the plaintiff could not state a claim under
the NYSHRL even though the termination occurred as "part of a world wide
reduction in force ... decided upon at corporate headquarters in New York"
without an allegation that "the decision to implement the reduction in force in
an age-discriminatory manner originated at corporate headquarters.'
56. Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 406-7; Duffy v. Drake Beam Morin, Harcourt Gen., Inc., 1998 WL
252063 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1998); Iwankow v. Mobil Corp., 541 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dep't App. Div. 1989.
57. N.Y. Exec. L. § 298-a(3); Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 406, n. 10. If the New York State Division
of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") believes that discrimination has occurred, it can issue an order directing the
non-resident to cease and desist from the acts of discrimination alleged. Sherwood v. Olin Corp., 772 F. Supp.
1418, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). If the non-resident fails to obey the NYSDHR's cease and desist order, the
agency must prohibit the non-resident from transacting business in New York State. Id. at 1422-23. Violation
of that prohibition on transacting business in New York State constitutes a criminal misdemeanor. Id.
58. N.Y. Exec. L. § 298-a(2); Sherwood v. Olin Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1418, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
59. Iwankow v. Mobil Corp., 541 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1 st Dep't App. Div. 1989).
60. !wankow, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
61. Id. See also Duffy v. Drake Beam Morin, Harcourt Gen., Inc., 96 Civ. 5606 (MBM), 1998 WL
252063 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1998) (A non-New York resident employed in New Jersey could not claim
discrimination occurred in New York even though defendant made decision to fire plaintiff in New York.);
Miller v. Citicorp., 1997 WL 96569 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1997)(A non-New York resident employed in Florida
could not state NYSHRL claim even though defendant made decision to terminate plaintiff in New York.).
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If an employee employed outside of New York State cannot show that the
discrimination at issue was "committed" in New York State, he or she can assert
an NYSHRL claim only by showing that he or she is a New York State
resident.62 The NYSHRL, however, does not define the term "resident" for the
purposes of Section 298-a. In Torrico, the Southern District of New York
observed that, where, as in the NYSHRL, "a statute prescribes 'residence' as a
qualification for a privilege or the enjoyment of a benefit, New York courts
have interpreted the statutory term 'residence' to mean 'domicile. "63
"Domicile," in turn, is defined as residence or physical presence in New
York State plus an intent to remain in the state indefinitely,' or an intent to
return to the state from some other location.65 A trip to or a stay in a foreign
country, "no matter how long continued, without any intention of remaining
there permanently, does not result in a change of domicile. 66 Courts generally
ascertain domicile by considering the "the entire course of a person's conduct,"
including, but not limited to, "the place of his family ties, voter registration, tax
liability, driver's license and vehicle registration, business activities, bank
accounts, social activities and religious affiliations."'67
In the context of foreign employment of American citizens, courts have
adopted a "strong presumption in favor of a domestic [U.S.] domicile rather
than a foreign domicile., 68 That presumption appears to only hold, however, if
the plaintiff exhibits an intention to return to the United States. In Kavowras v.
Pinkerton, Inc., US.A., the plaintiff, a native New Yorker, sued for defamation
after his employment was terminated in China. The plaintiff paid taxes in New
York State, listed his family's Brooklyn, New York house as his permanent
residence on his visa, had a New York State driver's license, registered his car
in New York State, maintained a bank account in New York State, and was
certified as an emergency medical technician in New York State. The Southern
District of New York found, however, that the plaintiff lacked domicile in New
York State for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, because the plaintiff had
no articulable plan to return to the state permanently, as evidenced by the fact
62. N.Y. Exec. L. § 298-a.
63. Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08.
64. Id.
65. Morrison v. Blitz, 1996 WL 403034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
66. Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
67. Morrison, 1996 WL 403034 at !; Bevilaqua, 642 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in which the
plaintiff remained domiciled in New York after he returned to his parents' home in Virginia, where the
plaintiff had an apartment in New York, attended classes in New York, had had a full-time job in New York,
paid New York State income taxes, and was registered to vote in New York).
68. Davis v. Davis, 525 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1988).
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that he obtained employment with two other companies in China after the
defendant had terminated his employment there.69
Significantly, although non-United States citizens working for an Ameri-
can employer abroad cannot bring an action under federal anti-discrimination
laws, they may be able to bring an action under the NYSHRL, if they can show
domicile in New York State.70 In Torrico, a Chilean citizen resided in New
York State before commencing a four-year temporary assignment to Chile for
a New York employer. During that temporary assignment, the plaintiffs
employment was terminated. The Southern District of New York held that the
plaintiff could claim domicile in New York State because the plaintiff had, prior
to the temporary assignment, resided and worked in New York and because the
assignment to Chile was temporary. Accordingly, the court held, even if the
alleged discrimination was committed outside of New York State, the plaintiff
could pursue a claim under the NYSHRL as a New York resident.7
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADEA, Title VII, the ADA and the NYSHRL can, under certain cir-
cumstances, offer significant protection to American citizens and/or New York
State residents who suffer discrimination while working abroad. If those
statutes can be applied extraterritorially, they can provide expatriate workers
with claims, remedies, discovery and litigation advantages that may be other-
wise unavailable. Applying these anti-discrimination statutes to expatriate
workers, however, requires careful legal and factual analysis, given the many
variables that bear upon the issue.
69. Kavowras v. Pinkerton, Inc., U.S.A., 1998 WL 209617 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1998).
70. Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 408-9.
71. Id. at 410.
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NARRATIVES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
LITERATURE AFTER 9/11
Gary Minda*
What is the connection between international law and literature-the
subject of this meeting? The connection of course, is to be found in the practice
of storytelling and narrative. It is the act of storytelling that brings international
law and literature together as disciplines and as practices. International law
lives on narrative and so does literature. Reasoning in international law depends
on the ability to tell a good story, and good story telling in literature depends on
the ability of the storyteller to do exactly the same thing. Of course, it is in the
telling of the story where the creative art is to be found. Good storytelling
requires that one construct the story in a way that is interesting, compelling, and
simply enjoyable.
It is in the construction of reality that international law and literature relate
and intertwine. A good lawyer knows how to construct facts by constructing a
word story of reality, and a good writer of literature will do exactly the same in
constructing a good story for the reader. Of course, not all narratives are equal.
Sometimes the world changes and then the narratives of the past no longer make
sense. Then, one would expect that a new story would be constructed to make
sense of the current situation. On the other hand, some stories are so powerful
that they are slow to die. When this happens, the continuation of the story itself
comes to construct the reality for its readers.
One would have thought that the narrative of public international law, at
least as it was once described by legal scholars such as Myers McDougal,
Harold Lasswell, and Eugene Rostow, had long since past.' In the golden age
of international law, McDougal and others helped to develop the notion that
international law could be something other than "political authority" or just
"politics" by any other name. The self-image of international law, as being
something other than politics, developed at a time when legal scholars fell in
love with the idea of policy analysis and used it to defend "Rule of Law"
thinking in international law. International lawyers following McDougal's lead
adopted the view that law could be used as an instrument to remodel the world
* Professor of Law Brooklyn Law School October 15, 2004 ILSA Conference City Bar
Association New York. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2004.
1. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 191-203 (1995)(recounting the
rise and fall of the Lasswell-McDougal paradigm of international law).
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in accordance with American democratic principles and values. The goal was
to develop international legal relations on the basis of policy, which was soft
and flexible. Instead of viewing international law as merely a collection of rules
and doctrines, McDougal insisted that we regard international law as a process
that was slowly evolving into a system of world government that resembled
American liberal democracy.
The realities of the Cold War and then later the Vietnam War made it
apparent, however, that the McDougal-Lasswell story of international legal
relations-the one based on the notion of "one world governed" by democratic
policies-was a pipe-dream. During the Cold War, policy analysis of
international law became a cloak for Cold War chauvinism; during the Vietnam
War we learned how futile it might be to use American military power to
remodel a foreign culture in accordance with American ideals of liberal-
democracy. If we learned anything from Vietnam, it was that the "best and
brightest" policy analysts were blind to the international relations of the diverse
culture in Vietnam. We also paid a dear price in terms of blood and money in
our attempt to remodel Vietnam in accordance with American values. Consider
the results of that war. At the end of the Vietnam war, the communist regime
in North Vietnam remained in control of not just South Vietnam, but Cambodia,
and Laos as well, and not one of the democratic goals of the United States was
ever achieved by military intervention.
By the end of the Vietnam war, international law had lost confidence in its
ability to define itself as being separate from political authority. Contrary to the
story that was told about international law by scholars who continued to believe
in the McDougal-Laswell theory of international law, the world was not ready
to be remade in the image of the Untied States. Yet, there is an important aspect
of the McDougal-Laswell story that remains alive today and continues to
construct our reality about international public law. Even while many modem
international lawyers are quick to dismiss the policy-science story line of the
McDougal-Laswell story, these same lawyers continue to believe that the Rule
of Law governs international legal relations. International law continues to be
taught in American law schools as a collection of rules, treaties, and
conventions that are slowly evolving into a global Rule of Law. Of course, the
reality of our world is far from being ruled by anything like the Rule of Law
imaged by American international legal scholars. The reality of the run up to
the war in Iraq reminds us that international law is something that is brushed
aside in the face of Western values and politics. The law schools, nevertheless,
continue to teach international public law as if the Rule of Law did in fact
govern the world. It was as if, as David Kennedy put in 1988, the discipline of
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international law as taught in North American law schools had taken on the
appearance of a "discipline which had lost its way and kept its jobs."2
The idea that "the rule of law, not man" governed the world, powerful as
it is, continues to be dogged by the reality that laws are not self-enforcing;
someone had to interpret the rules and in the act of interpretation, the rules will
always be subject to manipulation of powerful elites. The narratives of public
international legal scholarship, nonetheless, seem legitimate and compelling
because we are motivated to believe that international law can be something
other than just "political authority." There may have been reason for believing
in the Rule of Law story before September 11, 2001 (9/11). Recall what the
world was like in the 1990s.
By 1989 we witnessed the collapse of various communist regimes and the
fall of the Berlin Wall. The fall of the Berlin wall gave new hope for those who
continued to cling to the "one world" narrative of the Rule of Law. The fall of
communism reinforced the belief that the world could be remodeled in
accordance with the values and social practices of Western democracies. For
a brief moment in history, it did seem that the entire world was evolving into a
free society, democratically organized in light of Western values. There is now
reason for believing, however, that the "woven world" optimism of the 1990s
was just another pipe dream of global enthusiasts who thought that American
capitalism and globalization would soon take over the task of world governance.
First, there was the terrorist attack on 9/11; then the war on terror; followed
by the Iraq war; and homeland security. We were back to building walls that
separate us from dangerous "others." The world did change after 9/11; the Rule
of Law "collapsed" on March 19, 2003, when President George W. Bush
delivered his war letter to Congress and issued his order to launch three dozen
Tomahawk cruise missiles on a "target of opportunity" in Baghdad. With the
submission of a letter and the launching of three dozen cruise missiles, the
President made it clear as never before, that the United States would no longer
rely on the authority of the international legal community in deciding when and
where to use force against other nations of the world community.
In refusing to wait for Security Council approval for the use of force
against Iraq, the United States went on record that it would no longer comply
with the Rules of International law in the war on terror. The Unites States, as
the single dominant super world power, would instead permit a single person,
the President of the United States, to decide when force would be used in
waging future wars against terror. The idea that war would be used as a
legitimate tool of foreign policy was now an acceptable instrument of
international legal relations. Preventive use of force, once thought to be a
reason for declaring war and something that was thought to be unacceptable in
2. David Kennedy, A New Stream ofInternational Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1988).
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civilized international relations, was now part of the official international policy
of United States and the so-called "coalition of the willing."
What gave the President of the United States the appearance of legal
authority was not the Rule of Law, but rather a war resolution enacted by
Congress on the eve of a mid-term election year, which many now regard as an
act of strategic political opportunism. Congress gave the President the authority
of a war resolution so he could have leverage in the United Nations. However,
when the French and Germans threatened to veto the United States in the
Security Council, then the President was able to say to the world that he did not
need the permission from the United Nations or from anyone because he was
already authorized to go to war. The war in Iraq was, without a doubt, a huge
exercise of political opportunism; remember how the President was able to
persuade lawmakers in the United States to ignore their own Constitutional duty
to declare war by raising fears about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in
the hands of Saddam Hussein. The narrative about the meaning of 9/11 and the
fears generated about imaginary WMD made it relatively easy for lawmakers in
the United States to go into denial about the Rule of Law.
With a congressional war resolution in hand, the President was able to
claim that he was authorized to wage war against Iraq unilaterally and that he
was required to go to war to defend the Rule of Law from the threat of future
terrorist attacks. Ironically, the narrative about the Rule of Law became a
reason and rationale for preventive war and for violating international law. For
the first time in American history, a President took the nation to war before
anyone, Congress, the United Nations, or even the President himself could
declare a "war emergency." Rule of Law thinking had thus come full circle in
justifying the kind of raw power that was once exercised by tyrants and kings.
Where there had been two checks on presidential war power in the first Gulf
War of 1991: one in the Security Council of the United Nations; the other in
Congress, there were no checks in the second "Iraq" War. International law
now seems rather quaint when viewed in the Post-Iraq war context.
In the face of the fears of another 9/11 and WMD, it is far from clear
whether the American people want their President to obey international legal
conventions and rules. It may well be that the rules of international law have
"collapsed," as Michael J. Glennon stated in an article in Foreign Affairs,
written shortly after the invasion of Iraq.3 What was "lawful" or "unlawful" no
longer seemed to be pertinent to the question of whether force should be used.
If the terrorists are not going to play by the rules, why should we? Would it not
be better to cut down the Rule of Law to get to the terrorists?
Michael Glennon asserted that the use of force prevailed over the Rule of
Law because the threat of WMD proliferation and the danger of global terrorism
3. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FoREIGN AFF. 16 (2003).
had created a new world reality based on unsupported threats to the national
security. As Glennon put it: "That the world [was] at risk of cascading disorder
[and this danger] place[d] a greater rather than a lesser responsibility on the
United States to use its power assertively to halt or slow the pace of
disintegration."4 However, once America announced its decision to maintain
its world preeminence as a superpower by essentially deciding for itself whether
to go to war, the United States placed itself in the position of rejecting the Rule
of Law, and in effect announced that it favored the use of political authority of
nationalism in deciding international disputes. Of course, the danger is that
someday a nation state will decide to use its power against a rival and the
example of the Iraq war will be a powerful narrative legitimating such action.
In this way, the fault lines of world power have been shifted to a new terrain
where war becomes, once again, a thinkable alternative to diplomacy.
Michael Glennon says that we must go "back to the drawing board" and
rediscover a new legal order to deal with reality of a unipolar world with the
United States "at the wheel" of power.5 Going back to the drawing boards
would require that we construct a new narrative about international legal
relations; one that would permit the super power to pick and choose the rules
other nations of the world must obey. Now that story will be hard to tell.
However, before we submit to the fears of terrorism and accept a world
dominated by United States military power, and before we begin the task of
constructing a new narrative for international legal relations, we might want to
consider narratives about what can happen when we ignore international legal
community and take on the task of remodeling the world in accordance with the
values of the United States. This is where literature comes into my narrative.
There are important lessons we can learn from the narratives found in literature
about what can happen when one person or one nation seeks to govern the
world.
We might start with a classic from the Greek tragedies. Homer's Iliad, for
example, may be the right literary text for our time. Within the story of the Iliad
one can find the narrative of the conquering hero turned tyrant.6 The story starts
with noble intentions of a Conquering Hero, the defeat of Troy, and then later
the Conqueror's descent to tyranny and corruption. The story can be heard
today in media interviews with American soldiers in Iraq who report that they
are no longer sure who the "bad guys" are and that they are not even sure if they
are the "bad guys." Tony Amersterdam and Jerome Bruner in their book,
Minding The Law, demonstrate how this Greek tragedy sets out a plot that
4. Id at 34.
5. Id at31.
6. See THE ILIAD OF HOMER (Richmond Lattimore trans., 1951).
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reoccurs in constitutional law and perhaps it can be a useful text for
understanding exactly what is at stake in the war on terror.7
We also might want to consider how the narrative of preventive war
resonates with stories from literature about the clashes of fidelity to law in the
face of evil. One classic story that comes to mind is the story of Sir Thomas
More and Roper in Robert Bolt's A Manfor All Seasons. Sir Thomas More and
Roper argue about the validity of obeying the law in the face of evil and Roper
objects to the notion that the Devil should be given the benefit of the law.8 Sir
Thomas challenges him: "What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the Devil?" "Exactly so," Roper declares, "I'd cut down every
law in England to do that."9 Sir Thomas retorts:
Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned around
on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This
Country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's laws,
not Gods-and if you cut them down-and you're just the man to do
it--do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then?1"
These lines resonate powerfully with presidential war rhetoric that justified
taking the nation to war without United Nation consent, and in clear violation
of the United Nation Charter. Roper sounds a lot like President Bush on the eve
of the Iraq War, and Sir Thomas can be heard in the critique of preventive war
made by France and Germany in the Security Council of the United Nations.
Is there not a point to Sir Thomas' retort to Roper? Didn't France and Germany
have a point in objecting to the idea that United States should be given carte
blanc authority to decide for itself when war should be waged against a member
of the United Nations (UN)? If we cut down the Rule of Law to get to the
terrorists, will we be able to stand up in the winds that blow after international
law is no longer relevant? Of course, not everyone would agree that this is the
lesson to be gleaned from a reading of Robert Bolt's story.
Maybe, the Rule of Law is simply undefinable; maybe "there is no there,
there."11  For many, the Rule of Law is nothing more than a clich6, an
expression used for rhetorical purposes. However, even if one is doubtful about
7. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: How COURTS RELY ON
STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE LAW-AND OURSELVES
143-164 (2000). For the original theoretical account of how storytelling shapes cognitive understanding in
the law, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAw, LIFE, AND THE MIND (2001).
8. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS _ (1990).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUToBIOGRAPHY (1993).
the Rule of Law, the narratives found in literature about law can be useful in
determining how Rule of Law thinking can be twisted to support tyranny. Is
that not, as Richard Weisberg has argued, the lesson of the Jews when Germany
occupied France, and when the Rule of Law supported and legitimated official
tyranny in France during World War II. Is this not a lesson for the world we
now inhabit after 9/11? A critical reading of Melville's Billy the Budd, Sailor2
can be fruitful for understanding how justice can suffer in the face of narratives
of national emergency brought about in times of war. We need to remind
ourselves of the lessons of these stories, because they provide needed insight for
understanding what is at stake, now in America with the Home Land Security,
and the United States of America Patriot Acts. The war on terror is still too
young to know the full implications for international legal relations of the
future. It is not too early, however, to assess whether mistakes have been made
in the narratives we tell to justify the commission of war in violation of the Rule
of Law.
In War and Responsibility, the late John Hart Ely, writing in the 1990s,
looked back on the Vietnam war, including: the secret war in Laos; the
bombing in Cambodia; and the notorious Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 that
authorized President Johnson to commit the nation to war, concluding that war
powers of the United States presidency were in a real mess and that if something
was not done soon, we might lose sight of the importance of placing checks on
presidential war powers. 3 Nothing was done and we seem to be stuck with a
series of wars, justified by war emergency and brought about by imaged fears
of terrorism and WMD. This has presented unique dangers of major disruptions
in normal international legal practices and good world governments. We will
not be able to do anything unless we first understand how the narratives of the
past continue to shape and limit the possibilities for the future direction of
international legal relations. Understanding the narratives of international law
and learning from the lessons to be found in the stories from literature about
similar human dilemmas posed by times of great emergency, can help us find
our way once again to a more peaceful and sane world order.
I am not an idealist. I am not suggesting that by reading Dickens or
Melville we will come to discover the mistakes of the Iraq war. On the other
hand, I am saying that literature and poetry can be a fertile ground for self-
discovery of the human condition and just might enable us to better understand
other people of other cultures. Three billion people live on less than two dollars
a day; two billion lack electric power. Narratives of international law that fail
to come to grips with these realities will always be the subject of suspicion.
12. See HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD (1992).
13. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
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Rule of Law thinking will never survive if it is nothing more than an expression
of American self-interest. We say we are for free trade, but then we adopt trade
rules that favor American interests at the expense of the interests of other
nations. If there is to be an enduring Rule of Law, it must be one that under-
stands and speaks to the stories of all people of the international community
without falling pray to politics of self-interest.
In the emerging new world after 9/11, the "international" is no longer
something that is "out there" or "foreign" to our national identity. What was
once foreign and dangerous is now part of our national identity, whether we like
it or not. We have closer contact with aspects of diverse new cultures that are
hostile and dangerous to our world. We can either build walls that attempt to
keep others out to keep the homeland safe, or we can begin to build new
alliances based on real understanding of other people and other cultures. If we
want to understand other people and other cultures then we need to know
something about their culture, their law, and their literature.
Ironically, international legal policy-makers continue to rely upon the old
McDougal-Lasswell story about international legal relations that once pro-
claimed that liberal-democratic values could transform the world into a demo-
cratic global "free society." Hence, we wage war in Iraq so that the Iraqi people
can embrace Jeffersonian democracy. We send missiles to Iraq so that we can
liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny. We destroy the infrastructure of their
cities so that we can liberate the cities and free the inhabitants. It is as if we for-
got the story of Vietnam War where American international policy sought to
remodel a nation in accordance with American liberal-democratic ideals to no
avail. The world was not ready to accept American values in 1969 and we can
not expect the world to have a change of heart in our time. The ongoing strug-
gle on the streets of Baghdad should have reminded us by now of that lesson.
The point is not that reading a great classic will tell us what to do in the
war on terror, rather the point is that literature may give us pause to consider
what is at stake in this war and what it is that is worth fighting for. As my
friend and colleague Lawrence Joseph recently explained in an editorial in the
Metro section of the New York Times: "Writing a poem does not stop the kill-
ing of innocent people, but it is an act of resistance. The arc of all our lives is
accumulated violence, but with this also comes intensification of the will to live
and to love."' 4 It is the inherent human struggle between love and hate that now
seems to be embroiled in the war on terror. There is an essential human lesson
to be discovered in our great literary classics about this struggle, and those
lessons can be useful to us in deciding how to construct stories about a world
we want and deserve.
14. Chris Hedges, Love Conquers Evil: Poetry is About the Timetable, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2002,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Academic perspectives on the issue of Self-Determination are in abundance
as the International Standards with respect to the Rights of People and their
Rights to Self-Determination have taken huge steps in the last two decades.
This has resulted in a large number of a secessionist movements, claiming
various forms of Self-Determination, in today's geo-political landscape.
Furthermore, when these movements of Self-Determination embrace terrorism
as their only act of expression, we find ourselves immersed in a quagmire
hitherto seen in the World stage. Against this challenging backdrop, we will
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revisit the issue of Self-Determination within the evolving framework of Inter-
national Law, where the Right of sovereign Nations must be taken into account
while conferring legitimacy to a People's movement. This issue of sovereignty
of a Nation is critical in our study to develop the proper context in which a
legitimate People's Right to Self-Determination can be distinguished from the
multitude of illegitimate ones mushrooming every nook and comer of the globe.
In this context, we must identify the relevant actors, the minorities asserting
their Rights to Self-Determination and the Nation State being accused of
illegally depriving those very Rights. This is because, more often than not,
international politics and the alignment of Nations either over dramatize or
trivialize the legitimacy of claims for Self-Determination. This is done by
casting blinders on the real issue or lumping the various forms of pseudo or
illegitimate Self-Determination under one thread. Therefore, our objective in
this monograph is to clarify some of these misconceptions that accompany
legitimate Rights of Self-Determination.
The controversy surrounding the legitimate Rights of People for sovereign-
ty gets murkier in the quagmire of international politics as the Rights of a
minority within a Nation State gets misconstrued as the Rights of a People.
Often times a Nation State is accused of demeaning and degrading the status of
People to that of a minority by use of State power and thereby hindering their
legitimate Right of sovereignty. On the other side of the coin, rogue States, or
terrorist outfits utilize the misguided concept of Self-Determination for the ful-
fillment of their nefarious intentions. How is this possible? Particularly, when
and if in fact, the status of People is clearly defined in International Law. We
will examine this apparent quandary.
The issue before us is to determine as to what extent a government may
redefine fundamental Rights of minorities with respect to the demands for the
Right to Self-Determination by the use of referenda and legislation. This is
because, the idea of a Nation State changing the constitutional ground rules
affecting citizens without their consent has cropped up in recent years in cases
dealing with People's Right to Self-Determination. However, the legitimacy of
such rights can be best understood within the broader context of a Nation's
sovereignty. This will eventually address the issue of legitimacy for various
secessionist movements by either recognizing them as a violation of People's
fundamental Rights by the Nation State or treason threatening the sovereignty
of a Nation.
International covenants, working groups, and legal writings in this regard
have been very successful in developing context and scope regarding Self-
Determination. Moreover, International Law has gone through a tremendous
metamorphosis during the last decade. But many questions still remain. Our
objective in this study is to establish the premise that, Self-Determination must
be addressed in the context of original secession of the relevant Nation State
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during de-colonization. This will help us identify legitimate movements for the
Right to Self-Determination from the scores of secessionist movements all over
the World. One such case we present here is that of Kashmir, where the
evolving legal framework on the very concept of Self-Determination is being
pitted against the historical context of the region.
We begin our analysis by revisiting the history of Self-Determination in
Section II, which is followed by a discussion on the evolving norms of Self-
Determination in Section III. We present our case study on Kashmir in Section
IV, which is followed by our discussion in Section V.
II. HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
To trace the evolution of Self-Determination through historical documents
and political actions, we must first clarify our understanding of People's Right
as it has emerged over the years. This contextual necessity has historical
significance, as Self-Determination cannot exist without it being the Right for
the People.
A. Self-Determination As a Right For the People
Both the Right to Self-Determination of People and the Right to
sovereignty of Nations regardless of its size has been recognized as a basic norm
of International Law'. In this context, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights develops the framework of early versions of Self-
determination.2 The documents entail the following principle:
In those States where ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.3
1. U.N. CHARTERart. I, para. 2.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966, 99 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was to take effect ten years later in all
nations that had become state parties. Id. at 394. A sufficient number of states had become parties so the
ICCPR took effect as planned in 1976. Id. The United States Senate ratified the ICCPR in June 1992. Id.
The ratification was with declarations and understandings. Id. at 394-95.
3. The Organization and Functioning of Democracy and the Expression of Ethnic Diversity as a
Means of Ensuring the Stability ofAll States, Economic Development and Better Use of the Peace Dividend
for the Benefit of the Third World, INTER-PARLIMENTARY UNION (Apr. 11, 1992) http://www.ipu.org/conf-
e/87-2.htm. The resolution was adopted without a vote by the 87th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on April
I1, 1992, where Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was recalled. Id. An
additional reference can be obtained from the Assembly debate on October 1, 1990 (14th Sitting). See Doc.
6294, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Rapporteur: Mr Brincat; Doc. 6302,
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Thus, religious, ethnic and cultural minorities have come to be recognized
in International Law as People that have a Right to Self-Determination.
Although States remain the main subjects of International Law, social
institutions other than the State have long been recognized as entities with
standing in International Relations.4 People have thus come to be repositories
in International Law for the Right to Self-Determination.
B. Self-Determination Through Historical Documents and Records
Before we begin to apply the concept of Self-Determination in specific
situations, let us analyze the evolution of the theory of Self-Determination. In
this context, our thought process is influenced by three main caveats. First, the
concept of Self-Determination has evolved over the years. As a result, we must
clearly distinguish among the different shades of meaning the concept has
attained. The second issue comes from the meaning attributed to Self-
Determination in particular instances. That means, in order to legitimize the
claim for the Right to Self-Determination, we must determine the identity of the
People who have a claim to that Right. Lastly, the concept of secession should
not be considered as a necessary condition for the Right to Self-Determination.
Because, Right to Self-Determination is not the only vehicle through which
secession is achieved. Current State practices have shown that the Right of
secession has its own merit and can stand on its own feet. However, we will
show in the discussion that follows that, secession is not even considered in
cases involving movements where Self-Determination has already been
addressed once before.
Opinion of the Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mr Baumel.
4. Over the years the definition of People has taken different shades and evolved. The United
Nations has recognized the following six categories in which the right to Self-Determination would apply to
People:
1. People that constitute independent and sovereign States.
2. People of States which had lost their independence and sovereignty and wish
to regain it.
3. People which although constituted in independent sovereign States are
prevented by their own dictatorial governments from exercising their right to
Self-Determination.
4. People who form part of an independent and sovereign State, but consider
themselves absolutely different from the other elements in the country and wish
to set up a separate State.
5. People constituting States that were formerly or nominally independent and
sovereign but whose independence was forcibly controlled by another State.
6. Non self-governing people whose territories were administered by the so-called
colonial powers.
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By delving into the archives of recorded history, we find the Right to Self-
Determination5 dates back to World War I, when it was introduced as a norm
of International Relations.' Since then the concept has evolved in meaning, and
has gone through the maturation process via distinct stages. While trying to
develop a legal framework for the secession of People from the old empires, the
process of legitimizing the Right to Self-Determination witnessed the first phase
of its development. It was made clear during the negotiations that ensued, that
the Right of disposing of national territory is not in conflict with the Right of
sovereignty. In this context, we must be cognizant of the fact that the positive
International Law does not legitimize the Rights of national groups to secede
any more than the States to dispose of their national territory. Therefore, the
Right to Self-Determination cannot be invoked by a simple expression of
interest, nor could certain disenfranchised communities within a State use it as
5. Please note the concept of Self-Determination has been in the process of development and
modification in international jurisprudence. Two salient points relating to the concept are observed by
Professor Garth Nettheim of University of Sydney, as follows:
The United Nations practice has been virtually to confine the right to Self-
determination to People in the classic colonial context of governance from a distant
European power. For such People, Self-Determination came to be regarded as virtually
synonymous with independence. Partly for this reason, national governments appear
reluctant to extend the right of Self-Determination to other People, including
indigenous People within independent states; for fear that acknowledgment of a right
to Self-Determination would threaten the territorial integrity of established states.
Also note that the concept of Self-Determination is beginning to impinge on emerging international
instruments relating to indigenous People. In 1989 the International Labor Organization completed revision
of its earlier 1957 Convention No. 107. The Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in
Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382. It treated the question of Self-Determination with
great caution and even qualified the titular reference to People by article 1(3) by stating, "The use of the term
'peoples' in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may
attach to the term under international law." Id. at 1385.
6. The Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations emphasizes the paramount importance
of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the
development of friendly relations and co-operation among States in this declaration. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles].
Recalling its resolutions 1815 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 1966 (XVIII) of 16
December 1963, 2103 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2181 (XXI) of 12 December 1966,
2327 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, 2463 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968 and 2533
(XXIV) of 8 December 1969, in which it affirmed the importance of the progressive
development and codification of the principles of international law concerning friendly
relations and co-operation among States, having considered the report of the Special
Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States, which met in Geneva from 31 March to 1 May 1970.
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a political tool. When then, can the Right of Self-Determination be exercised?
According to Nathaniel Berman,
The formation, transformation and dismemberment of States as a
result of revolutions and wars create situations of fact which, to a
large extent, cannot be met by applying the normal rules of positive
law that 'People' may either decide to form an independent state or
choose between two existing ones.7  In circumstances where
sovereignty has been disrupted, the principle of Self-Determination
of People may be called into play.8
Thus, the legal framework for the concept of Self-Determination originated
from the end of colonial rules, and was incorporated as a vehicle to provide
Rights to the People dominated by the colonial powers. However, as the
colonial powers started crumbling, the Right to Self-Determination started
assuming different hues. The Right to Self-Determination was extended to
People subjugated by racism9 by expanding the concept of People from the
populations in colonial rule to a larger community under foreign occupation or
racist regime. This began the process of an evolving legal framework where the
concept of Self-Determination encapsulates a larger section of People.
The scope of the Right to Self-Determination has further broadened by the
United Nations General Assembly's Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty of 1965,"0 in which the United Nations called on
7. See Autonomy, Sovereignty and SelfDetermination, 85 AM. J. INT'LL. 730 (1991) (reviewing
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1990)).
8. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 6 (1920). See generally Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in
Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 51 (1988), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Martti Koskenniemi ed. 1992), and in SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Robert McCorquodale ed. 2000).
9. See Advisory Opinion No. 53, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21).
10. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty of 1965 [hereinafter Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention) G.A. Res. 2131XX, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A16014 (1965).
Recognizing that, in fulfillment of the principle of self-determination, the General
Assembly, in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and People contained in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, stated its
conviction that all Peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise
of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, and that, by virtue of
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all States to, "respect the right of self-determination and independence of
peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure, and
with absolute respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms" and to this
end proclaimed that, "all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of
racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.""
Self-Determination has further been given legal grounds within Article I
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966.12 This
constituted a newer development in the Rights of Self-Determination that
evolved after the colonization phase passed. Additionally, this entitlement
signified the entitlement of a broader spectrum of People, coming from
independent, non-racist States. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 was not restricted to only People subjugated
under foreign powers, but also to People belonging to national or ethnic groups.
Several important references can be made in this context. The United Nations
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations of 1970 guaranteed the Right to Self-Determination applicable to "all
States."'' 3  Similarly, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 defines the principle of
Equal Rights and Self-Determination of People as entitlement that belongs to
"all People always ... in full freedom, to determine ... without external
interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social, and
cultural development."14  This certainly seems to include the People of
that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development, Recalling that in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights the General Assembly proclaimed that recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, without distinction of any kind.
Id.
11. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 10 at para. 6.
12. See supra text accompanying note 2.
13. Declaration on Principles, supra note 6, at 124. This was adopted by consensus on October 24,
1970. Id. at 121. An assertion in that declaration is worth repeating. It says, "[t]he principles of the Charter
which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of International Law, and consequently
appeals to all States to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual
relations on the basis of the strict observance of these principles." Id. at 124.
14. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on
3 July 1973 and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, was
concluded at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the
German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy
See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the
United States of America and Yugoslavia.
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independent States. 5 Again in this context, we are reminded of the definition
of Self-Determination as the Right of People to "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development", and
do not in itself exclude ethnic sections within a political community. More
recently, the People within an independent and sovereign State with a claim to
Self-Determination have been more clearly identified as national or ethnic,
religious and linguistic minorities. 6
III. CHANGING NORMS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The above historical excursion has shown that the Right to Self-Deter-
mination developed over time and that its substantive meaning has changed over
the years. Most of the current threats to international peace and security
emanates from the struggles of groups of People claiming or trying to assert
their Rights to Self-Determination. Whether legitimate or not, these claims are
creating tensions among States, casting doubts in the nature of democracies, to
say the least. Thus, the concept of democracy and Self-Determination is inter-
connected and we must take a closer look at this concept. One of the contro-
versies surrounding the concept of Self-Determination is that it immediately
conjures up the notion of territorial secession. However, Self-Determination
should not be misconstrued to mean secession at all times; rather it should lend
legitimacy to retention of territorial integrity.
We begin by identifying a path of evolution for Self-Determination in
International Law. Self-Determination has originated as enforceable Right to
freedom from colonial rule. The United Nation has recognized three types of
situations where the Right of Self-Determination is deemed inalienable and
enforceable. First and foremost, when the People's Right of Self-Determination
emanates from the colonial rule, Self-Determination must be enforced, if no
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Sept. 1, 1975, vol. 73 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec.
29, 1975, at 323.
Section ](a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States states the
following interesting finding:
VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of
thought, conscience, religion or belief. This finding outlines as follows:
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language or religion. Within this framework, the participating
States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice,
alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the
dictates of his own conscience.
Id. at 325.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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other condition makes it unable to enforce. The second situation arises when
People claim Self-Determination as a result of having been under the occupation
of foreign power. Thirdly, the United Nation has given legitimacy to the
situation when racist domination enables the emergence of People's Right of
Self-Determination.
Let us examine the concept of Self-Determination in the context of de-
colonization a bit further. Impregnated in the concern for People under colonial
rule was the realization that conflict and chaos as a means to break the shackles
of the colonial power could also easily escalate into total chaos and destruction
of balance of power in the globe. Therefore, it was asserted in the Declaration
on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and People at the United
Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1960, "The subjection of People
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation (i.e., the denial of Self-Deter-
mination) constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights."' 7
Not only does this interrelate with the concept of Self-Determination and
the Human Rights movement but also enshrines Self-Determination under solid
legal principles. However, this provides legal binding to the idea of People's
Right to Self-Determination only when it relates to People Rights under colonial
rule. Subsequently the word Self-Determination finds its way as an emanci-
pated principle in the United Nation charter as linked to the notion that "People
have equal rights."' 8 This has alone been incorporated into the preamble to the
International Covenant on Economy, Social and Cultural Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Stepping back to our discussion to identify the roots of Self-Determination
in International Law, we highlighted three main themes, and questioned whether
the United Nation has legitimized the People's Right of Self-Determination.
There are several means through which People can exercise the rights to Self-
Determination. One of which is the Declaration of Principles of International
Law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States which notes,
"that the creation of a sovereign and independent state, the free association or
integration with an independent state or the acquisition of any other friendly
decided political states."
17. This refers to the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries andPeople, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1960. G.A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4494 (1960).
18. On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217 A (I), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948). Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text
of the Declaration and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools
and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories."
Id. at 78.
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In spite of the above, the International instruments do not provide a
succinct definition for the Rights to Self-Determination of People; and there
does not exist a perfect definition of Self-Determination. This has, therefore,
created more shades of gray in today's global arena when we are confronted
with trying to determine whether a certain People claim for the Right to Self-
Determination is truly legitimate or not. This leads us to examine two distinct
frameworks within the broader concept of Self-Determination. The first is
concerned with the Right to External Self-Determination, i.e., the Right of
People to undertake external roles, such as foreign policy and defense; issues
reserved for sovereign States to deal with. The second is the Internal Self-
Determination, i.e., the concept of Self-Determination that asserts the Right of
People or minorities in a variety of jurisdictions over affairs internal to State,
and could range from enhanced participation in governance to autonomy under
a sovereign States control. 9 We submit that, the Right of Internal Self-
19. International Law, the Right to secede is only one of the options and even that option cannot be
exercised unilaterally. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. In fact this question was
posed by the Governor in Council of Canada to the Supreme Court (1998) as follows: "[l]s there a right to
Self-Determination under International Law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or government
of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?" Id. at 218. In response, the
Supreme Court of Canada (1998) set out its opinion very clearly:
The recognized sources of International Law established that the right to Self-Deter-
mination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal Self-Determination, a
people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state. A right to external Self-Determination (which in this
case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises
in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circum-
stances. The International Law principle of Self-Determination has evolved within a
framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. There is no neces-
sary incompatibility between the maintenance of the territorial integrity of existing
states, including Canada, and the right of a 'people' to achieve a full measure of Self-
Determination. A state whose government represents the whole of the people or
People resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination,
and respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled
to the protection under International Law of its territorial integrity.
Id. at 282-84.
A number of commentators have further asserted that the Right of Self-Determination may ground a
right to unilateral secession, when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its Right to Self-Deter-
mination internally. Id. The Vienna Declaration adds credence to the assertion that such a complete blockage
may potentially give rise to a right of secession. Id. We note that the Canadian Supreme Court and much of
the literature on the subject (e.g., Steiner and Alston, 2000) draw a clear distinction between Internal and
External Self-Determination. "Effective provision for internal Self-Determination (e.g., federalism combined
with non-discrimination), far from paving the way for unilateral secession, de-legitimizes any recourse to it.
On the other hand, the denial of due internal Self-Determination could legitimize a right of secession. Is there
a widely recognized understanding of the term internal Self-Determination?" In this context, the broad
definition offered in the above quoted judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court, viz. "a people's pursuit of
its political, economic, social and cultural development within the frame work of an existing state."
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Determination emanates from cases where it has been determined that the
legitimacy of External Self-Determination does not exist. There are several
instances where relevant People or territory of a State cannot claim the Right to
External Self-Determination. For example, when the issue of Self-Determina-
tion has already been determined once during the course of evolution of the
relevant People, there should be no claims for External Self-Determination.
Similarly, when the relevant minority People forms part of a sovereign Nation
and are in no way subjected to a systemic oppression due to their minority
status, there cannot be a legitimate cause to entertain Self-Determination. By
the same argument, claims for the External Right to Self-Determination cannot
be legitimized for part of a Nation State when such State originally emerged as
a result of the de-colonization process, unless evidence of systemic oppression
can be proven against such State. In the next Section, we present our analysis
of the Right to Self-Determination related to Kashmir.
IV. ANALYZING THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF KASHMIR
Kashmir presents a test to our premise that, a claim for Self-Determination
must be dealt with within the dual context of the sovereignty of a Nation and the
original secession of the State. As will be clear from our discussion below that,
giving legitimacy to any claim for Self-Determination of Kashmir will argue for
a case of a faulty de-colonization process that led to the independence of both
India and Pakistan. In some parlance, Kashmir is viewed as a disputed territory,
whereas in some quarters, there is no question about the legality of Kashmir as
an integral part of India. The issue before us is then to analyze this situation
with respect to the existing concepts of Self-Determination. Before getting into
the legitimacy of the claim for Self-Determination, let us take a look at the his-
torical context through which Kashmir was annexed as part of India.
A. History and Legitimacy ofAnnexation
The State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) acceded to the dominion of India
on the 26th October 1947, as one of the remaining acts of de-colonization of
British territory. In order to understand the Kashmiri's Right to Self-Determina-
tion, the legality of this accession of Kashmir has to be analyzed. The accession
took place under the provisions of the Constitution of India as in force on 15th
August, 1947,20 as well as the Government of India Act 1935 as adopted under
20. Embassy of India, Jammu & Kashmir, at http:llwww.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/
kashmiraccession.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
Now, therefore, I Shriman Inder Mahander Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Har
Singhji Jammu and Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipathi, Ruler of Jammu
and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my Sovereignty in and over my said State do
hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession; and I hereby declare that I accede to
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provisions of the Indian Independence Act 1947. The provision states, "An
Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the dominion, if the Governor
General had signified his acceptance of an instrument of accession executed by
the ruler thereof."'"
Consequently, when the ruler of Kashmir executed the Instrument of
Accession2 (26 October, 1947) and Lord Mountbatten23, then Governor
General, accepted the Instrument (27 October 1947), the whole of Kashmir
became an integral part of India. This accession was provided within the stipu-
lations granted by the British Government for the Independence of the India.
Under this plan, the Muslim majority area in British India would constitute the
Dominion of Pakistan and the Hindu majority would constitute the Dominion
of India. Additionally, it also was made clear that the decision about Partition
related only to British India and the Rulers of the Princely States would be
restored their earlier Paramount power. In other words, the Princely States
24
were to become 'independent' and the communal basis of the division of India
would not affect those States at all. Therefore, the Rulers of the Princely States
were free to choose, for example, if they would join India or Pakistan, as long
as the accession is agreed upon by the powers granting them that.
Since the Act was enacted by the British Parliament to create the Domi-
nions of India and Pakistan, it cannot be questioned either by India, Pakistan or
the United Kingdom, all parties to the agreement. One of the players spon-
soring the current air of illegitimacy of Kashmir as an integral part of India is
the neighboring country of Pakistan. However, historical events point out that
the Government of the Maharaja of Kashmir was recognized by Pakistan. It
the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor-General of India, the
Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established
for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession
but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion,
exercise in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as "this
State") such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India
Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th Day of August 1947,
(which Act as so in force is hereafter referred to as "the Act".
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. To view the actual letter that Maharaja Hari Singh wrote requesting accession into India and
also requesting for the Government of India to help protect the people from the invading Pakistan soldiers that
were infiltrating Kashmir and causing great nstability, http://www.kashmi-information.com/LegalDocs/
Maharaja_letter.html.
23. See Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten and the Transfer of Power, HISTORY TODAY, Sept.
1997, at 34.
24. With the exit of the British and the independence of India in 1947 there were 562 Princely
States. Aharon Daniel, India History: Princely States and Provinces, at http://adaniel.tripod.com/
princely.htm. These Princely States were actually ruled by Kings, and some of them, such as Kashmir, and
Hyderabad were as large as England. Id.
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was with this Government that Pakistan signed a Standstill Agreement by the
exchange of telegrams on August 12 and 16, 1947 .25 At that time the Pakistan
Government did not question the validity of the Agreement with the Govern-
ment of Maharaja of Kashmir. India's Right, as well as its duties with regard
to Jammu and Kashmir flowed from the fact that accession was recognized and
viewed as legitimate since the birth of the two nations. Mr. Warren Austin, the
representative of the United States in his speech on February 4th 1948, during
the 240th meeting of the Security Council, where he asserted the following,
which further corroborated, "The external sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir
is no longer under the Maharaja. With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir
with India, this sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India."
It is significant that the legality of the accession has never been questioned
either by the Security Council or by the United Nations Commissions for India
and Pakistan (UNCIP). On the contrary, with regard to the question of acces-
sion, the UNCIP legal advisor examined this issue and found that it was legal
and authentic and could not be questioned. This fact clearly influenced the pro-
posals made by the UNCIP. The most significant recognition of India's legal
status in Kashmir was contained in the Commission's reply to protests from the
Pakistan Government against the decision of the Indian Constituent Assembly
to reserve four seats for the representatives of Jammu and Kashmir. The
Commission declined to take up this matter and observed, "In the Commission's
view, it is difficult to oppose this measure of the Indian Government on purely
legal grounds. 26
The issue of armed conflict with Indian Military forces has been raised in
several quarters in trying to establish legitimacy of the Self-Determination of
25. Three days before the transfer of power, the Maharaja of Kashmir sent telegrams
bearing identical dates, asking for Standstill Agreement on 12 August 1947 to both the
Dominions India and Pakistan to maintain the normal amenities of life such as post
office, communications and so on. The agreement, as provided in the Indian Indepen-
dence Act 1947, would guarantee that till new agreements were made all existing
agreements and administrative arrangements would continue. Any dispute in regard
to this would be settled by arbitration and "nothing in this agreement includes the
exercise of any paramount functions" Pakistan immediately accepted the agreement on
15 August through a telegraphic communication. But the Government of India asked
the Prime Minister of Kashmir to fly to Delhi to negotiate the Agreement, or to send
any other authorized Minister for the purpose. The non-acceptance of the Standstill
Agreement by India immediately aroused suspicion in the minds of Pakistan and it
complained that India's failure to conclude the agreement was indicative of some plan
to effect the accession immediately. Before any Minister could reach Delhi, the
Pakistan sponsored tribal invasion had altered the situation altogether.
RAM KRISHEN K. BHATr, KASHMIR AND PARTITION OF INDIA (PART II) (2001), http://www.kashmir-
information.com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt2.html.
26. KASHMIR PAPERS: REPORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
(JUNE 1948 TO DECEMBER 1949) 194.
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some Kashmiri People. However, based on the legality of accession of Kashmir
to India, there should be no confusion to the use of force for the law and order
situation in Kashmir. Because, an essential attribute of sovereignty is the Right
to maintain an army for national security. Based on the UNCIP resolutions of
August 13th 1948 and January 5th, 1949, there has always been recognition of
the Rights and obligations of the Government of India to maintain a sufficient
force "for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order."
In this way, the UNCIP, and authorized World body, not only recognized the
Right of India to retain her troops in Jammu and Kashmir in sufficient numbers
consistent with the security of the State, but also recognized the responsibility
of India for the maintenance of law and order throughout the State.
B. Granularization of Self-Determination or Faulty De-colonization?
It is imperative that the Right of Self-Determination in Kashmir is analyzed
within the context of the Instrument of Accession discussed above. We have
shown that, the instrument of accession was a legitimate process born out of de-
colonization. The independence of India and Pakistan came about as a result of
this de-colonization, which in essence was driven by a broader concept of Self-
-Determination. Thus, granting the territory of Kashmir to an independent India
via the process of Instrument ofAccession was an act precipitated by invoking
the concept of Self-Determination. Therefore, any further granularization of
this Self-Determination by responding to an illegitimate demand for Self-Deter-
mination of any territory within a sovereign State would question the legitimacy
of the de-colonization process that in the first place started this chain of events.
It is therefore of utmost importance to take out the blinders of political rhetoric
and try to understand the legitimacy of the accession via historical truth.
The Instrument of Accession executed by the Kashmir Maharaja was in no
way different from that executed by some 500 other Princely States. It was
unconditional, voluntary and absolute. It was not subject to any exceptions.
And as Alan Campbell-Johnson wrote in 1951,27 "The legality of the accession
is beyond doubt." The legitimacy of Kashmir's accession to India has further
been corroborated as recent as February 11, 1975 Sheikh Abdullah, the Lion
Leader of Kashmir, wrote a letter to India's Prime Minister saying, "The
accession of the state of J&K is not a matter in issue. It has been my firm belief
that the future of J&K lies with India because of the common ideal that we
share." More than twenty years thereafter, the same sentiments are being
reiterated by the present Chief Minister of Kashmir, Mufti Md. Sayed, and it is
worth noting, the people democratically elected him.
27. ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON, MISSION WITH MOUNTBATrEN 225 (Macmillan Publishing Co.
2001).
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V. DISCUSSION
Taking a peek at history of the United States of America, we can compare
the accession of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) to India with the annexation of
Texas by the USA in 1845. Threatened by the menace of predatory incursions
from Mexico, independent Texas requested the US government to annex it. The
US Congress sanctioned the proposal. When Mexico protested, the US govern-
ment did not consider its action of annexation as a violation of any of the rights
of Mexico. However, when Texas opted out of the Union in February 1861, so
as to be unhindered in preserving and propagating slavery, Lincoln battled
against the secession, committed as he was to freedom and democracy. If,
therefore, minorities of Kashmiri people instigated and nurtured by Pakistan are
alienated against India, should not India act like Lincoln?
Even as arguments on the Kashmir issue lingered in the United Nations
Security Council for years, two important events of historical significance have
further ratified the issue of accession. Firstly, in June 1949 the Prince of
Kashmir,28 on the advice of his council of ministers, nominated four represen-
tatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly which was then framing a Constitu-
tion for free India. At that time, it was made clear by the Kashmir government,
"the accession of the J&K State with India was complete in fact and in law", the
State would be governed by its own Constitution as permitted by the Instrument
of Accession. Secondly, the Constituent Assembly comprising representatives
duly elected in August 1951 on the basis of universal adult suffrage started
deliberations, which ratified the accession on February 15, 1954. This
ratification irrevocably incorporated the State of Kashmir as an integral part of
the Union of India in the non-amendable Section 3 of its Constitution that came
into effect from January 26, 1957.
The above series of acts by the State of Kashmir in no way violated its
legal status vis-A-vis India or the United Nations Security Council. Moreover,
at no time did any one doubt the representative nature of Kashmir's Constituent
Assembly. Once the People of Kashmir had taken a final decision regarding
their future status, the question of any further Self-Determination or plebiscite
does not arise either legally or morally. Entertaining the demands of Self-
Determination will only undermine the earlier Self-Determination, which in turn
will create the illusion of a faulty de-colonization process. This is because, Self-
Determination is a one-time process, and any movement to further granularize
this would imply reopening the issue of the accession of Kashmir. This would
mean going 57 years back in time and examining the legitimacy of the
Independence of India and Pakistan. This lies in the simple fact, that the
document that called for the accession of the Princely States including Kashmir
28. More information can be found at http://www.kashmir-information.com/.
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also legitimized the Independence of both India and Pakistan. We must under-
stand, that reopening and dividing Kashmir on the basis of religious compulsion
will surely lead to a replay of the communal Indian and Pakistan Holocaust of
1947 . 29 Therefore, it is high time we engage ourselves in a bit of historical
revisionism and duly recognize that the Security Council was exceeding its
reach by presenting a plebiscite proposal with respect to Kashmir.
We are reminded by a more recent reaffirmation by the United Nations
General Assembly where the conflict between the People Right to Self-Deter-
mination and the sovereignty of a Nation has been addressed. The declaration
says,
The right of Self-Determination of all People, taking into account the
particular situation of People under colonial or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation, recognized the right of People to
take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to realize their inalienable right of Self-Determination. This
shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and Self-
Determination of People and thus possessed of a Government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction of any kind.3"
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of Self-Determination has broadened since the formative days
of the post World War I Along the way, various International bodies, Human
Rights groups and the comity of Nations worked hand-in-hand to ensure
freedom for all groups. The issue of Kashmir however opened up a whole set
of new questions. Firstly, can the Right to Self-Determination be conferred
upon a community or a group of People more than once? This situation is some-
what akin to attaching double jeopardy in common Law criminal jurisprudence,
29. The famous Mohandas Gandhi was known for his help in gaining India's independence from
the British. Generally it is accepted that Gandhi lead the largely Hindu movement, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah
lead the Muslim majority in Pakistan. While Gandhi promoted inclusion and wanted Hindu and Muslim
represented together, Jinnah advocated the division of India into two separate states, Muslim and Hindu. This
division came at a painful cost. When the land was divided, violence erupted when Muslim and Hindu
minorities were stranded in various areas, and raced to join their new lands. Within a few weeks halfa million
people had died, and resulted in nothing shy of a Holocaust.
30. The Declaration of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, issued on 24 September 1996 on
the occasion of the celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Movement, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/51/462 (1996).
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when a defendant cannot be tried twice. If the Right to Self-Determination is
enshrined in the framework of International Law, can People's Right of Self-
Determination be judged more than once? We argue, that unless evidence is
presented in which a minority group is systematically subjected to State-
sponsored oppression, demand for Self-Determination in any form should never
be entertained.
This brings us to the legitimate issue of considering whether the current
modalities of determining the Right of Self-Determination can actually work in
the future. We submit, when the claim of Self-Determination is mixed with
terrorism, as has been in the case of Kashmir, a sovereign State cannot ignore
the threat to fragment its territorial and political unity. Especially, in the present
case, if we consider that the legitimacy of the Instrument of Accession fulfilled
the Kashmiri's Right to Self-Determination. Re-opening the issue of Kashmir's
Self-Determination vis-A-vis the sovereignty of India would mean nullifying the
Instrument of Accession, which in turn would nullify the independent status of
both India and Pakistan. Can the World body afford to open that Pandora's
box?
Finally, the Right to Self-Determination should always be analyzed in the
context of the relevant group's original secession from the Colonial rule, if such
event existed. As the rise of religious fundamentalism continue to influence
political agendas all over the World, we will see an escalation of illegitimate
demands for the Right to Self-Determination. The issue of Kashmir, and so
many other territories in the world should be viewed with the same yardstick
and be dealt with according to the sovereign decisions of the relevant Nation
State. Otherwise, the whole issue of Self-Determination, in the words of Robert
Lansing, (President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State), "would likely breed
discontent, disorder and rebellion", and the world would indeed be a less safe
place.
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"An Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains"1
Chief Justice Marshall articulated this fundamental canon of U.S. statutory
construction, reflective of customary international law, in 1804 in Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, an admiralty case commonly referred to as the
"Charming Betsy" case. As the foreign government representative on this
panel, I would like to provide an extraterritorial perspective on the extraterri-
torial application of domestic law following the Charming Betsy principle.
I. CANADA'S POSITION ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Let me start by saying that Canada does not object to the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction per se. Canada exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction
pursuant to multilateral treaties for egregious offences such as those found in the
Convention against Torture. However, Canada is opposed, in principle, to
broad assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over Canadian individuals and
entities arising out of activities that take place entirely outside of the state assert-
ing jurisdiction. This assertion ofjurisdiction interferes with the sovereignty of
governments and is not in conformity with international law. Under inter-
national law, the limitations on the extent to which any single nation can extend
its own jurisdiction are generally recognized as flowing from the sovereignty
and equality of nations.
* Foreign Affairs Canada in Ottowa, Deputy Director, United Nations Human Rights and
Economic Law Division. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2004.
1. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
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II. EMPAGRAN
It was on the basis of this principle that Canada intervened as amicus
curiae in the F. Hoffinann- Laroche Ltd et al v. Empagran case (referred to as
Empagran) heard by the United States Supreme Court on April 26, 2004,
decision rendered on June 14, 2004.
I will be focusing my comments on the Empagran decision as it articulates
the Supreme Court's views on the extraterritorial application of antitrust law.
It also cited the Canadian brief and supported the Canadian position.
The Empagran case involved vitamin sellers (a vitamin cartel) around the
world that agreed to fix prices, leading to higher vitamin prices in the U.S. and
independently to higher prices in other countries. Foreign purchasers filed a
class action under U.S. antitrust law (the Sherman Act) alleging the vitamin
sellers had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy. The Court stated that a pur-
chaser of the vitamins in the United States could bring a claim under U.S. anti-
trust legislation. However, the plaintiffs in the Empagran case never asserted
they purchased vitamins in the United States. Therefore, the Court was essen-
tially left to determine first whether the conduct in question involved trade or
commerce with foreign nations and if so, did the conduct have a "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce.2 These
were the criteria to determine if the Sherman Act would apply.
In its consideration of the issue, the Court referred to the amici curiae filed
by Germany, Canada, Japan, and the United States.
III. CANADA'S AMICUS CURIAE
Before I get to the Court's analysis of the application of the Sherman Act,
I would like to give you a sense of the perspective Canada presented to the
Court. The Government of Canada submitted that recognized legal principles
militate against the broad extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act under
the circumstances of this case. United States legal principles limit the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-nationals when such exercise is "unrea-
sonable." These principles parallel principles of international law and comity
that are recognized and applied by Canada and other nations.
The legal principles that foreclose the unreasonable exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction had ready application to the facts of this case. The four
factors applied by U.S. courts to determine the reasonableness of an exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction relate to a nexus with U.S. territory, to a nexus with
U.S. nationals, to other countries' interest in regulation, and to conflict with
other countries regulation. Canada argued, that from the perspective of the
United States, the respondents were foreign nationals. The transactions on
2. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2363 (2004).
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which they base their claims occurred solely in foreign commerce and had no
effects in the United States or on U.S. commerce. Canada and other nations
have a strong interest in regulating, and do regulate the type of activity on which
respondent's claim are based. In Canada, members of the vitamin cartel were
prosecuted under the Competition Act in respect of criminally sanctioned cartel
activity and its domestic effects. Prosecutions also occurred in the European
Union, Australia, and the U.S. Record fines were levied within these jurisdic-
tions against the cartel members.
The laws of some countries, including those of Canada and the U.S., enable
private parties to seek compensation in a civil suit for damages for financial
injury suffered as a result of the activity of cartel members in the domestic
market. While Canada, and most other countries, allow recovery only of the
actual damages suffered, plaintiffs in the U.S. are entitled to treble damages if
their suit is successful. The assertion of U.S. jurisdiction would conflict with
Canada's enforcement of its own antitrust regime as it would, inter alia, under-
cut Canada's immunity program that gives cartel members incentive to report
their illegal activity and cooperate with other authorities, because criminal
immunity from Canadian authorities would come at the increased cost of
punitive treble damages under U.S. law for its worldwide transactions. Canada
concluded that it would be unreasonable for U.S. courts to exercise the juris-
diction requested by the foreign plaintiffs.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS TEST
The Court concluded that the Sherman Act did not apply. Citing, inter
alia, the Charming Betsy, the Court commenced its analysis with the principle
that it ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable inter-
ference with the sovereign authority of other nations. This allows potentially
conflicting laws of different nations to work together. The Court found that
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct to redress
domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused is
reasonable. It is however not reasonable to apply U.S. law when it is foreign
harm alone that gives rise to the plaintiffs claim. The Court asked why should
American law supplant Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determina-
tion on how to protect their own people from anticompetitive conduct engaged
in by their own companies. It noted that several nations filed briefs (Germany,
Canada, Japan) arguing that applying U.S. remedies would unjustifiably permit
the German, Canadian, and Japanese citizens to bypass their own less generous
remedial schemes and that permitting foreign plaintiffs to pursue private treble
damages remedies would undermine foreign nations own antitrust enforcement
policies by diminishing foreign firms incentive to cooperate with antitrust
authorities in return for prosecutorial amnesty.
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The Court then concluded that "if America's antitrust policies could not
win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we
must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperia-
lism, through legislative fiat."3
The Supreme Court could not have been more clear on the facts. Statutes
are to be construed to avoid unreasonable interference with other nations
sovereign authority--effectively a restatement of the Charming Betsy, custo-
mary international law-200 years later.
3. Id. at 2369.
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I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN GENERAL
One line of cases involving extraterritoriality revolves around the issue of
effective control over persons as a result of military occupation and also
involves jurisdictional issues. In the European system, the Cyprus v. Turkey
case developed the doctrine of effective control by Turkish forces of Northern
Cyprus as its basis for jurisdiction.' In the Inter-American system, the leading
case is Coard, which involved United States control over seventeen Grenadian
petitioners who remained under United States detention and had been involved
in the overthrow of the Grenadian government.2 The United States contested
the admissibility of this case, asserting that the Commission lacked the compe-
tence to examine the legal validity of its military actions in Grenada as this fell
beyond the scope of its mandate. The Inter-American Commission held that the
petitioners had been subjected to the extraterritorial authority and control of the
United States authorities and declared the United States in violation of the
American Declaration.'
* Principal Specialist at the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States' Secretariat
for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The opinions expressed are in the author's personal
capacity and are not to be attributed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the General
Secretariat of the Organization of American States, or to the Organization of American States. This article
is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125, 137
(1975).
2. Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 550, OEA/ser. L/V.II. 95 doc. 7 rev. (1997).
3. Id.
466 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:465
II. DEFINING THE ISSUE
The United States has deployed massive military power into Afghanistan
to fight against the Taliban regime and al-Qaida. The United States also sent
troops to Iraq to attempt an overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and the
attempted pacification of the country. During this worldwide war against terror,
the United States has also taken into custody, hundreds or perhaps thousands of
individuals, at various United States Military bases. These bases include the
United States military base at Guantanamo Bay, at the Bagram air base in
Afghanistan, and at other undisclosed locations. In addition, the United States
has turned over captured al-Qaida suspects from United States custody to other
countries where they were allegedly tortured, such as the case of Maher Arar,
a Canadian citizen of Syrian origin. Further, northern Alliance forces in
Afghanistan, allied to the United States in the Afghan armed conflict, reportedly
engaged in atrocities as the Taliban was retreating in November 2001. Should
any of these cases reach the international human rights bodies, should the
human rights bodies take jurisdiction over them?
In January 2002, the United States started bringing individuals it termed
enemy combatants to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
These individuals were not given the status of prisoners of war and they were
not charged with criminal offenses, or any other crimes for that matter. At the
domestic level, lawyers who were not granted access to the detainees sought
habeas relief on their behalf in federal court in order to have their status
clarified. It was unclear what legal regime, if any, they were being held under.
Two United States federal courts refused to take jurisdiction, with one declaring
that the detainees fell under Cuban sovereignty since no United States federal
court had jurisdiction over the territory where the Cuban base was located.
Since it appeared that no federal court would or could take jurisdiction, on
February 25, 2002, the public interest lawyers requested precautionary measures
from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to protect the detainees'
rights to be treated as prisoners-of-war, to be free from arbitrary, incommuni-
cado and prolonged detention, unlawful interrogations and trials by military
commissions in which they could be sentenced to death. On March 12, 2002,
the Inter-American Commission granted the request and called upon the United
States to "take urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal." The Com-
mission justified its assumption of jurisdiction invoking the authority and
control exercised by the United States over these detainees:
Accordingly where persons find themselves within the authority and
control of a state and where a circumstance of armed conflict may be involved,
their fundamental rights may be determined in part by reference to international
humanitarian law as well as international human rights law. Where it may be
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considered that the protections of international humanitarian law do not apply,
however, such persons remain the beneficiaries at least of the non-derogable
protections under international human rights law. In short, no person, under the
authority and control of a state, regardless of his or her circumstances is devoid
of legal protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.4
The United States ignored the precautionary measures issued by the United
States in 2002, but earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court corrected
the lower courts' interpretation that federal courts in the United States had no
jurisdiction and remanded the cases for reconsideration.
The first hurdle a human rights victim must overcome when presenting a
petition to an international human rights body is the jurisdictional hurdle. The
petitioner must show that the petition is prima facie admissible, ratione per-
sonae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione loci.
Admissibility becomes more complicated when looking at the exercise of
jurisdiction by a regional human rights body that is requested to extend its juris-
diction to acts that occurred outside the region, as defined by the territorial cir-
cumference of the membership of the regional organization. At the regional
level, the landmark case in this area is Bankovic.
III. THE BANKOVIC CASE
The Bankovic case involved an Application filed before the European
Court of Human Rights against seventeen States party to the European Conven-
tion that are also members of NATO. The complaint alleges that the NATO
bombing in 1999 of a Serbian Radio and TV station (RTS), in Belgrade,
violated provisions of the European Convention.5 The Application was filed on
behalf of the victims, both dead and injured, of that bombing. The European
Court declared the Application inadmissible because the matter was held not to
come within the jurisdiction of the respondent states within the meaning of
Article one of the European Convention.
The Application raised important issues of State responsibility under
human rights treaties for the killing of civilians during bombing campaigns,
with ramifications that extended far beyond this case. Michael O'Boyle, one of
the senior lawyers in the court's registry, noted that few inadmissibility deci-
sions [...] have given rise to such adverse comment and controversy as the
inadmissibility decision in the Bankovic case.6 One need only contemplate the
4. Posted on the website for the Center for Constitutional Rights, petitioners in the case: www.ccr-
ny.org.
5. Bankovic v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 345 (2001).
6. Michael O'Boyle, European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A
comment on 'Life after Bankovic' In Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 125 (Forts
Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
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possible scenarios: For example, do Iraqi civilian bombing victims have a case
under the American Declaration, against the United States, for violation of their
human rights before the Inter-American Commission? A similar fact situation
was dealt with in an earlier Commission case, involving the United States
bombing of Panama, during the December 1989 invasion to remove Manuel
Noriega from power. A petition was filed on behalf of Panamanians who were
killed, injured, or suffered material damage during the bombing campaign. The
petition was declared admissible by the Commission in 1993.7
What then is the difference between the European Convention and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, to warrant such
contradictory decisions on admissibility by the two international human rights
bodies? First, the American Declaration, unlike the European Convention, con-
tains no limits on the obligations assumed by states under the Declaration. The
European Convention, however, like the American Convention, limits the obli-
gations assumed by states. States must ensure all persons, subject to their juris-
diction, the free and full exercise of the rights and freedoms set forth in the
respective treaty.
Bankovic was declared inadmissible on December 12, 2001, because the
European Court considered that the NATO respondent states did not have the
required effective control of Serbia. The Court stated:
In sum, the case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of the
exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional:
it has done so when the respondent State, through the effective control of the
relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Govern-
ment of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be
exercised by that Government. (Emphasis addided).
Although the respondent States did not exercise public powers normally
exercised by the Government, it is a fair but unexplored question to ask of the
Court, precisely how much bombing is required to assert effective control of the
relevant territory and its inhabitants. Perhaps the bombing of the radio station
did not reach such a threshold, but perhaps carpet-bombing of a territory, sus-
tained over an extended period of time, might.
Since the applicants in Bankovic were arguing admissibility, ratione loci,
they never really argued the question of admissibility ratione personae, or
refuted the incontrovertible fact that the inhabitants of the FRY were outside the
system and consequently, outside the scope ofjurisdiction of Article one of the
European Convention. The applicants stated that they were nationals of the
Republic of Yugoslavia and would be left without a Convention remedy, but the
respondent states replied that "the FRY was not and is not a party to the
7. Case 10.573, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 312, OEA/ser. LUVII.85 doc. 9 rev. (1993).
Convention and its inhabitants had no existing rights under the Convention."'
This is a crucial point since the inhabitants had no rights under the European
Convention they could not have had a reasonable expectation of protection or
indemnification from the European Court.
Although some human rights activists have advocated that the Inter-
American Commission take jurisdiction over victims who were killed or injured
by United States firepower in Iraq, similarly one might argue that the inhabi-
tants of Iraq have no reasonable expectations or rights under the instruments of
the inter-American system, any more than the Serbs had a reasonable expecta-
tion of protection under the European system. This position, however, results
in a fundamental unfairness, for why should Iraqis or other aliens, detained by
United States forces at Guantanamo, be entitled to protection, whereas Iraqis,
detained by United States forces at Bagram or Diego Garcia, are denied the
same protection? The only logical response is that regional human rights bodies
must draw the lines that circumscribe the limits on the exercise of their juris-
diction somewhere. Perhaps the line should be drawn to coincide with the exer-
cise of authority and control anywhere in the world, or perhaps it should be
drawn geographically to limit their jurisdiction to the territorial circumference
of the region.
Why this is so is perhaps best explained by the characteristics of a regional
arrangement for the protection of human rights. A regional system, like the
European system or the Inter-American system, unlike the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, which is part of a universal system, is first and
foremost defined by geography, i.e. what states and territories comprise the
region? The European Court in Bankovic defined its espacejuridique:
In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject to
Article Fifty Six of the Convention, in an essentially regional context and
notably in the legal space (espacejuridique) of the contracting states. The FRY
clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not designed
to be applied throughout the world, even in respect to the conduct of contracting
states. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human
rights protection has so far been relied on by the Court in favor of establishing
jurisdiction only when the territory in question was one that, but for the specific
circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention.
The United Nations which functions largely through regional groupings,
does not conform the composition of these groupings to the composition of the
regional organizations. For example, the UN Group of Latin American and
Caribbean countries (GRULAC), which most closely corresponds to the
Americas region, does not include the United States and Canada, which are
members of the Organization of American States (OAS). On the other hand, the
8. Bankovic, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 347, 42 (2001).
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UN Group of Western European and other states (WEOG), corresponds to the
European region, but also includes the United States, which is not a member
state of the Council of Europe.
Another problem is the fact that regional organizations, such as the Council
of Europe, do not include all the states that geographically comprise Europe in
their membership. With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the end of
Communism, states previously defined as Eastern or Central Europe began to
be admitted for membership into the Council of Europe. Even Russia was
admitted to membership. Other states, geographically within the European
region, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia
(today Serbia and Montenegro) were considered during the period of armed
conflict in former Yugoslavia, not to have reached the requisite threshold of
human rights observance required for admission. Absurdly, a regional system
created in large part to promote and protect human rights in the region, excluded
from its protection and membership within that regional system, the states in
which the greatest number of human rights violations were occurring.
IV. CONCLUSION
In my view, this is the central problem with Bankovic, and it has nothing
to do with the reasoning of the Court, but with the unwillingness of the Council
of Europe to include all independent states within the European region in its
membership. This is now being remedied, as Serbia and Montenegro and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are both now members of the Council of Europe, as is
Monaco, which joined on October 6, 2004. The only remaining European State
that is a member of the United Nations and not of the Council of Europe is
Belarus.
The Inter-American system has not pushed the jurisdictional envelope
much further than the European system, although the larger question of the
Inter-American Commission's exercise ofjurisdiction outside the region is still
one of first impression, since the Commission has not yet had to confront the
issue. Given the charges of torture by United States forces in Abu Ghraib, how-
ever, it is not inconceivable that a detainee will file a petition at some point with
the Inter-American Commission.
A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
Elizabeth F. Defeis"
The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights' in the Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe2 has a curious history that in some ways
is similar to the history of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.
The Draft Constitution for the European Union, signed on October 29, 2004 in
Brussels by the member states, was the product of a Convention that
commenced its work on February 28, 2002 and completed its drafting process
on July 10, 2003. The first European Convention drafted the Charter of
Fundamental Rights proclaimed at Nice in 2000. The mandate of the second
Convention was to simplify the constituent treaties, to increase the democratic
legitimacy, transparency and efficiency of the European Union institutions, and
to consider the unification of the treaties into a basic treaty, including the
Charter of Fundamental Rights. While incorporation of the Charter will have
little immediate substantive impact, it is an important symbolic step for the
European Union.
Neither the United States Constitution as originally adopted, nor the Treaty
on European Union (also referred to as the Treaty of Rome)4 establishing the
European Economic Community and the subsequent constituent treaties contain
what can be considered a Bill of Rights. This omission in these documents can
be attributed to similar causes relating to the perceived limited power or
competence of the central authority.
The United States Constitution was intended to set forth a plan of
governance for the new nation in which the central government was to act
pursuant to specific enumerated powers set out in the Constitution. Human
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Professor Defeis would like to thank
her research assistant Jessica Hargis, Class of 2006. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks
presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE UNION, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
[hereinafter THE CHARTER].
2. DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, July 18, 2003, 2003 O.J. (C 169)
9 [hereinafter DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTION]. Although the Draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe is technically a treaty, the term Draft Constitution for the European Union or Draft
Constitution will be used throughout to refer to this document.
3. See generally PETER NORMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION (EuroComment 2003).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 96
[hereinafter ROME TREATY].
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rights were hardly considered during the debates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion in Philadelphia although human rights provisions were featured pro-
minently in all of the state constitutions then in effect. In the Federalist Papers,
Alexander Hamilton argued that a Bill of Rights would not only be unnecessary
but also dangerous.' He argued that a Bill of Rights would refer to power not
granted to the Federal Government and on this very ground it could be asserted
that the Federal Government had more powers than had specifically been
granted in the Constitution. The omission of a Bill of Rights proved to be one
of the most formidable stumbling blocks for the ratification of the Constitution
and it became the unifying force of the anti-Federalists who were opposed to a
strong central government and wished to defeat the Constitution. Faced with
this development, the supporters of the Constitution pledged that if the
Constitution were adopted, the adoption of a Bill of Rights would be the first
order of business for the new Congress. If the pledge were not kept, a new
constitutional convention would be convened that could once again reargue the
issue of redistribution of powers between the states and the national
government.
We now know the argument that the federal government of the United
States is one of limited enumerated powers did not stand the test of time.
Through the expansion of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause,6 the activities of the national government have expanded into areas
unanticipated by the framers at the Philadelphia Convention, such as education
and social welfare. It is only recently that the Supreme Court has once again
begun to question the limits of federal power.
What are the similarities between the experiences of the European Union
and the United States with respect to human rights? When the European Union
was first established in 1957, its primary goal was the attainment of economic
integration,7 albeit with political overtones. Moreover, its competence to act
was limited to specific areas designed to further economic integration. Since it
was necessary to harmonize the work force throughout the community, the
Treaty of Rome did contain a social chapter, which gives limited mention to
human rights and addresses worker's rights. Nevertheless its primary focus was
to improve working conditions on a harmonized basis throughout the European
community.
The Treaty of Rome was not viewed as a guarantor of rights and indeed,
its only substantive provision pertaining to rights was former Article 119 now
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
7. Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty ofAmsterdam: The Next Step Towards Gender Equality?, 23
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1999).
8Article 141, which guaranteed equal pay for equal work to women. However,
even this provision was put in for economic rather than human rights concerns.
Since some states already had such a guarantee (i.e. France), the guarantee was
necessary so that such states would not be placed at an economic disadvantage.
As originally envisaged, human rights were to be protected by the
individual member states through their respective national constitutions and
laws;9 indeed each of the original members of the European Union had strong
rights protections in their national Constitution or national law. In addition each
of the member states were also party to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and rights would be
protected through the Strasbourg process."
However, when the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") announced the
doctrine of supremacy of community law over national legislation in 1964," the
doctrine was resisted by some states that had strong human rights provisions in
their national constitutions. These states argued that as long as the Community
lacked specific human rights guarantees, Community legislation must be viewed
through the lens of national constitutional guarantees. In response, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice increasingly stated that the Union would be guided by
constitutional traditions of the member states and by the provisions of European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 2 In addition,
subsequent treaties, primarily designed to strengthen a single internal market
and foster monetary integration, acknowledged the goal of promoting demo-
cracy on the basis of fundamental rights.
Although the European Court of Justice early recognized human rights as
a fundamental aspect of community law, its approach to human rights lacked a
coherent policy. For example, although it ruled that the content of human rights
protections derived from the constitutional traditions of member states and later
8. ROME TREATY art. 141.
9. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm., 1969 E.C.R. 419, 427, C.M.L.R. 112(1970).
10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. See also Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human
Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
313 (1998). The European Court of Human Rights sits in Strasbourg, and individuals, as well as Member
States, may take complaints of human rights violations directly before the court. Id. at 316. Jurisdiction over
Member States is compulsory. Id. at 326. All Member States of the EU and most potential members, such
as Russia and Macedonia, have ratified the Convention. Id. at 327. The European Court of Human Rights
is separate and apart from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the other mechanisms of the EU, such as
the Commission and the Council. Id. at 316.
11. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
12. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Protection of Human Rights in the European Union: Overview and
Bibliography, 22 INT'L J. LEGAL INFo. 228, 231 (1994).
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to international agreements to which states are party,13 it did not initially apply
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights to cases before it,
nor did it refer to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in its
opinions. Although it had referred to decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights, it had also ruled that without an amendment to the EEC Treaty,
the EU could not itself become a party to the European Convention on Human
Rights.14 The Draft Constitution for the European Union now provides that the
Union will enjoy legal personality and is mandated to accede to the European
Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedom.15
As the Union directives and regulations emanating from Brussels become
more complex and comprehensive in scope, so the momentum for a charter of
rights for the European Union has developed. In July of 2000, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU was proclaimed at the Nice Summit. 16 However,
even though the document has political force, it is not legally binding on
member states. Under pressure from the Parliament and various non-govern-
mental organizations, the impetus to include the Charter as a binding document
gained momentum. One representative who worked on the new European con-
stitution remarked, "It was a Bill of Rights that created American identity...
it will be the same with Europeans." Thus, consistent with its mandate, and
with relatively little discussion at the Convention itself, a Charter of Funda-
mental Rights is included in the Draft Constitution for the European Union."' 7
The Charter contains seven chapters:
1) Dignity;
2) Freedoms;
3) Equality;
4) Solidarity;
5) Citizens' Rights;
6) Justice;
7) General Provisions.
The Equality Chapter prohibits "any discrimination based on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion
13. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974).
14. Opinion 2/94, Re Accession of the Community to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759,2 C.M.L.R. 265,291 (1996). See also Case
C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, 1 C.M.L.R. 993 (1998).
15. DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING CONSTIrTTON art. 6. See also Re Accession by the Community,
1996 E.C.R. at 265 (discussing that the ECJ ruled that absent Amendment to the treaty, the European Union
lacked competence to accede to the Convention).
16. NORMAN, supra note 3, at 19.
17. Draft Treaty establishing Constitution art. I1-1-52.
or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority,
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.""
The Draft Constitution's Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union
incorporates fifty paragraphs enumerating extensive rights including a "right to
life" (with the death penalty proscribed); a "right to respect" for "one's physical
and mental integrity" (including a ban on the sale of human body parts); a "right
to respect" for "private and family life"; a "right to the protection of personal
data"; a "right to marry"; a "right to conscientious objection"; the "freedom to
hold opinions"; a right "to form and join trade unions"; a right "to have access
to vocational and continuing training" and the right "to receive free compulsory
education"; a "right to engage in work"; a right for children to "express their
views freely" and to have those views "taken into consideration"; "rights of the
elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence"; a "right of persons with
disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence"; the
"right of access to a free placement service" for employment; the right of
workers' and employers to take "collective action"; and the "right to paid mater-
nity leave and to parental leave."' 9 "Sexual equality is to be ensured in all areas,
but so is the government's ability to allow 'advantages in favor of the under-
represented sex.'
20
Although a few countries, including France, Germany, Denmark and
Sweden, have accepted the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the document is not
without controversy. Some member states have been very vocal with their
apprehension. For example, initially Great Britain was reluctant to accept the
Charter as an integral part of the Constitution in part because it might be used
to overturn recently enacted labor legislation.2 Great Britain then proposed that
the Charter not be a legally binding document but a declaration of the rights of
European citizens.22 However, the U.K. ultimately accepted incorporation of
the Charter with the additional assurances23 that its provisions would apply to
member states only when they are implementing Union law. Further, in a bow
to state autonomy, the Charter is to be interpreted consistent with constitutional
provisions of member states. In addition, at the meeting of member states in
2004, the U.K. succeeded in having a new paragraph inserted into the text
18. Id. at art. -21.
19. Id. arts. 1-2-1-52; see also Edward Rothstein, Europe's Constitution: All Hail the
Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at B9.
20. See Rothstein, supra note 19.
21. Press Release, Scottish Parliament, European Committee Questions 'Diluted' EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (Feb. 7, 2001), available at http://www.scottish.partiament.uk/nmCentre/news/news-
comm-01/ceu0l -00 .htm.
22. Id.
23. NORMAN, supra note 3, at 89.
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concerning the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It states that
the "explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given due regard by the Courts
of the Union and the Member States."24 These explanations were drawn up
during the Charter drafting process in 2000 and were enlarged and modified
during the Convention. They were intended to provide some guidance concern-
ing which rights are merely aspirational and which are intended to be binding
and to provide some parameters for certain rights. A special Declaration has
been added to the treaty which includes texts of the Explanations in full.
25
However, it is not at all clear how the ECJ will treat the Declaration.
Now more than fifty years after the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, it
seems clear that the time has come for a Bill of Rights for the European Union.
Certainly, the experience of the United States can provide guidance. While
originally thought of as unnecessary and possibly even dangerous, the United
States Bill of Rights has proven to be pivotal in protecting rights and keeping
the government on course. Clearly, the incorporation of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights in the Draft Constitution will have important long term effects,
particularly as the Union moves into areas not contemplated in the Treaty of
Rome.
24. THE CHARTER art. 11-112, § 7.
25. See U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY ESTABLISHING
A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/White%2OPaperTreaty%20establishing%20a%2OConstitution%20for
%20Europe.pdf.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether or not the U.S. should ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention)' has been
debated since the treaty was concluded in 1982. UNCLOS itself is one of the
most significant achievements in international law in the Twentieth Century.
The Convention consists of 320 articles and eight annexes. It is comprehensive,
if not definitive, in its treatment of ocean usage. A hallmark of UNCLOS is the
balancing of interests between coastal states and other maritime users. From the
perspective of living marine resources such as fisheries, for example, UNCLOS
offers a balance between the conservation and utilization of those resources.
Without a doubt, UNCLOS contains numerous provisions addressing matters
of the marine environment.
This article attempts to highlight in very broad strokes some of the key
issues surrounding U.S. accession to UNCLOS, particularly with respect to the
marine environment. It is neither a comprehensive review of the treaty provi-
sions pertaining to the marine environment nor an exhaustive discussion of the
law and politics of the advice and consent process as it presently stands in the
U.S. Senate. With this parameter in mind, it is instructive to begin by
* Howard S. Schiffman, J.D., LL.M., is Clinical Assistant Professor and Director of the M.S.
Program in Global Studies at New York University, Center for Global Affairs. This article is a revised
reproduction of oral remarks presented at the American Branch of the International Law Association
International Law Weekend, October 2004, New York, NY, United States.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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understanding the context of this most recent attempt at the codification of the
modem law of the sea.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF UNCLOS:
THE NEED FOR A BETTER TREATY
The need for a more comprehensive treatment of ocean space became
apparent after the four 1958 conventions (produced by UNCLOS I) did not
establish a sufficient legal order of the oceans. Although these treaties added
considerably to the ocean governance of the time, they were not entirely
successful because they were unable to fix the breadth of the territorial sea.
Following the inability of the 1960 conference (UNCLOS II) to improve
on the 1958 agreements, specifically the lack of agreement about the limit to the
territorial sea, in 1970 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2570
calling for a new conference (UNCLOS III) to produce a comprehensive treaty.2
From 1973 to 1982, multiple rounds of negotiation produced the bundle of com-
promises that is UNCLOS. The growing concern for the marine environment
of the 1970s was reflected in various parts of UNCLOS. The most significant
of which is Part XII entitled, "Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment." Numerous other provisions express concern for conservation
and sustainable use of resources. Of course, the marine environment was just
one of several aspects of ocean governance addressed by the Convention. Other
key aspects include allocation of maritime zones, delimitation of maritime
boundaries, navigation and overflight, mineral exploitation, marine scientific
research, recognition of authority to exercise prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction, the settlement of disputes and many others.
III. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF UNCLOS AND ITS OBJECTIVES
The most basic goal of UNCLOS is to divide the ocean into maritime zones
that more or less allocate the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and
other maritime users in those zones. Unlike its predecessors, UNCLOS adopted
a limit to the territorial sea. The territorial sea, out to a maximum of 12 nautical
miles, is adjacent to a state's coastline. It is that part of the ocean where the
coastal state enjoys its greatest rights for applying its prescriptive and enforce-
ment jurisdiction, providing for its defense, exploiting its marine resources and
protecting its marine environment. In addition to the territorial sea, UNCLOS
provides for coastal states to have an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to a
maximum of 200 nautical miles. In the EEZ, the coastal state has considerable
authority to provide for the exploration, conservation, and utilization of
resources. In the EEZ the coastal state specifically has jurisdiction to protect
2. See R. R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 16 (3d. ed. 1999).
and preserve the marine environment.3 From the standpoint of fisheries, the
regime of the EEZ is significant not only because it allows the coastal state to
determine the allowable catch limits in these waters,4 but also because many
living marine resources are found within 200 miles of a coastline. Perhaps most
importantly, the regime of the EEZ allows coastal states to use their prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction to address a variety of environmental concerns in
what amount to wide sections of the ocean.
Apart from the allocation of maritime zones, some of the provisions
generally directed to the environment include Article 194, which requires states
to take action to prevent, reduce and control pollution. Article 195 requires
states to act so as not to transfer "damage or hazards" from one area to another.
UNCLOS addresses marine pollution originating from land-based sources, 5 sea-
bed activities,6 dumping,7 the ordinary operation of vessels,' and the atmos-
phere. 9 In addition, Articles 65 and 120 favor the conservation of marine
mammals, cetaceans in particular, over their exploitation.
A particular innovation of UNCLOS is its dispute settlement mechanism.
The dispute settlement provisions found in Part XV are flexible and can lead to
binding decisions. Part XV creates a tribunal, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which is dedicated to the interpretation and application
of UNCLOS. Under Part XV, UNCLOS members are permitted to designate
certain enumerated dispute settlement options should disputes arise with other
UNCLOS parties.
IV. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE AND PRESENT RATIFICATION STATUS
Understanding the U.S. history with the Convention is a useful starting
point to address the potential impact of the treaty on any number of maritime
uses. Although the U.S. participated in UNCLOS negotiations and achieved
many of its goals in those negotiations (most particularly with regard to navi-
gation and overflight rights for military vessels and aircraft), the U.S. ultimately
resisted ratification because of the perceived effect of Part XI governing the
deep sea-bed. Article 136 declares the resources of the deep sea-bed to be "the
common heritage of mankind."' This provision implied an obligation to share
3. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 56(b)(iii).
4. Id. art. 61(1).
5. Id. art. 207.
6. Id. art. 208 & 209.
7. Id. art. 210.
8. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 211.
9. Id. art. 212.
10. Id. art. 137.
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deep sea-bed resources in a manner that was objectionable to the U.S. and other
developed states. Despite this, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that the
bulk of the substantive provisions of UNCLOS would be applied by the U.S. on
a provisional basis.
In 1994, in a separate agreement addressing the concerns of developed
states, a compromise was reached on access to deep sea-bed resources. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton signed this additional agreement and transferred it, along with
the main text of UNCLOS, to the Senate for Advice and Consent. The Senate
did not act on UNCLOS until 2003.
In October 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings
on U.S. ratification. All of the testimony taken by the Foreign Relations
Committee favored U.S. membership. Among the witnesses were John F.
Turner, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs of the State Department, and Roger Rufe,
President of the Ocean Conservancy. These witnesses highlighted some of the
ways in which UNCLOS contributes to the stewardship of the marine environ-
ment.' In March 2004, the Foreign Relations Committee ordered UNCLOS
reported to the full Senate. This included the attachment of 24 declarations and
understandings to accompany U.S. ratification.
At about the same time, the Environment and Public Works Committee
held additional hearings on UNCLOS. The stated purpose of these hearings was
to include some voices opposing U.S. ratification of the Convention.1 2 The
opponents emphasize the surrender of decision-making ability to the Sea-Bed
Authority provided for in Part XI and its accompanying agreement as well as the
potential impact of decisions by the ITLOS on U.S. activities. 13 In support of
the latter concern, it should be noted that even though the U.S. does not intend
to designate the ITLOS as a method of dispute settlement there are certain
circumstances under which it might still be subject to its jurisdiction.
As of November 2004, the full Senate had not yet voted on the question of
ratification, however, the proposed declarations and understandings of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 many of which address environmental
concerns, are worthy of review. At the outset, it is useful to recall that because
of the highly coordinated and integrated nature of its provisions, UNCLOS
11. The statements of these witnesses can be found at the. following website:
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrg03 1021 a.html (visited Nov. 13, 2004).
12. See Senator James M. Inhofe, Opening Statement, United States Senate Oversight Hearing to
Examine the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (March 24, 2004),
http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=219593.
13. See Frank Gaffhey, Jr., President and CEO, The Center for Security Policy, Statement at the
United States Senate Oversight Hearing to examine the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea"
(March 24, 2004), http://epw.senate.gov/hearingstatements.cfin?id=219549.
14. S. EXEC. DOC. No. 108-10, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (2004).
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specifically prohibits reservations." 5 On the other hand, UNCLOS does permit
a state, when signing, ratifying or acceding, to make "declarations or state-
ments" with a view to the harmonization of its domestic laws with the Conven-
tion. 6
V. PROPOSED DECLARATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS
AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
The most substantive declaration proposed by the Senate addresses the
U.S. option for dispute settlement under Part XV. In this declaration, the U.S.
designates a "special arbitral tribunal" to hear disputes arising from the
Convention related to:
1) Fisheries;
2) Protection and preservation of the marine environment;
3) Marine scientific research; and
4) Navigation,
including pollution from vessels and by dumping. This type of declaration is
perfectly permissible under Article 287(1) of UNCLOS. For all remaining
disputes, the U.S. opts for arbitration. Arbitration is not only an option under
Article 287(1) but is also the default method of dispute settlement under the
treaty.
7
Another declaration proposed by the Senate that affects the environment
emphasizes the right to impose and enforce conditions for the entry of foreign
vessels into U.S. ports and internal waters. This declaration is specifically
directed at the introduction of alien species from ballast water discharge as well
as oil spills. In a similar declaration, the U.S. expresses the understanding that
UNCLOS supports the authority of a coastal state to regulate the introduction
of alien species into the marine environment. Another declaration emphasizes
the right of the coastal state to determine allowable catch limits of living
resources in its EEZ and to establish terms and conditions for access by other
states to those resources. This same declaration expresses the understanding
that these determinations are not subject to binding dispute resolution.
Still, another declaration asserts that Article 65, the UNCLOS provision
pertaining to conservation and management of marine mammals, lends direct
support to the present moratorium on commercial whaling and the establishment
of sanctuaries and other conservation measures. The same declaration also
asserts that states must cooperate with respect to all cetaceans not just large
ones. This declaration is a clear reference to the work of the International
15. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 309.
16. Id. art. 310.
17. Id. art. 287, paras. 3 & 5.
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Whaling Commission (IWC) although it does not identify the IWC by name.
To understand the context of this declaration, the moratorium on commercial
whaling, which has been in effect since the mid-i 980s, has come under assault
in recent years by pro-whaling states that find no basis in law for the
continuation of the moratorium. Furthermore, the reference to "all cetaceans"
not just large whales speaks to an ongoing debate in the IWC: that is, whether
or not the IWC is competent to regulate small cetaceans (i.e., dolphins and
porpoises) as well as the great whales. The effect of this declaration will likely
be to lend greater U.S. support to the efforts of the IWC which today has a
solidly conservationist agenda.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
By most accounts, U.S. ratification of UNCLOS will have a positive effect
on the environment. This is not because the U.S. will be binding itself to any
new substantive norms. On the contrary, most substantive provisions of
UNCLOS are already part of U.S. policy and have been for many years.
Despite this, the conservation of ocean wildlife, the protection of delicate
marine ecosystems, and the control of marine pollution are by their very nature
multilateral issues. U.S. ratification will demonstrate U.S. commitment to
address these problems in a cooperative manner at a time when some view U.S.
policy as generally antithetical to multilateral arrangements. The environmental
community strongly favors UNCLOS and U.S. ratification would send a
message of support.
Among the benefits the U.S. will receive from UNCLOS membership is
the ability to have a judge of U.S. nationality serve on the ITLOS and the right
to participate in the amendment process of the treaty as provided for in Article
312. The power to amend the treaty is vested in the parties 10 years after the
treaty has entered into force.18 The 10-year anniversary was November 16,
2004. The U.S. would be entering the game just as amendments become
possible. Admittedly, the question of amendment to such a comprehensive legal
instrument is fraught with difficulties, but U.S. membership ensures that any
future amendments will only be adopted when the U.S. is a full participant in
the process.
The U.S. has a golden opportunity to take a more respected leadership role
in ocean governance by embracing a treaty that offers a meaningful, if imper-
fect, framework for ocean governance. Even though the U.S. has already
proven its commitment to the marine environment and willingness to work both
independently and with responsible partners to achieve environmental goals,
U.S. ratification will highlight those objectives in international affairs. U.S.
18. Id. art. 312.
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ratification will energize and elevate the status of UNCLOS in international law.
Undoubtedly, the marine environment would be an immediate beneficiary of
U.S. participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION-AVOIDING HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
When the prisoner abuse scandal in Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Iraq,
broke in the Spring of 2004, Lord Lester, a British Parliamentarian, submitted
a written parliamentary question to the U.K. government asking the following:
[W]hether the Coalition Provisional Authority or the Coalition Forces
are required by law to respect the fundamental human rights of Iraqi
people, as defined in the bill of rights contained in the transitional
administrative law for Iraq or otherwise; and if not, what recourse is
available to the people of Iraq for breaches of those rights by the
Authority or the forces.'
Baroness Symonds, a U.K. Foreign Office Minister, responded, stating
that:
[t]he Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the coalition forces
as occupying powers in Iraq are required to conduct themselves in
accordance with the rules of international law, which includes
* Lecturer, University College London, University of London; ralph.wilde@ucl.ac.uk. My warm
thanks to Axelle Lemaire and Virginia Mantouvalou for research assistance. This article is a revised
reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20-22, 2004.
1. Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Iraq: TransitionalAdministrative Law andHuman Rights,
House of Lords, Written Answer to Lord Lester, Hansard Vol. 661, Part No. 80, Columns WA9 - 10, question
HL2545 (May 10, 2004).
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respecting the human rights of the Iraqi people. The CPA and the
coalition are also responsible for upholding the law of the land, which
until a new constitution has been agreed by the Iraqis is the Transit-
ional Administrative Law (TAL). We take very seriously any allega-
tions alleging breaches of human rights. Iraqis will have recourse to
the Iraqi justice system for any infringements of their rights in the
TAL. For incidents relating to U.K. personnel, it is standard practice
for an independent investigation to be undertaken ifthere is any doubt
as to whether the appropriate rules of engagement have been adhered
to. If an investigation concludes that there was wrongdoing on the
part of U.K. personnel, appropriate disciplinary measures will be
taken, including criminal proceedings where necessary.2
Baroness Symonds invokes the "law of the land" somewhat ambiguously
as far as its applicability to the CPA and coalition forces is concerned, but even
if this law is applicable, judicial remedies in Iraq involving the application of
this law to particular cases are barred because of the jurisdictional immunities
granted to the coalition in Iraq under CPA Order No. 17,' which like other CPA
Orders continues in force in the post-CPA period under the Transitional Law.4
As then acting U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand
Ramcharan described this regime of immunity during the CPA period: "[i]n
effect, there is immunity for Coalition Forces personnel for any wrongful acts,
including human rights abuses, committed in Iraq as far as Iraqi jurisdiction is
concerned."5
Baroness Symonds also mentions "the rules of international law, which
includes respecting the rights of the Iraqi people." But which areas of inter-
national are being invoked here? In particular, does Baroness Symonds mean
only international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict), or also
international human rights law?
Although both the United Kingdom and the United States are parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),6 neither state
2. Id.
3. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 17, Section 2, CPA Doc. CPA/ORD/27 (June 17,
2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ (last visited April 9, 2005).
4. Law ofAdministration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, Arts. 2, 3, 26 (March
2004), at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/governmentfTAL.html (last visited April 9, 2005).
5. Bertrand Ramcharan, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Report, The
Present Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, E/CN.4/2005/4 (2004), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/hchr/docs/iraql .pdf (last visited April 9, 2005).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23,1976. The United
States ratified the ICCPRon June 8, 1992; the United Kingdom ratified the ICCPR on May 20, 1976 [hereinafter
ICCPR ratifications], at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr-ratify.htm (last visited April 12, 2005).
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appears to have entered a derogation to the Covenant and the United Kingdom
has not entered a derogation to the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR) with respect to its presence in Iraq from 2003.7 The derogation
provisions of the two instruments enable states parties to temporarily suspend
the operation of certain rights obligations in times of war or other public
emergency. 8 If the ICCPR and the ECHR were applicable to these states in Iraq,
one would imagine that the United States and the United Kingdom would regard
the entering of some kind of derogation as required in order for them to carry
out some of the activities considered necessary in a situation of military occupa-
tion and ongoing hostilities, for example prolonged detention of enemy comba-
tants without trial.
In fact the states concerned do not appear to consider their obligations in
these treaties to be applicable to their presence in Iraq at all. According to a
secret memo prepared for the Department of Defense in March 2003 and leaked
in June 2004, "[t]he U.S. has maintained consistently that the Covenant does not
apply outside the U.S. or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and that
it does not apply to operations of the military during an international armed
conflict." 9 Here, then, applicability is rejected on two alternative bases; in
reverse order, these are: (1) subject matter-the ICCPR does not apply to
operations of the military during international armed conflict; and (2) territorial
-the ICCPR does not apply to the United States outside its territory.
The United Kingdom rejects applicability of the ECHR on different
grounds. Adam Ingram MP, the U.K. Armed Forces minister (equivalent to a
senior government official in the U.S. Department of Defense), wrote to British
Parliamentarian Adam Price MP on April 7, 2004 in the following terms:
The ECHR is intended to apply in a regional context in the legal
space of the Contracting States. It was not designed to be applied
throughout the world and was not intended to cover the activities of
a signatory in a country which is not signatory to the Convention.
The ECHR can have no application to the activities of the U.K. in
Iraq because the citizens of Iraq had no rights under the ECHR prior
to the military action by the Coalition Forces. Further, although the
U.K. Armed Forces are an occupying power for the purposes of the
7. Supra, note 6, at art. 4; see also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 22 1, as amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994
[hereinafter ECHR].
8. See, e.g., Brogan v U.K. (1988) 11 E.H.R.R. 117 ECHR (discussing this area of law).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATION (2003), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf (last
visited April 9, 2005).
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Geneva Convention, it does not follow that the U.K. exercises the
degree of control that is necessary to bring those parts of Iraq within
the United Kingdom's jurisdiction for the purposes of article 1 of the
Convention. 10
A similar position seems also to have been taken by the United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary (equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of State), Jack Straw MP."
Here, then, we again have two alternative arguments for non-applicability, but
of a different character. The first argument is a variant on the territorial
argument put forward by the United States: that the ECHR only applies in the
territory of contracting states. This does not necessarily rule out applicability
to a contracting state acting outside its territory (as the U.S. argument does), so
long as that state is acting in the territory of another contracting state. The
second argument focuses on the degree of control exercised: Ingram seems to
assume that a certain degree of control, aparrently over territory ("those parts
of Iraq"), is required for the Convention to apply to the U.K. extraterritorially,
and asserts that such a situation does not prevail in Iraq.
This article considers whether these views on inapplicability are
sustainable. It is divided into two parts based on the two U.S. reasons for
rejecting the application of the Covenant: (1) the "wartime" situation in Iraq;
and (2) the extraterritorial nature of Iraq as far as the United States and the
United Kingdom are concerned. 2 The analysis in the second part will require
an analysis of the two U.K. arguments.
10. The Rt. Hon. Adam Ingram MP, Ministry of Defence, Letter to Adam Price MP (on file with
author).
11. The U.K. Foreign Secretary made the following statements in a Parliamentary Written Answer
to parliamentarian Sir Menzies Campbell MP on 17 May 2004: "[t]he government's position is that ECHR
rights have no application in Iraq." Jack Straw, Written Answer, House of Commons, 'European Convention
on Human Rights,' 17 May 2004, Hansard Vol. 421, Part No. 87, Columns 674W-675W. In a later written
answer to Sir Menzies, the Foreign Secretary made the following statement in relation to the applicability of
the ECHR to the United Kingdom in Iraq, invoking by contrast the situation in Turkish-occupied northern
Cyprus, which the European Court of Human Rights had found engaged Turkey's responsibility under the
ECHR: "[T]he citizens of Iraq had no rights at all under the ECHR prior to military action by the coalition
forces; furthermore, the United Kingdom does not exercise the same degree of control over Iraq as existed in
relation to the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus."
Id. at Part No. 89, Column 1083W. For an example of a case concerning northern Cyprus before
the ECHR, see Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 11 IIHRL 112 ECHR.
12. There are other potential reasons why states might consider international human rights law not
to apply extraterritorially. These include situations where the acts in question are not imputable to them but
to a separate juridical entity, for example on the grounds that the entity performing the acts has been "placed
at the disposal of" a third state for the purposes of the acts in question. See, e.g., Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
the Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at art. 6, UN Doc. A/56/10 ( 2001).
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II. APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN WARTIME
We begin our consideration of the applicability of human rights law with
the question of the relevance of the "wartime" situation in Iraq which renders
international humanitarian law applicable.13 It might be thought that humani-
tarian law, on the one hand, and human rights law, on the other, are mutually
exclusive in terms of the situations in which they apply. When one area of law
is in play, the other is not, and vice versa. Humanitarian law applies only in
times of "war"; human rights law applies only in times of "peace." Whereas
indeed the first contention is correct, the second runs counter to a basic
understanding of human rights law. 4 In the Coard case of 1999 concerning the
detention of an individual by U.S. military forces during the 1983 U.S. invasion
of Greneda (which deposed the revolutionary government instituted following
the assassination of the Prime Minister), 5 the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights stated that:
while international humanitarian law pertains primarily in times of
war and the international law of human rights applies most fully in
times of peace, the potential application of one does not necessarily
exclude or displace the other. There is an integral linkage between
the law of human rights and humanitarian law because they share a
"common nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of
protecting human life and dignity," and there may be a substantial
overlap in the application of these bodies of law. Certain core
guarantees apply in all circumstances, including situations ofconflict,
and this is reflected, inter alia, in the designation of certain protec-
tions pertaining to the person as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and
obligations erga omnes, in a vast body of treaty law, in principles of
customary international law, and in the doctrine and practice of inter-
national human rights bodies such as this Commission. Both
normative systems may thus be applicable to the situation under
study.' 6
The applicability of human rights law in times of war is assumed by the
aforementioned derogation provisions of human rights instruments. Of course,
13. On the rights of individuals in international humanitarian law, see the main treaties in this area
of law. See, e.g., DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1989).
14. On the relationship and overlap in applicability between humanitarian law and international
human rights law, see, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case No. 109/99, Report No. 109/99, Annual Report of
the IACHR (1999) [hereinafter Coard case].
15. See id. at paras. 1-4.
16. Id. at para. 39.
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a valid derogation by a state is not the same as the non-applicability of that
state's human rights obligations. In the first place, the state must make a formal
declaration of derogation."7 In the words of the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
this "requirement is essential for the maintenance of the principles of legality
and rule of law at times when they are most needed."' 8 Moreover, only those
derogations necessary to meet the needs of the war, and proportionate to that
need, are permissible.' 9 As the Human Rights Committee stated in relation to
the obligations under the ICCPR, "even during an armed conflict measures
derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the
situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation. 20
Even if a broad series of derogations meet this test, certain obligations are
incapable of any derogation, including the obligation not to commit torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.2 ' It follows, then, that in all
circumstances, both wartime and peacetime, there will always be a core set of
human rights obligations in play, operating in tandem with the obligations under
humanitarian law.
As the International Court stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion (reaffirmed in the Wall Advisory Opinion) in relation to the ICCPR,
"the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant
whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national
emergency., 22 Thus the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that:
[t]he Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which
the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in
respect ofcertain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international
humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the
17. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 15(3); see also CCPR, supra note 6, at art. 4(3).
18. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/lI/Rev.6 at 186 (2003)
[hereinafter General Comment 29].
19. Supra note 17.
20. Supra note 18, at para. 3.
21. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 15(2); ICCPR supra note 6, at art. 4(2).
22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 1.C.J. 226 (July 8), at para. 25,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm (last visited April 13, 2005); see also
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J., at para.
105 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2004/ipresscom2004-
2_summarymwp_20040709.htm (last visited April 13, 2005).
interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are comple-
mentary, not mutually exclusive.
It is notable that none of these statements make a distinction, as the U.S. memo
extracted above does, between international and non-international armed
conflict.
It might be asserted that human rights law has no place in a wartime
situation. In such a situation, different considerations prevail and to consider
the niceties of human rights one would respect in peacetime is to misunderstand
the needs of the battlefield. In part, this is an argument for total war-that no
standards should operate on the battlefield at all. Such an approach would do
away with much of the laws of war. If, however, one accepts the premise of
humanitarian law-that military necessity must sometimes be trumped by
certain basic standards-then this particular objection to human rights law falls
away. The question then becomes whether the restrictions placed on the state
during wartime by human rights law strike the correct balance between the need
to preserve order and the need to safeguard human dignity. If one examines the
law in this area, one sees if anything a somewhat generous latitude accorded to
states when the derogation provisions of human rights instruments are
interpreted by human rights bodies, especially under the European Convention
through the invocation of a broad "margin of appreciation" involving deference
to state's own decision as to what restrictions on rights are necessary to respond
to threats to public order. If, then, the application of international human rights
law is not somehow excluded by the wartime context in which some of the
activities discussed in our study take place, is it excluded because these
activities occur extraterritorially, as the U.S. memo suggests in the alternative?
III. APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
EXTRATERRITORIALLY
Most human rights treaties do not conceive state responsibility simply in
terms of the acts of states parties, as is the case, for example, in Article 1 of the
third Geneva Convention (on the treatment of prisoners of war), in which
contracting parties undertake "to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances." Instead, responsibility under most human
rights treaties is conceived in a particular context: the state's jurisdiction. The
23. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on
States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2I/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment
31 ]. In its earlier General Comment 29, the Human Rights Committee made the following remark: "[D]uring
armed conflict, whether international or non-international, rules of international humanitarian law become
applicable and help, in addition to the provisions in article 4 and article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, to
prevent the abuse of a State's emergency powers." Supra note 18, General Comment 29, at para. 3.
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state is obliged not merely to secure the rights contained in the treaty, but to do
so within its "jurisdiction."'  Thus, a nexus to the state-termed jurisdiction-
has to be established before the state act or omission can give rise to responsi-
bility.
The consistent jurisprudence of the main human rights treaty bodies and
the International Court of Justice has been to interpret the term jurisdiction
under human rights treaties so as to operate extraterritorially in certain circum-
stances.25 The second basis for rejecting the application of the Covenant offered
by the U.S. Department of Defense memorandum is, therefore, incorrect.26 The
key question is the precise circumstances in which jurisdiction operates extra-
territorially.
It is here that the United Kingdom rejects the operation of the ECHR to its
presence in Iraq, on two alternative grounds. In the first place, the United
Kingdom adopts an argument that echoes part of the dictum of the European
Court of Human rights in the Bankovi6 case relating to the NATO bombing of
the radio and TV station in Belgrade in what was then the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), now Serbia and Montenegro. In that case, the Court stated
that the European Convention applies "in an essentially regional context and
notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States. The
FRY clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of
Contracting States. 27
Taken out of context, we might read this dictum to suggest that a particular
action taken by one state in the territory of another state would not be governed
by the human rights treaty obligations of the first state, if the second state is not
also a party to that treaty. Under this view, although the concept of "jurisdic-
tion" under human rights treaties is not limited to a state's own territory, it is
limited to the overall territory of contracting states. So states acting outside the
territorial space of the human rights instrument are not bound by their
obligations in that instrument, thus excluding the ECHR from applying to the
United Kingdom in Iraq, and the Inter-American Declaration on Human Rights
from applying to the United States in Iraq.
24. See e.g. ECHR, supra note 7, at art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 2. Some obligations are
limited to the state's territory, see, e.g., Protocol No. 4 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (ETS No. 46), entered into force May 2, 1968, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/fall0l/intllaw/basicdocs/Protocol4.htm (last visited April 13, 2005).
25. See General Comment 31, supra note 23, at para. 10.
26. Many human rights treaties include a special clause allowing for the application of the rights
they contain to be extended to dependent territories. Whether such rights can also apply because of the
extraterritorial exercise of "jurisdiction" by the state concerned is beyond the scope of this paper; this question
is potentially mediated by the agency issue discussed supra note 12.
27. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), at para. 80.
However, a closer evaluation of the context of the Bankovid dictum
suggests that this reading is incorrect. In the first place, although out of context
it reads like a general statement of principle, in the context of the judgment it
is something quite different: a specific response to one of the submissions of
the applicants. The applicants had submitted that to find that the acts of NATO
states in the then FRY did not take place within those states' "jurisdiction" for
convention purposes would "leave a regrettable vacuum in the Convention
system of human rights' protection," a problem that the Court had seemed to
suggest it was trying to avoid in its earlier case Cyprus v. Turkey. The Court
chose to respond to this submission in terms of the specific type of vacuum in
protection that had prevailed in the Cyprus v Turkey case, a gap created where
a population reside in a state that is a party to the Convention-and have
therefore already been granted rights under it-but the state is unable to secure
those rights because the territory is occupied by another Convention state.
Clearly in situations like the then FRY in 1999, and Iraq today, this policy
consideration does not apply, because the populations affected did not already
have rights under the convention by virtue of their state being a party to the
Convention. The court was right to reject its application in the Bankovid case,
and would be right to reject it in any case on Iraq. To reject the application of
this particular policy basis for extending human rights obligations extra-
territorially is one thing, however; to say that such a basis has to prevail in order
for such obligations to apply is quite another. The United Kingdom seems to
suggest that it does, even though the Court's dicta in Bankoviddo not make this
assertion.
Quite apart from examining the Court was responding to when it made
these comments in Bankovi4 two further factors mitigate against the U.K.
position. In the first place, the Court's comments can be considered obiter dicta
given that the Court had already reached a conclusion that rendered the case
inadmissible, having concluded that the nature of the air strikes by NATO states
in the FRY did not render this territory under the jurisdiction of the states
concerned as far as the exercise of effective control was concerned.28
In the second place, other cases before the Court before and since Bankovid
have in fact found that states' Convention obligations can be in play in relation
to their activities in other states that are not parties to the Convention. One
things here of the Ocalan case, where the Court held that the actions of Turkish
agents in relation to the alleged abduction of Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya-not
a Convention state-took place within Turkish "jurisdiction" and similarly
declared admissible the Issa case brought against Turkey in relation to its
28. Id. at para. 75.
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actions in northern Iraq, the very country in relation to which the United
Kingdom insists its Convention obligations cannot apply.29
The U.K. argument is limited to the ECHR, and it is notable that of course
the United Kingdom is a party not only to the ECHR, but also, like the United
States, party to other human rights treaties and of course is subject also to
customary human rights law. One other notable treaty is the ICCPR. Here,
crucially, Iraq is also a party, and is thus, unlike with the Convention, part of the
espacejuridique of the Covenant.3" Even if one accepted the United Kingdom's
assertions about the inapplicability of the ECHR, then, clearly the same
assertions could not be made about the obligations of the United Kingdom and
the United States under the ICCPR.
However, the United Kingdom offers an alternative basis for rejecting the
application of the ECHR: that "those parts of Iraq"--presumably a reference
to the areas under U.K. military control-are not within the United Kingdom's
jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention, because the United Kingdom
does not exercise the necessary level of "effective control" over the areas
concerned. This argument is significant because it is potentially applicable to
human rights law generally, notjust the law of the European Convention. Thus,
even though the United Kingdom may have read Bankovidwrong, and that limb
of its argument fails, the second argument, if successful, would by itself render
all those areas of international human rights law conceived in relation to the
United Kingdom's "jurisdiction" inapplicable to Iraq.
One might be somewhat surprised to hear an assertion by the United
Kingdom that no part of Iraq is under its effective control; ultimately the answer
to this question depends on a detailed factual analysis of the level of control
asserted by U.K. forces in that country, something that is beyond the scope of
this article. However, even if the United Kingdom, despite having almost 9,000
troops in the country, does not actually exercise effective control over any part
of it, it is far from clear that the only basis on which jurisdiction can operate
extraterritorially for the purposes of international human rights law is in
circumstances where the state exercises effective control over territory. A
number of cases from the European Commission and Court of Human Rights,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights
Committee have actually established the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction
on the basis of a relationship between the foreign state, on the one hand, and the
individual or individual complainants, on the other.31
In the aforementioned 6 calan case, for example, in establishing the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction the Court makes no mention of any
29. Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), at para. 5.
30. See ICCPR ratifications, supra note 6 ( Iraq ratified the ICCPR on Jan. 25, 1971).
31. See Coard, supra note 14; see also Ocalan, supra note 27.
control over territory-effective or otherwise--on the part of Turkey, focusing
instead only on the actions of Turkish agents in relation to the individual
concerned.32 This conception of jurisdiction based on the exercise of control
over an individual rather than an area of territory is reflected in the U.N. Human
Rights Committee General Comment 3 1, on Article 2 of the ICCPR, which
states that the jurisdictional test in Article 2.1 "means that a State party must
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the
power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the
territory of the State Party., 33 It would seem, therefore, that the exercise of
effective control over individuals by the United Kingdom in Iraq would bring
those individuals within the United Kingdom's jurisdiction for the purposes of
its obligations under the ECHR and ICCPR, regardless of whether in a broader
sense the territory in which such control is exercised is also under U.K. control.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the suggestions being made by the United States and the United
Kingdom, we have seen that the obligations of these two states under the
ICCPR, and the obligations of the United Kingdom under the ECHR, continue
to apply to acts and omissions in Iraq insofar as such acts and omissions occur
in the context of the exercise of control by the state concerned over individuals
or territory. It is regrettable that suggestions are being made which challenge
the established position in international human rights law in a manner that
would attenuate the application of this law.
32. See Ocalan, supra note 29, at para. 93.
33. General Comment 31, supra note 23, at para. 10.
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